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Abstract
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the creative and generative capacities of a
group of savant artists. As savant talent has a higher prevalence in autism, a disorder
associated with deficits in imagination and creativity, it is surprising that one should
find savant ability in areas such as music and art. Despite the interesting paradox this
creates there has yet to be a thorough, empirical investigation into this area of savant
performance in artists.
The measurement of the concepts of creativity and generativity is alone a contentious
area in psychology; however, from the outset they were clearly defined for the
purpose of this thesis. Creativity is defined as the capacity to produce novel and
meaningful responses, whereas generativity refers to the amount, or quantity, of ideas
produced, irrespective of their originality. As the creative and generative capacity of
savant artists is a hitherto neglected area of research, this investigation began by
measuring this capacity in the domain of ability, using a standardised test where the
response was drawn. A second test looked at creative and generative performance on
a construction task with no drawn element. Subsequent investigations focused on the
processes thought to underlie performance on the initial two tasks, particularly
relating to the assets and deficits in the performance of the savant group, which may
have occurred as a result of their autism.
The results showed that a general autism-specific deficit was evident on tasks that
required generativity outside of the direct domain of drawing. On the other hand, in
relation to creativity, there were indications that such qualities were spared in the
savants on tasks not directly involved with drawing, although still in the visual
domain. These contrasting results are discussed in terms of a segmented visual
processing style in the savant artists and an autism-specific deficit with regard to the
generation of appropriate action plans.
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Chapter 1:
The Savant Phenomenon
1.1 SAVANT ABILITY: AN INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 The Nature of Savant Talent
The term idiots savants was first used by Down in 1887, to describe those individuals
with mental retardation, who demonstrated a particular ability in a specific area.
Recently this term has fallen out of favour, in part due to it's derogatory nature, and
also because it is factually inaccurate; the majority of savant cases showing an IQ
above the requisite 40. Indeed, recently the definition of savant has been expanded to
include not only individuals with lower than average IQ, but also those with
developmental disorders who have IQ scores within the normal range (Miller, 1999;
Young, 1995). Savant cases are also found to occur more in individuals with a
diagnosis of autism than in any other disorder (Rimland, 1978).
Ability, skill and talent
Inmuch of the literature on savant cases, terms such as ability, skill and talent are
commonly utilised yet rarely adequately defined. The first aim of this section is,
therefore, to present a discussion of the terminology that will be employed
throughout, beginning with ability. 'Ability' can be defined as those qualities, skills
and talents that enable an individual to achieve a certain level of performance at a
given time (Reber, 1985). The term ability thus pertains simply to the level of
performance that has been attained and can be displayed at a certain time, without
relating to any sort of inherent •talent' . The term 'skill' on the other hand, is often
associated with learning and practice. Reber (1985) defines skill as the capacity for
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carrying out complex, organised patterns of behaviour in order to achieve an end goal.
The concept of 'talent' is far more complex and has been hotly contested in
psychology for many years. Whereas the definitions of skill and ability imply that a
behaviour can be learned, talent is often seen as innate or inherent within an
individual. Winner (1996) for example, argues that talents are unlearned, domain-
specific traits that may be developed in favourable circumstances, but that cannot be
manufactured. Others have deftned talent as the potential for exceptional
performance, (Detterman, 1993; Feldman, 1988; Gardener, 1983) and as such it is
more difficult to measure than ability and skill, both of which can be objectively
assessed. Indeed, some have argued that the concept of talent is in fact a myth and
cannot exist, with high performance arising as a result of extensive practice (Howe,
1991; Howe, Davidson & Sloboda, 1998). While a review of the talent debate is not
relevant to this series of studies, a good overview is provided by Howe et al. (1998)
and the responses to their article. Furthermore, due to these intrinsic problems with
measurement of talent, the term savant ability is favoured throughout this thesis. It
should be borne in mind that some researchers have proposed that the very existence
of savant ability is evidence of innate talent (Rutter, 1998).
Talented and prodigious
The distinction between differing levels of savant skill has been noted by several
researchers; Treffert (1988) for example, distinguished between talented and
prodigious savant ability. In order to be considered a talented savant, he argues the
individual must possess a level of ability remarkable in comparison to their general
level of cognitive functioning. On the other hand, there are instances whereby the
level of skill an individual displays is remarkable, not only in comparison to the
17
individual in question, but also to the population as a whole. These latter individuals
possess what Treffert refers to as prodigious ability. Hill (1978), in accepting this
distinction, argues that only those with prodigious ability should be considered a
savant. Young (1995) however, extends Treffert's view further still to incorporate
splinter skills.
1.1.2 Cognitive Theories of Savant Ability
There have over the years, been a nwnber of attempts to conceptualise the outstanding
feats of these individuals. Early accounts, reviewed by Hill (1978) focussed on
sensory deprivation (Hoffinan, 1971), compensation (Lindsley, 1965) and abstraction
deficits (Anastati & Leeve, 1960; Nurcombe & Parker, 1964). While many of these
accounts have been widely disregarded over time, others have formed the basis for the
contemporary theories that will be discussed below. This overview does not aim to
cover all the theoretical accounts of savant talent, rather the intent is to provide an
introduction to the approaches relevant to the study of the savant artist. For a
comprehensive review readers are pointed toward Hermelin (2001), Miller (1999) and
Treffert (1989).
Extended practice
Howe (1989a, 1989b) maintains that, as with all instances of high level ability, the
majority of apparent savant ability is simply a manifestation of obsessive interest and
a high degree of practice. Certainly this might help account for the high rate of savant
ability found in individuals with autism, a disorder associated with repetitive and
obsessional interests (Wing & Gould, 1979). Nevertheless, while it is likely that
savants do spend a disproportionate amount of time practising (O'Connor &
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Hennelin, 1991) this explanation alone cannot account for the savant phenomenon.
Firstly, extended practice is a principle factor in the development of any high level
skill (Ericsson & Faivre, 1988). Furthermore as Winner (1998) argues, while practice
is necessary in the attainment of high level ability, it is not by itself sufficient. The
extended practice account also fails to explain sufficiently the manifestations of
'talent' which occur from a very early age and in the absence of training, for example
the artist Nadia, reported by Selfe (1977, 1983). Finally, it has been suggested that
the obsessional activity associated with savants is qualitatively different from that
practised by non-autistic experts. Trehub and Schellenberg (1998) refer to Lehmann's
(1997) three-factor model of high ability, arguing none of the factors; goal setting,
evaluation and feedback. are evident in savant activity. It appears then, as argued by
Waterson (1988), that savants practice because they enjoy the activity rather than to
improve their performance.
Rote memory
A number of explanations of savant ability have focussed on the outstanding memory
often shown (Hill, 1975; Lafontaine, 1974). Indeed, Tregold (1914) noted that a
considerable majority of the savants he investigated showed some sort of high level
memory ability. Selfe (1977, 1983) and Sacks (1995) have both highlighted the
capacity of savant artists to produce visually correct, complex artistic outputs. in some
cases several months after seeing the initial image. This ability was also subject to an
empirical investigation by Hennelin and Pring with Buhler, Wolff and Heaton (1999).
Interestingly a strong tendency towards rote memory recall has also been found in
autism in general (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967, 1970; Frith, 1989) and thus could
also explain the prevalence of savant ability in this disorder. While this explanation
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can account for the strong memory element often associated with savant ability, again
it does not provide a full explanation of the phenomenon. Miller (1999) identifies
three core characteristics of rote memory; that it results in a high-fidelity
representation of the original information, involves little reorganisation and is
primarily concerned with the physical aspects of the stimuli, resulting in an inflexible
and domain-specific output. While certain aspects of Miller's criteria are certainly
evident in savant ability in areas such as music, art and calendrical calculating, savant
output rarely consists of an exact replica of the original input. With regard to art,
such outputs often display a number of notable transformations that go beyond mere
memory omissions (Hermelin et al., 1999; Pring & Hermelin with Buhler & Walker,
1997; Sacks, 1995; Selfe, 1983). The types of transformations evident in art are
discussed more fully later in this chapter and in chapter 2. Further evidence against
the rote memory account can be seen in savant calculators (O'Connor & Hermelin,
1989) and savant musicians (Miller, 1987, 1989). It seems then that savant ability
involves both generative and flexible elements. Indeed Heavey and Colleagues
(Heavey, 1997; Heavey, Hermelin & Pring, 1999) found that savant calculating ability
results from a structured knowledge base, which is likely to have arisen through
exposure to calendar information rather than rote learning.
Segmentation
Until 1989, the majority of research into autism had focussed on the triad of
impairments (socialisation, communication and imagination) identified by Wing and
Gould (1979). In particular this research did not address the spiky IQ profile
associated with autism (see Happe, 1994a). Uta Frith (1989) argued that the deficits
and the assets associated with the performance of individuals with autism on tests
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such as the WISC (Wechsler, 1992) resulted from the same cognitive process.
Specifically, she argued that individuals with autism had difficulty in processing
information contextually; that is the drive for meaning that dominates normal.
everyday thought, is absent. In autism, instead of looking for global meaning,
processing is dominated by a focus on detail at the expense of overall gist. This can
explain the good performance of children with autism on the block design sub-test of
the WISC (Shah & Frith, 1993) and Shah and Frith's earlier (1983) finding of autistic
superiority on the children's version of the Embedded Figures Test (EFT; Witkin.
Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971). The central coherence account can also explain some
of the deficits associated with autism, such as the poor performance of autistic
children at correctly integrating homophones into sentences (Frith & Snowling, 1983;
Happe, 1997). Happe (1999) argues that weak central coherence is demonstrated at
several levels: perceptual, visuo-spatial constructional and verbal semantic. She
maintains that this processing style can also account for the assets found in autism
particularly within the first two levels.
A segmented processing style has been related to savant ability in a number of
domains. Firstly Hermelin and colleagues (O'Connor & Hermelin, 1987a; Hermelin,
Pring & Heavey, 1994) found that artistic savants were better able than controls at
reconstituting a visual display in the form of a picture puzzle. Initially they attributed
this superiority to the savant artists possessing a greater pictorial lexicon, however.
such performance is clearly similar to that displayed by autistic groups on the block
design task. In 1995 Pring, Hermelin and Heavey investigated this observation in
more detail. They found that savant artists were as able as normally developing
children, gifted at art, on an abstract block design task. What is more, in support of
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Shah and Frith's (1993) finding, the performance of the autism control group was also
above that of the non-gifted, normal controls. From such results, Pring et a1. (1995)
argue that a tendency towards segmentation may prove particularly adaptive to artistic
ability; a domain in which individuals are required to go beyond the usual constraints
imposed by Gestalt law, in order to isolate and emphasise component elements. In
support for this view, superior segmentation ability has been found in artists with no
cognitive or intellectual impairment (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976, O'Connor &
Hennelin, 1983; Pring et al., 1995).
Another area that could benefit from perceptual segmentation is music. It has been
argued that the presence of perfect pitch often found in accomplished musicians, and
all musical savants, may represent a type of auditory segmentation (Heaton, Hennelin
& Pring, 1998; Miller, 1989). Heaton et al. (1998) argue that whereas for normal
people global strategies tend to dominate perception, in music both local and global
strategies play an integral part. They suggest here that a tendency for local processing
might increase the salience of some surface pattern elements, such as individual
pitches.
As the discussion of both art and music have hopefully illustrated, a tendency toward
segmentation might constitute a building block for ability. One area which does not
immediately appear to be a perceptual ability in the way that music and art are, yet
which is also facilitated by a segmented processing style, is calendrical calculating.
Heavey et al. (1999) suggest that this ability may arise in part, due to savants
processing parts of the calendar individually through repeated exposure. Perhaps
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more interestingly they also found a correlation between block design score and
calculation span.
The segmentation explanation of savant ability is useful in that it not only provides
some reasoning as to the prevalence of such ability in autism, but can also account for
the manifestation of ability in the normal population. This supports points made
earlier, whereby it was stated that the knowledge structure underlying savant ability is
the same as that found in unimpaired individuals. Interestingly, this theory has clear
parallels with Rimland's (1964) high fidelity attention account of savant skills. This
suggested that savant syndrome arose due to a preferential processing system, which
places greater emphasis on the physical characteristics of stimuli rather than
meaningful aspects. However, as Heaton, Pring and Hennelin (1999) point out, the
existence of superior segmentation ability does not necessarily denote that a person
will develop a high level skill. They illustrate this point by describing the case of a
young boy with autism who, despite showing exceptional segmentation ability in a
number of tasks in the musical domain, exhibited no special musical competence.
This case study shows that although a segmented perceptual style may benefit savant
performance, alone it cannot provide a full explanation for it. As Heaton et al. (1999)
maintain, "any plausible account of the savant phenomenon has to include the notion
of inherent talent, however illdefined" (pp.50S).
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1.1.3 The Relationship with Intelligence
The fact that savant skill occurs against a background of cognitive impairment
naturally brings into question more traditional views that cognitive processing is
governed by a general processing capacity. Spearman (1904, 1927) for example,
argued that all intellectual activity was largely attributable to innate differences in •g'
that is general intelligence. The fact that individuals with either mental retardation or
developmental disorders are capable of such extraordinary feats has been cited as
evidence against this idea of a general intelligence (Howe, 19898, 1989b). Indeed
some have argued (Fodor, 1983; Gardener, 1983) that the existence of savant ability is
evidence for the modular nature of cognition. However, the relationship between
intelligence and savant ability is not as simple as strict modular theorists might
indicate. Despite the apparent independence of a general factor on savant ability, the
overall level of cognitive functioning possessed by an individual has been shown to
influence performance on some tasks. While this thesis does not aim to review how
savant syndrome fits in with current views of intelligence (for a review see Anderson,
1992, 1998; Nettlebeck & Young, 1996), it is important to outline the effect that
intelligence, as measured on standardised IQ tests, has on the manifestation of this
ability.
Miller (1999) reviewed the IQ scores and aetiologies of the individuals included in
most, if not all, published savant research. He found that where IQ had been formally
assessed, most participants fell into the "low normal" or borderline levels of
functioning, that is having an IQ of between 70 and 75. However, he also points to a
number of cases of exceptional ability in individuals in whom intelligence is un-
measurable, for example the child artist Nadia (Selfe, 1983). Miller refers to the
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doctoral thesis of Robyn Young (Young, 1995) in which a sample of 51 individuals
with a variety of savant skills, were investigated. The IQ range within this sample
was from 50 - 114 and it was reported that the majority of the savants seen to possess
prodigious ability had performance IQ's of 85 or above. Such a finding certainly
implies that, in some cases, a certain level of general intelligence is necessary for the
manifestation of truly exceptional skill. Similarly, IQ has been found to correlate
with performance in a number of studies. Firstly, Hermelin and O'Connor (l986a)
found that calendrical calculators with higher IQ's showed a wider range of
calendrical knowledge than those at the lower end of the IQ range. Likewise they
found that IQ significantly correlated with artistic accuracy, although no such
relationship was found regarding aesthetic merit (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1990).
Therefore, as Miller (1999) argues, although there are some well documented cases in
which individuals with severe retardation are found to display a level of ability way
above that found in the normal population, in the main there appears to be a
correlation between the degree of exceptionality shown and overall cognitive
functioning.
1.1.4 Savant Performanee: The Main Issues
As previously mentioned, the aim of this section was not to give a comprehensive
review of all the factors associated with savant performance, but rather to provide the
reader with an introduction to the pertinent issues that will arise throughout this thesis
in relation to the creative and generative capacity of artistic savants. For example, the
biological and genetic accounts of savant ability have not been covered (see Miller,
1999; Waterhouse, Fein, & Modahl, 1996 for a detailed review of these issues), nor
have the questions that savant ability poses for theories on intelligence in general (see
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Nettlebeck & Young. 1996). However, such issues were not deemed essential for the
understanding of the creative and generative nature of savant artists and readers have
been directed to relevant reviews throughout. More importantly this section has
identified a number of key issues and findings that will form the basis of the
following investigations. The first is the prevalence of savant ability in individuals
with autism. This finding has naturally moulded several of the cognitive theories
proposed to account for this phenomenon, namely obsessional practice and rote
memory. While neither of these theories can provide an adequate account of savant
ability, more promising is the segmentation approach proposed by Pring. Hermelin
and colleagues. As Heaton et al. (1999) rightly point out, while this account is not
without flaws, it does have the propensity to account not only for the prevalence of
savant ability in autism. but also for those abilities evident in the normal population.
Finally a brief summary was provided, outlining the influence that the level of
cognitive functioning may have on the these abilities. Here it was concluded that
while savant talent does occur in individuals independently of their overall level of
functioning, it does appear to place constraints on exactly how this ability is
displayed.
1.2 ARTISTIC SAVANTS: EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS
1.2.1 Descriptive Accounts of Savant Artists
Whereas the first section of this chapter sought to provide an overview to the relevant
issues surrounding savant ability, this next section aims to deal specifically with
previous studies with savant artists. Accounts of savants with a specific skill in the
graphic domain have appeared in the literature since the 1900's. Whilst not the most
prolific of savant skills (Hill, 1979). artistic ability is possibly the most commonly
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documented, at least in terms of descriptive accounts. One of the most well known
descriptions of this ability was provided by Selfe in her reports of child artist, Nadia
(Selfe, 1977, 1983). Diagnosed with autism when she was six years old, Nadia
possessed no language skills and poor comprehension, however, at the age of three
and a half years she developed an amazing capacity to draw. This drawing ability
apparently arose spontaneously, omitting the normal scribbling stage associated with
children's normal drawing development (see Thomas & Silk, 1990, for a review), and
she went straight on to drawing very sophisticated images, mainly of animals but also
including people, trains and other objects. She drew without regard to the edge of the
paper and never made mistakes or used an eraser. Perhaps more outstanding was that
she was able to generate these images from memory and, not only did these drawings
possess a unique style full of life and movement, but she was also able to add and
omit details and to rotate the original image in order to represent it from a different
perspective. Furthermore Nadia displayed the use of complex graphic strategies such
as linear perspective, foreshortening, occlusion and proportioning, which are not
usually apparent in artistic output until much later in life, all without any sort of
training.
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Figure 1.1: Church drawn from life. by savant artist ML
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1.2.2 Empirical Investigations
Controlled experimental research into the ability of savant artists was initiated in the
late 1980's, with the work of Beate Hermelin and Neil O'Connor. They began a
series of experimental studies, not only into the skills of savant artists, but also in
other areas such as music, language, arithmetic and calendrical calculating. In such
studies they attempted to isolate the component aspects thought to be related to
specific ability, or to talent in general. They then compared the performance of the
savant groups with IQ matched, non-talented controls or gifted individuals with no
cognitive impairments. In this way it became possible to identify whether
performance was a result of the overall level of cognitive functioning or associated
with a specific ability. An example of a savant artists work is shown in figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Still life by savant artist TM
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Memory
A number of the descriptive reports outlined previously have mentioned the
outstanding visual memory possessed by savant artists (Sacks. 1986. 1995; Selfe,
1983; Tregold, 1952). It thus follows that the initial investigations undertaken by
Hennelin and O'Connor should begin by focussing on this topic. Comparing the
performance of five savant artists. three of whom had a formal diagnosis of autism,
with a control group closely matched on diagnosis, IQ and age, O'Connor and
Hermelin (1987a) presented participants with a variety of simple memory tasks,
involving both recognition and reproduction of concrete and abstract drawn shapes.
It was found that the memory of the savant group was superior to that of controls only
on tasks involving reproduction, but not on those requiring recognition. That is the
performance of the savants was comparable to the IQ matched control group on a
short term memory matching task, yet it was superior when the task involved a drawn
response. such as reproduction of a complex figure and of concrete and abstract line
drawings from memory.
The results of this study, therefore, do not provide any support for the observation that
savant artists possess a superior visual memory to their IQ matched control
participants. However. whilst overall the savant artists were not found to differ from
controls. the finding that only tasks with an output of drawing distinguished savant
performance warranted further research. 0' Connor and Hennelin (1987b) compared
the performance of the savant group with a group of talented child artists (matched
mental age to chronological age) and a non-talented. IQ matched control group. In
this task they attempted to directly compare recognition and reproduction
performance by presenting participants with a variety of analogous tasks. Memory
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was assessed either by a drawn output, matching or recognition. Here again it was
found that recognition performance, and also visual matching, were determined by IQ.
However, as with the previous study, when drawing was required the performance of
the savant group was found to be equal to that produced of child artists.
At first glance this result might seem unsurprising, after all we would expect that
those with a gift for drawing would be better at tasks where the response is drawn.
However, it does indicate that motor control is a primary skill in the talent of the
savants; what is more, the relationship between this motor output function and
performance is not as simple as first implied. In particular the question arises as to
how the reproduction memory of the savant group is superior to their controls, while
this memory ability is not evident on the easier recognition tasks. A simple answer to
the above question is that recognition tasks are easier, hence the performance of the
non-talented control groups improves to the level of the savant group. However, the
results of such studies show that this is not the case, on the contrary, the performance
of the LDC group tends to remain constant throughout conditions while, by
comparison, the savant group show noticeable improvements on tasks requiring
drawing. The role of motor operations then became the focus of subsequent studies.
Motor operations and manual dexterity
Following these results O'Connor and Hermelin (1990) proposed an alternative
suggestion for the observations that savant artists are able to produce their outputs in
the absence of direct visual stimuli, despite not displaying superior short term
memory. They suggested that drawing ability might depend on an encoded motor
programme, operating independently of visual memory. Here they looked at visual-
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addition as the control group, with the only significant difference being that the savant
group made less errors of omission. That the non-talented control group left out more
details in their responses, might be less indicative of memory ability and more a result
of their lower drawing ability; that is they added less features because they could not
draw them, rather than because they could not remember them. In contrast, however,
Hermelin et al (1994) showed there was no difference between the savants and their
controls on a simple pencil and paper task. What is more, in the 1990a study, the
error pattern was not repeated on reproduction following tactile presentation,
indicating that the non-talented control group might have been relying more strongly
on memory schema, rather than perceptually based memory.
Memory schemas and segmentation
The influence of memory schemata on the performance of savant artists is one that
has also received attention. In dealing with artistic ability it has been suggested that
good artistic performance arises from drawing what is seen rather than what is known
(paine, 1981). It is therefore interesting that savant ability should be more common in
a disorder which, as discussed, is related to a contextually independent processing
style. The beneficial effect that such a processing style might have on artistic
technique is illustrated by an example from Pring et al.'s (1997) paper. They point
out that if a student in art school is instructed to draw a chair, their response will often
be visually wrong. This is because their conceptual knowledge of what is known of
the chair (i.e. it comprises of right angles) will interfere with the perceptual image.
However, should the student be instructed to draw the spaces between the chair, the
output is more accurate. This, Pring at al. (1997) argue, is because the spaces
between the chair have no conceptual value thus are free from any preconceived
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kinaesthetic matching and reproduction, again using two control groups; non-talented,
IQ matched participants and talented child artists. The above suggestion that drawing
ability may depend on the conversion of visual input into a motor output, was
supported in a number of studies. It was found that the performance of the savants
was equal to the gifted children at visual to kinaesthetic tracing, but only to the level
of the non-talented controls at visual recognition. Again, the reproduction
performance of the savants was found to be determined by their talent. From this
study O'Connor and Hermelin concluded that the graphic skill of the savants was
related to superior output ability, rather than a particularly defined perceptual input.
Following on from the above finding, the nature of this motor control was the subject
of investigation, specifically whether savant superiority was evident only on pencil
and paper tasks, or if this was found this was a general ability. Hennelin, Pring and
Heavey (1994) confirmed that, the savant group was better than the IQ matched
controls at recalibrating complex visual feedback with motor ability, as evident on a
mirror drawing task, and perceptual-motor control in 3-D space. Such results indicate
that savant motor control is not simply related to simple pencil and paper operations.
An intrinsic problem naturally arises when comparing performance of talented
individuals with non-talented, learning disabled control groups on drawing tasks.
This relates to the level of manual dexterity possessed by the two separate groups. It
might thus be that the savants are better at tasks involving reproduction, simply
because they are more able to add detail to their responses. This suggestion gains
some support when the error rates on O'Connor and Hermelin's (1990) reproduction
task are looked at. Here, the savant group made as many errors of distortion and
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schemas regarding what a chair should look like. Art teachers refer to this as
'negative'space.
The use of memory schemata in savants, in relation to artistic ability, was investigated
by Pring and Hermelin (1993). They investigated whether savant artists used
perceptual or semantic processing strategies. Despite finding no support for the idea
that savant artists may sort and store information perceptually rather than
semantically, they did find that the savants used similar strategies as the gifted control
group. This supports previous studies with calendrical calculators and musicians
(Heavey et al., t 999; Miller, t 989; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1989), in which the
organisational structure of savants' knowledge was identical to their talented, normal
counterparts. In this case it was found that the savants, like the talented art students,
all used semantic strategies for retrieval in both a matching task and a reproduction
task.
Having now established that both artistic savants and talented, young, normal artists
recall information semantically, it is how they perceive this information which
becomes the next focus of investigation. Indeed in the example given earlier in
relation to how art students were taught the correct procedure for drawing a chair, the
onus was on how the image was perceived. It has been shown that savants organise
information semantically, but this does not necessarily denote that they perceive this
information contextually in the fist place. In the earlier discussion of how a
segmented processing strategy related to autism might facilitate savant ability, Uta
Frith's work on central coherence was mentioned. Many of the investigations into
this processing style were based on how information was initially processed. For
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example, in the children's EFT a measure of central coherence was gained by looking
at how well the participants were able to identify a simple shape within a larger
meaningful picture (Shah & Frith, 1983). Further to this Jarrold and Russell (1997)
found that children with autism did not take account of canonical patterns when
counting. Finally, it was found that children with autism did not perceive visual
illusions (Happe 1996, however, for an alternative account see Ropar & Mitchell,
1999,2001) possibly as a result of failing to see the image in terms of the contextual
biases that produce the illusionary effect.
Previous studies (Hermelin et al., 1994; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1987a) have
highlighted the skill of savant artists at reconstituting partial or fragmented images
into a global whole, a process similar to that described by Shah and Frith (1983).
Pring et al. (1995) investigated this segmented processing style in relation to artistic
ability and the effect of context. Here they presented a group of savant artists and
their autistic controls, as well as a group of talented art students and their non-talented
controls, with both the abstract block design test and also a meaningful picture puzzle
made of blocks.
Pring et al. (1995) found that both normal art students and the savant artists possessed
a segmented processing style, as evidenced by their facilitated performance on block
puzzle tasks. However, while the art students were able to use both perceptual and
semantic, or contextual, cues to aid performance the savant group appeared to rely
heavily on simple perceptual cues. This resulted in their performance only reaching
the level of the non-talented, normal controls on a meaningful condition, despite being
equal to the normal artists on the abstract task. This finding indicates that a cognitive
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style that emphasises the contextually free, segmented processing of visual
information might aid artistic output and is also apparent in gifted artists in general
(Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1979; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1986b; O'Connor &
Hermelin, 1983; Pring et al., 1995). However, as illustrated in the Pring et al. (1995)
study. these non-autistic artists are able to use both perceptual and semantic cues to
aid performance.
A similar view was adopted by Mottron and Belleville (1993, 1995) in a number of
case studies with the artistic savant EC. Rather than looking at the effect of meaning
and context on EC's art work, they focussed on his attention to detail and the lack of
global precedence in his artistic technique. They observed that like Nadia, EC was
able to reproduce highly detailed pictures with good perspective and perfect
proportions, as well as showing an ability to draw images from unusual points of
view. Also like Nadia, it was noted that EC never used an eraser to amend his
drawings and was able to draw perfect lines and circles without the use of any
drawing equipment. Mottron and Belleville (1993) noticed that when EC began to
draw he did not start, as is usual, with a global outline, rather he started his drawing
with minor features. In support of previous findings (Hermelin, Pring & Heavey,
1994; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1987a; Pring, Hermelin & Heavey, 1995) EC
performed up to the level of professional, adult, draftsmen on jigsaw puzzle tasks and
a fragmented picture task. From subsequent studies investigating his perceptual
hierarchy, Mottron and Belleville (1995) found that, although EC was able to process
information globally, that is to perceive the whole picture, this did not dominate how
he perceived visual images in the way that it does in normally functioning individuals
(Navon, 1977). This unusual perceptual hierarchy, they suggested, might account for
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EC's detailed drawing style and his ability to depict exceptionally precise visual
images, because he is not subject to global, or semantic, interference thus allowing
greater local accuracy. Mottron and Belleville (1993) did not compare the
performance of EC to groups of non-talented autistic or IQ matched controls, nor did
they utilise a talented control group on all of the tasks; as such it is difficult to
ascertain how much of this processing style is related to his diagnosis of autism or to
his artistic ability. However, despite such flaws these results do support previous
findings outlined previously, adding further weight to the suggestion that an unusual
perceptual style might in part, account for the prevalence of savant artistic ability in
autism. Interestingly, Mottron and Belleville suggested that EC's perceptual style
might be the causal factor in a phenomenon commonly seen in savant artists, the
ability to portray linear perspective.
Linear perspective and domain-specificity
The ability of savant artists to portray linear perspective in their art work has been
commonly noted (Mottron & Belleville, 1993, 1995; Selfe, 1977, 1983; Young,
1995). Gombrich (1988) argues that, along with the abandoning of perceptual size
constancy, linear perspective is a key feature in drawing. Mottron and Belleville
(1995) investigated this ability in the savant EC. They found that although he was
able to depict realistic perspective in his outputs, he did not make use of the oblique
or linear projection systems taught in art schools (Farber & Rosinski, 1978), as
evident in the observation that he does not maintain parallelism or use vanishing
points in his work. Mottron and Belleville (1995) argue that EC's ability to draw
realistic perspectives, more accurately than trained draftsman arose due to his
idiosyncratic perceptual organisation. They suggest that EC does not experience the
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normal conflict between what is seen and what is known about a visual image. Thus,
rather than using a consciously planned strategy, his ability was in part due to his
visual realism. Mottron and Belleville's (1995) suggestion that a lack of perceptual
hierarchizaton may facilitate artistic accuracy by sparing perceptual representations
from top down processing, was also adopted by Costall (1997).
The ability to portray linear perspective was the subject of an empirical investigation
by Hermelin and Pring (1998). They found that when asked to draw the image of a
road with three cars at varying distances, all eight of the savant artists tested were able
to portray linear perspective and size constancy. Interestingly, they were not able to
replicate this ability in a construction task, when presented with two or three
dimensional components. While at first this finding may seem at odds with the lack
of a linear projection system reported by Mottron and Belleville (1995), it should be
noted that they were referring to the lack of a single vanishing point, in a complex
image. This differs from the simple image required in Hermelin and Pring's (1998)
study; here only the point where the two road borders converged was investigated and
not the vanishing points of the cars added to the picture.
1.2.3 Summary on Artistic Savants
Savant artists have received much attention over the last two decades and descriptive
accounts of these individuals have often highlighted how this artistic ability arises in
the absence of any special training. A strong memory element is also often apparent
in their art work. Empirical investigations into this apparent memory ability have
shown that superior memory is only evident in the savant group on tasks that involve
drawing. The results of these early studies seemed thus to indicate two things, firstly
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the domain-specific nature of savant artistic ability and secondly, the importance of
motor ability or manual dexterity here. It was suggested that in savant artists, visual
stimuli may be directly encoded into a motor programme and thus bypass visual
memory. Further investigation into the manual dexterity of savant artists indicated
that superior motor ability was not confined solely to pencil and paper, drawing tasks,
but that the savants also displayed superior manual dexterity in three-dimensional
space. A number of studies have indicated the artistic knowledge of savant artists is
organised in the same way as it is in other talented artists with no cognitive
impairments and also that they organise and recall semantic information in a similar
way as is evident in the normal population. However, while the savant artists
perceive visual information comparably to artists in general, this differs from how
information is processed in individuals with no artistic ability and they show a bias
towards perceiving information in a segmented form. To conclude, it appears that in
many respects, the artistic ability shown by savant artists is domain-specific and only
really evident in their artistic outputs. Nevertheless, there are several skills that are
evident in tasks that do not require a drawing response. Skills such as superior
manual dexterity and the ability to recalibrate visual information into a motor output,
along with a processing style that favours a possible context independent, segmented
perception of visual stimuli, can thus be seen as primary factors in savant ability.
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Chapter 2
Autism, Savants and the Generativity Question
The previous chapter provided an overview of the theoretical background of savant
abilities, along with a review of the empirical studies conducted into the ability of
savant artists. From this overview, despite a lack of consensus on the basis of savant
ability, there is one unequivocal finding that stands out, the prevalence of savant
ability in the autistic population. Indeed the segmentation account of savant talent is
based around Frith's central coherence account of autism (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe,
1994) and the relationship between the deficits and assets found in autism, suggested
by Happe (1999). There has yet to be a comprehensive account of the deficits
associated with autism. Other than the central coherence account cognitive
explanations have focussed on executive deficits (see Russell, 1997, for a review) or a
lack of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985).
Meanwhile, recent advances have highlighted a likely genetic basis for this complex
disorder (Bailey, Le Couteur, Gottesman, Bolton, Simonoff, Yuzda, Rutter, 1995;
Maestrini, Paul, Monaco & Bailey, 2000). For a review of current theoretical and
biological approaches to autism, see Lord and Bailey (2002).
Despite the lack of an overall consensus regarding the cause of autism, the pattern of
behaviours associated with the disorder have been well documented, in particular the
triad of impairments initially highlighted by Wing and Gould (1979). It is somewhat
surprising then, that despite the generative and imaginative impairments so clearly
evident in the behaviour of individuals with autism, savant ability occurs in areas
associated with these very processes. In order to investigate this fascinating paradox a
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number of issues must first be addressed. First and foremost the terminology as it will
be used throughout this thesis must be defined, second the relevant empirical
investigations into the generative capacity of individuals with autism must be
identified. Third, there will be a review of the creative abilities, as defined here,
found in autistic savants. This review will then conclude with a discussion of the
current methodological approaches to the measurement of creativity.
2.1 CREATIVITY AND GENERATIVITY: THE DEFINITIONS
The area of creativity, despite having interested the academic community for many
decades, is one that has been widely overlooked in terms of scientific study. The
majority of introductory text books and cognitive psychology texts rarely provide
even a cursory review of this area, illustrating the difficulties that the area of
'creativity' has in being recognised as a valid psychological concept. Finke, Ward
and Smith (1992) argue that this is due to unscientific connotations and difficulties in
the development of an acceptable model to explain the creative process. Certainly,
one of the biggest problems faced by researchers wanting to test creativity in an
acceptable manner, results from the lack of a suitable definition. The difficulty in
providing a workable definition perpetuates the problem of measurement, with the
authors relying on the assumption that the reader has a general understanding of terms
such as 'creativity' or 'imagination'. This lack of definition contrasts with cognitive
processes such as memory, which have been defined, tested and redefined for
decades. Such cognitive based studies generally introduce the topics with
comprehensible definitions of the areas that will be discussed, such that the reader is
given a clear indication of the what is actually being investigated. When compared to
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the lack of a functional defmition in creativity research one can easily see the types of
problem encountered when embarking on research in this domain.
2.1.1 Creativity: Providing a Workable Defmition
Creativity:
"the mental processes that lead to solutions, ideas,
conceptualisation, artistic forms, theories, or products
that are unique or novel"
(Penguin dictionary of psychology; Reber, 1985, pp.In)
To provide a detailed review of the various accounts of creativity which have been
proposed over the last century is way beyond the scope of this thesis and, more
importantly, irrelevant to the study of savant artists undertaken here. For instance,
many accounts of creativity written during the middle of the last century focussed on
equating people historically seen as creative artists (painters, writers and the like) with
certain personality traits (Gardner, 1994, Koestler, 1964, Vernon, 1970). Others have
focussed on historical periods in society (Martindale, 1994) or on the study of genius,
creativity in individuals with very high IQ's (Eysenck, 1995; Getzels & Jackson,
1962). The following investigation of the savant artist does not aim to compare how
'creative' the savant is compared to the artistic community or the population as a
whole. Nor is the intention to cast any aspersions on how creative their artistic
output is, as Vernon maintains "these are matters of aesthetic criticism or theoretical
evaluation" (1960, pp.9), although attempts are made to equate performance on
empirical tests to the spontaneous output of this group of artists. The objective of this
series of experiments is to investigate whether this group of savant artists share any
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cognitive processes with normal individuals gifted at art or if their performance is
more similar to that which would be expected as a result either of their autism or their
general level of functioning. As such, much of the plethora of literature into this area
is simply not relevant and any theories that may be are presented at the end of this
chapter and where of importance throughout the experimental chapters. What is
necessary. is that a workable definition of creativity as it will be used throughout the
thesis is presented, however. as will now be evident, this in itself is no easy task.
Creative products
Despite the difficulties researchers have encountered in the past, in providing a
general definition for creativity. a number of feasible attempts have been made to do
so. Eysenck (1994) identifies four components of creativity; the product, the process,
the person and the situation, and his model is a good starting point for this discussion.
Firstly a number of definitions have focussed on the creative product or response.
Baron for instance, defmes creativity as the "ability to generate new and unusual
ideas, often by combining existing information in novel and unusual ways" (Baron,
1989, pp.620). This emphasis on the generation of something new or novel was also
accepted by Boden (1994) and Finke et al. (1992) amongst others. Boden (1994)
does point out, however, that in order to be truly creative the product or idea must be
meaningful. that is it must make sense and fulfil a goal or an aim, as such creativity
has often been measured in the context of problem solving. Certainly the creative
nature of the product or response. is of utmost importance in creativity research.
especially when one adopts the view that the only way of testing creativity is by
looking at the final manifestation. be that an idea or a concrete product. In terms of
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the definitions outlined above this manifestation must be thus, both novel and
meaningful in order to be considered creative.
Creative processes
Next are the definitions that emphasise the creative process. Clearly the two concepts
are inextricably linked, as evident in Baron's definition which also refers to the
process of combining information in different ways. However, researchers who focus
on the process by which creative products arise are less interested in the final outcome
and more in how this came to be. As such they tend to centre on the process of
creativity in normal individuals, rather than those with a particular ability. The upshot
of this being that creativity research is not solely restricted to the domain of the
talented or accomplished. Early views on the creative process focussed on the
association between separate ideas (Mednick, 1962; Wallach & Kogan, 1965).
Interestingly, Wallach and Kogan saw the essence of the creative process to be
contained in productivity and uniqueness, two related but not indistinguishable
concepts. Newell, Shaw and Simon (1962) on the other hand, equated creativity with
problem solving. They saw problem solving could be considered creative as long as it
satisfied one of four criteria; that the initial problem is vague and undefined, the
product has novelty value, that the thinking is unconventional, that it requires high
motivation and persistence.
Perkins (1981) distinguishes between being creative and the process of creating.
While he sees creativity as linked to the traits that an individual might posses, his
concept of creating is similar to recent accounts of the creative process in normal
individuals. Creating is seen as going beyond what an individual is able to do
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effortlessly and Perkins sees it to involve four moves; planning, abstracting, undoing
and making means into ends. As such he views creating as involving thinking,
rethinking, amending and a preoccupation with the final product, again illustrating the
link between the process and the product. A more recent model was proposed by
Finke et al. (1992), who define the creative process as consisting of two distinct
phases, generation and exploration. The resulting 'Geneplore' model identifies a
number of processes related to each of these phases and is very similar to that outlined
by Perkins (1981). In the generative stage Finke et al. (1992) propose that one
constructs pre inventive structures that are generated, regenerated and modified
through the course of the exploratory stage, and that ultimately result in the creative
product.
In this thesis the focus will be on both the creative product and the creative process,
without dealing with the person or the situation. As such the definition of creativity
proposed by Vernon (1989) appears to encapsulate the aspects we are referring to in
particular. Vernon refers to creativity as a person's capacity to produce new or
original, ideas, inventions or artistic products, which are accepted by experts as being
of scientific, aesthetic, novel or technical value. Such a definition refers to both the
process and the end product.
2.1.2 Generativity: How Many Ideas can be Produeed?
A second term that will be used throughout this thesis is that of generativity. The
expression generativity has been used in a number of recent studies, especially those
looking at creative ability or imagination in autism (Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1996;
Jarrold, 1997; Turner 1999). Unlike creativity, this term is often used as it is seen as
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more psychologically testable and can be viewed simply as the process by which an
idea or behaviour arises, irrespective of how novel that idea is. Therefore, whereas in
creativity the onus is on the creation of something new, in generativity the onus is on
the generation of something. For this reason studies which look primarily at the
amount, or type, of ideas which can be produced tend to use the term generativity
rather than dealing with the negative psychological connotations that arise when using
the term creativity. Indeed when looking at generativity, quite often the novelty of an
response can also be measured by looking at how unusual it is, compared either to the
group in question or the general population as a whole.
2.1.3 Creativity and Generativity: A Quality, Quantity Distinction.
The distinction between creativity and generativity is a useful one and one that will be
used throughout this thesis. As such generativity is often equated with the overall
nwnber of responses produced, that is the quantity of responses, without any inference
on the creative nature or quality of these ideas. Creativity. on the other hand, is
concerned with quality and the unusualness of a response or an idea. As mentioned
before, in this study of individuals with learning difficulties no asswnptions will be
made concerning the historical creativity of the ideas that will be produced. Rather,
the processes that might allow these individuals to overcome the impairments
associated with their disorder, a disorder that predicts impairments in both the creative
and generative domain, will be investigated. The distinction made here, between
creativity and generativity, can be seen as being very similar to the productivity.
uniqueness distinction mentioned by Wallach and Kogan (1965) earlier.
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2.2 AUTISM, CREATIVITY AND GENERATIVITY
One term not referred to so far in this brief introduction, and one that does not
concern this thesis outside of this introduction area, is 'imagination'. The Penguin
dictionary of Psychology defines imagination as "the process of recombining
memories of past experiences and previously formed images into novel constructions"
(Reber, 1995, pp.359). Clearly this definition is very similar to those previously
proposed for creativity and indeed the two processes are inextricably linked. In the
wider realm, however, imagination does not necessarily require the formation of an
entirely novel output (despite Reber's definition) and is often used to denote the
consideration of something which is not physically present (Karmiloff-Smith, 1990;
Leevers & Harris, 1998; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996). It follows then, that if an
individual has difficulty in imagining a 'non-present' entity they will no doubt have
difficulty in producing a creative response. As such throughout this thesis the term
creativity, rather than imagination, is preferred due to the emphasis in this term on the
creation of a novel response.
Despite the interest and resulting empirical investigations into the socialisation and
communication deficits found in autism, as well as non-triad behaviours and islets of
ability, the imagination deficits associated with this complex disorder were widely
overlooked until very recently. Even now the number of published papers on other
areas far outnumbers reports regarding creative or generative ability and this may
reflect the previous psychological climate with regard to such investigations. This
imbalance does mean that an important area of functioning in autism, with particular
relevance to savant ability, has been widely neglected. Initial studies into this area
tended to focus almost exclusively on the area of pretend play, as it was recognised
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that the play engaged in by children with autism was qualitatively different to that
shown by other children of the same mental age. Rather than engaging in pretend
play the autistic children would engage in stereotyped or repetitive behaviours (Wing.
1978). they produced less spontaneous pretence than IQ matched controls (Baron-
Cohen, 1987) and did not appear able to produce creative pretence (Atlas, 1990).
Deficits have been found in both the quality of pretend play produced by children
with autism (Riguet, Taylor, Benaroya & Klien, 1981) as well as the quantity (Jarrold
et al., 1996).
Early investigations
Early explanations for the lack of imaginative or creative play of autistic children
focussed on the mentalizing impairments thought to be at the centre of 'theory of
mind' deficits. Leslie (1987) claimed that pretend play was metarepresentational in
nature because it involved representing how another person sees the world. The
failure of autistic children to produce pretend play was thus seen to be due to an
deficit in constructing and manipulating metarepresentations, that is alternative
representations of the world. There are, however, a number of flaws in this account.
Firstly, a number of studies have shown that with explicit instructions and under
controlled conditions, children with autism are able to produce or understand pretence
(Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1994a; Lewis & Boucher, 1988) not in keeping with
Leslie's prediction of a global deficit here. Jarrold et a1 (1996) extended these
findings. and attempted to overcome previous methodological weaknesses. They
concluded from a number of studies that the deficits in pretend play were executive in
nature. What is more, the pivotal impairment was seen to be a generativity deficit, in
that the children with autism were impaired in their ability to generate spontaneous
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pretend play rather than a global deficit in understanding pretence. This idea was
expanded by Jarrold (1997), who argues that the lack of spontaneous pretence was not
due to an impairment in inhibiting the correct use of the object in order to generate a
new use, (for example using a banana as a telephone) as children with autism were
able to do this in a controlled situation, following training.
Studies of generative abilitv
A deficit with regard to the generation of ideas has also been highlighted on tasks
outside the domain of play. One paradigm often used in assessing the generative
capacity of individuals with autism is word fluency. Classic word fluency tasks
require the individual to name as many words as possible belonging to a particular
category (Lezack, 1995) and have been used with a variety of subject groups. The
results in autism have been inconclusive, with several studies indicating a deficit
(Minsew, Goldstein, Muenz & Payton, 1992; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988; Turner,
1998) whereas others report that the performance of autistic groups was equal to that
of their IQ matched controls (Minshew, Goldstein & Seigel, 1995; Scott & Baron-
Cohen, 1996). While these fluency tasks do measure generative ability in that they
assess the amount of ideas that can be produced in a given period, they can be
criticised in that they only measure a participant's ability to trawl a verbal lexicon in
order to retrieve appropriate examples. As such these word fluency tasks provide us
with little information as to the generative processes utilised by individuals. This last
point was raised by Boucher (1988), who was interested in the processes by which
responses were generated and who suggested, supporting Jarrold et al.'s (1994a)
conclusion, that a generativity deficit might be pervasive in autism. Boucher (1988)
found that children with autism performed equally to an IQ matched control group on
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a categorical word fluency task, but were significantly worse than controls when told
to name as many miscellaneous words (i.e. "name me all the words you can think
of'). Boucher concluded this was due to the autistic group's failure at generating a
self-cueing strategy and similar results are also discussed by Jarrold (1997) and
Turner (1997, 1999).
Further support for a pervasive generativity deficit in autism is provided by a set of
studies conducted by Turner (1997,1999) who also looked at this generativity deficit
in terms of an executive impairment. Turner presented participants with a variety of
fluency tests in the visual, verbal and drawing domains and investigated whether the
poor performance of individuals with autism on generative and creative tasks was due
to an inhibitory impairment or a generativity deficit. One task used by Turner (1999)
was the object uses task (Christensen, Guildford, Merrifield & Wilson,1960; Getzels
& Jackson, 1962, Wallach & Kogan, 1965), where participants are required to name
as many uses they can think of for a common everyday object such as a brick. This
task had previously been used by Scott and Baron-Cohen, (1996) who reported no
difference between children with autism and their IQ matched and mental age
matched control groups. However, the low response rate produced by all groups in
this study could indicate that the task demands were too high for individuals of such a
young age or low IQ. Turner not only used older individuals of a wide range of IQ's
but she also extended the study by presenting participants with both conventional
objects (such as a brick) and non-conventional objects (such as a piece of material).
The use of conventional and non-conventional objects allowed Turner to investigate
the cause of any poor performance. So, if participants produced a number of repeated
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responses this would be indicative of a low-level inhibitory impairment, in that the
participants were unable to inhibit their previous response, resulting in high rates of
perseveration. A high-level inhibitory impairment would be evident in a high
percentage of redundant responses, that is responses of the same semantic category.
On the other hand, if the performance of the autistic groups was better in the non-
conventional condition than the conventional, this would indicate a deficit in terms of
inhibiting the most common associations of the object in question. Again Turner
found evidence of an overriding generativity deficit with regard to the number of
responses produced by the autistic participants. Interestingly she found that it was
only the control participants who showed superiority on the non-conventional
condition, where as the autistic group did not show this bias. An autism-specific,
fluency deficit was also indicated on the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking
(Torrance, 1974) by Craig and Baron-Cohen (1999) this result is discussed in more
detail in chapter 3.
Similar fluency results to those reported above were also obtained on the other
measures used by Turner. In the pattern meanings task (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) the
autistic group produced significantly fewer responses than controls and in the Design
Fluency task (Jones-Getman & Milner, 1977) they produced significantly fewer
acceptable responses with more repeats, although their overall fluency score was
equal to controls. Such results indicate a problem in the monitoring of action plans
and this is particularly evidenced by the high error rate, particularly on the design
fluency task. Turner argues that this is because individuals are not required to
generate a complete action plan before they begin, rather they need to constantly
monitor their behaviour throughout their response. In terms of executive dysfunction
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Turner suggests that a lack of generativity and impaired inhibition are two sides of the
same coin. She argues that in a situation that provides few cues for how to respond,
the transition from one activity to another means one activity must stop whilst another
begins. However, an inhibitory impairment alone cannot account for the pattern of
results produced on such tasks, nor can an impairment in monitoring, as indicated by
the low error rates on tasks such a word fluency. It is worth noting, however, that
although a useful task for assessing generative ability in terms of the amount of
responses produced, these word fluency tasks do not require the participant to produce
new or novel responses. For this reason they cannot be considered tests of creative
ability, it may be that word fluency tasks provide enough cues for participants not to
have to monitor their behaviour. Therefore this generativity deficit is only evident on
tasks that require the participant to go beyond stored knowledge.
If a generative deficit is at the heart of the imaginative impairments found in autism,
what is the cause of this? Jarrold (1997) proposes a model of executive control based
on Shallice and colleagues' Supervisory Attentional System (SAS; Norman &
Shallice, 1986; Shallice, 1988, 1994; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). This model suggests
that a limited capacity system (the SAS) provides conscious control over action
selection, including inhibitory and excitatory control processes. The model can be
split into three distinct levels; action scheduling, activation and inhibition, and goal
selection and representation. A dysfunction at any of these levels could result in a
generativity deficit. but Jarrold (1997) argues that the main impairment is due to a
deficit at the highest level, that of goal representation and selection. He argues that in
autism, goals are poorly represented in the SAS and as such control signals are poorly
specified. Thus. as goals are poorly represented, adequate plans cannot be generated.
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behaviour cannot be monitored effectively and deficits in overall inhibitory control
will also occur. Further support for this model can be seen in a number of the studies
previously discussed, in particular, the monitoring, inhibitory and generativity
impairments highlighted in Turner's study. A deficit at this level can also account for
why, given the right environmental cues, individuals with autism are able to produce
behaviours such as pretend play (Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1994b; Lewis & Boucher,
1988). Moreover, as suggested by Turner (1999), when there are no cues available to
guide behaviour, then no behaviour can be generated. Finally an earlier study
conducted by Russell, Jarrold and Henry (1996) indicates the locus for problems in
goal selection rather than goal representation and specifically monitoring. Support for
this view also comes from the fact that the only executive tests in which individuals
with autism are constantly found to be impaired is the Tower of Hanoi or the similar
Tower of London task, (Ozonoff, 1997), both tasks specifically measuring planning
ability and require the generation and monitoring of appropriate goal states and plans.
What is more, it is suggested that this inability comes from a lack of ideas, or a
paucity of goals, rather than an inability to translate goals into action (Turner, 1995).
Autism and creativitv
The review of work so far has tended to focus on generative ability. This may be
because generativity, as defmed here, can be measured in absolute terms (that is the
total number of responses) where as quantifying creative ability is far more difficult.
What is more, studies of the type described above can be viewed in terms of current
theoretical models, thereby allowing different processes to be distinguished in an
attempt to highlight a primary cause. The question can thus be raised, if individuals
with autism are inferior in the quantity of responses they can produce, are they
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similarly impaired with regard to the quality of response? The imaginative or creative
capacity of individuals with autism has been measured in a number of studies, Scott
and Baron-Cohen (1996) used a methodology previously employed by Karmiloff-
Smith (1990) to look at the ability of individuals with autism at drawing impossible
pictures. They found that the children with autism were less able than controls on this
task, thus were less creative. Unlikely to be a result of a deficit in fusing objects
together (see Craig. Baron-Cohen & Scott, 2001) they concluded in line with the
metarepresentation deficit hypothesis (Leslie, 1987) that the difficulties that autistic
children have on this task resulted from problems in the representation of unreal
objects. Therefore results were interpreted in terms of an imagination deficit.
Leevers and Harris (1998) replicated the Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996) study but
reduced the executive demands by presenting children with a basic outline, which the
children were then required to add details to. They found that not only were the
children with autism able to produce as many correct responses as the controls, but
also that many of the responses produced by the autistic group were considered very
imaginative or creative. Leevers and Harris (1998) concluded that the deficit reported
by Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996) on this task occurred in the generation of action
plans for drawing unfamiliar pictures, rather than difficulties in generating novel
responses. Again this fits in with Jarrold's (1997) hypothesis, in that a deficit in goal
selection could disrupt the planning necessary to complete a novel response,
especially if this results in non-specific action schemas. Thus when the task demands
were reduced and the planning necessary to complete the task was lessened the
autistic group were as able as the controls.
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Could it be the case then, that the key problem autistic individuals have is in the
generation of responses rather than the creative nature of these responses? While the
results obtained by Leevers and Harris (1998) do provide some support for this view,
they did not measure creativity specifically, indeed when studies have aimed to
empirically test this dimension the results have not been positive. Turner (1999)
included a measure of creativity in her studies and found that contrary to the
suggestion above, the autistic group were less able to produce unusual or novel
responses that controls. As the tasks used by Turner did not have standardised
scoring guidelines or norms available, she measured creativity or imagination by
looking at whether the response took into account all of the stimulus characteristics in
a plausible fashion. She found that the responses produced by the autistic group were
less creative than those produced by the controls on both ideational fluency tasks (the
pattern meanings and the object uses). Similarly Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996)
found that even though the response rate was very low, the mean number of creative
responses produced by the children with autism was below that produced by the
control group.
In keeping with the above findings Lewis and Boucher (1991) reported that although
children with autism were able to produce drawings of the same technical level as IQ
matched controls, the art work produced by the group with autism showed less
thematic variation. They concluded that the autistic group felt constrained by what
they felt they were able to draw, but this conclusion can be criticised as it is unlikely
that given the equal performance of the groups in terms of ability, the autistic group
should feel more constrained than controls. It might thus be that the lack of thematic
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variation is evidence of a generativity deficit in producing a variety of different or
flexible responses. possibly related to an executive deficit.
In explaining the lack of creativity outlined above. further reference can be made to
Jarrold's (1997) model. Jarrold states that initiation of appropriate action plans is
possible if the external stimuli are strong enough to guide behaviour. This model then
predicts that in situations where novel responses are necessary. where there are less
environmental cues. the overall number of responses will be fewer and when
responses are produced they are often the most common ones.
Summary: Autism and generativity
To summarise. a deficit in imagination and creative behaviour is one of the triad of
impairments thought to characterise autism and forms part of current diagnostic
criteria (DSM-IV. American Psychiatric Association. 1994). However. despite ifs
importance. this area is one that has been widely overlooked in research. Early
studies tended to concentrate on children with autism's failure to generate pretend
play, focusing on mentalizing impairments, while later work in this area has
highlighted a primary problem of generativity. An overall deficit in generating
behaviour has also been found to discriminate the performance of individuals with
autism in areas other than play. This generativity deficit can be seen in terms of an
executive impairment and in particular it has been suggested that this is because
individuals with autism have difficulties in selecting and representing goals. While
there appears to be much evidence concerning a pervasive generativity deficit in
autism. any conclusions regarding creative ability are less clear. Indeed several tests
have indicated that given the correct environment or when the task is non-verbal,
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individuals with autism are able to produce novel or inventive responses. However,
the results of studies that have attempted to measure behaviour in novel situations,
without the aid of environmental cues, do indicate a deficit associated with the
disorder.
2.3 SAVANTS AND GENERATIVITY
Given the evidence outlined in the previous section, that individuals with autism are
impaired in their ability to spontaneously produce a variety of responses that are away
from the ordinary and established, it is very surprising that savant talent is found in
domains associated with creative or generative ability. However, despite the high
incidence of savant talent associated with autism, there has yet to be a systematic
investigation into the generative and creative abilities of such individuals. While such
investigations are particularly lacking with regard to savant artists, there are a number
of studies which have looked at the generative capacity of savant musicians.
Investigations into the generative ability of musical savants have mainly centred on
improvisation ability. Improvisation is seen to be a very good indicator for generative
ability in music, as it requires not only inventiveness but also the ability to produce a
response within the constraints of the original piece (Hermelin, O'Connor & Lee,
1987). Case studies of musical savants (Miller, 1987; Sloboda. Hermelin & O'Connor
1985) have found that savants not only possess an outstanding musical memory, but
that they also have the ability to pick out appropriate melodies and harmonies.
Chamess, Clifton and McDonald (1989) reported the case of a blind man with
epilepsy who, despite a very low IQ, was able not only to elaborate musical pieces,
but also to imitate specific musical styles.
57
Hermelin, O'Connor, Lee and Treffert (1989) compared the improvisational ability of
a savant musician with that of a talented, adult keyboard player. It was found that the
overall performance of the musical savant was comparable to that of the adult
musician, but interestingly, the output produced by the savant was richer and more
elaborate that that produced by the control. Similar findings were also reported by
Hermelin, O'Connor and Lee (1987) who compared the performance of a group of
savant musicians to a group of talented, musically trained children. In this study
participants were required to continue a tune started by the experimenter, as well as to
invent an entirely new tune, an accompaniment, a melody and accompaniment and
finally to improvise over a twelve bar blues sequences. A scoring criterion was
calculated by using the mean ratings gained on completed tasks, thus giving an overall
measure of inventiveness. Performance was also rated on overall aspects such as
timing, complexity and balance, resulting in an overall competence score. The savant
musicians were found to be both more competent and more inventive that the control
group, indicating that their knowledge of musical structure was at least equal to
individuals talented at music, but with no cognitive impairments. Access to such
representational rules meant that the savants were not only able to reproduce music,
but also to go beyond what was directly perceived in order to produce an output
conforming to the original structural pattern. These results not only provide further
evidence for the lack of a general intellectual capacity to govern all behaviour, but
also support the notion that savant talent is flexible and based on the same
organisation structure of the information in memory, as found in talented individuals
with no cognitive impairments.
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In many ways musical inventiveness can be likened to artistic inventiveness; both
require structural rule-based representations as well as complex motor planning and
control. Pressing (1989) argues that musical improvisation, which requires fluency
and flexibility, is possible only after the individual has gained a level of automaticity
in their motor organisation, thus allowing conscious attention to focus on a higher
level of expressive control. Given the similarities between the structural basis of
musical and artistic talent and the conclusion that savant artists have superior motor
control with respect to their instrument (Hennelin, 1994) one might then expect that
the generative ability of savant artists would be equal to that found in normal artists
with no impairments.
Despite the apparent creative and generative nature of savant artists, this is a hitherto
neglected area of empirical research. As previously illustrated, a number of studies
have been conducted into the cognitive styles of savant artists but whether their
generative ability is restrained or facilitated by their autism, has yet to be the subject
of systematic investigation. Nevertheless, the creative nature of savant art has been
mentioned by a number of researchers. Sacks (1995) refers to the art work produced
by a number of savant artists. He points out that their outputs are rarely exact
replications of the original image and thus must go through some sort of
transformation. What is more Selfe (1977, 1983) pointed out that Nadia was able to
draw her images from a variety of perspectives, introducing a variety of omissions
and additions, similar to that reported by O'Connor and Hennelin in their 1990 paper.
In their 1990 paper, Art and Accuracy, Hermelin and O'Connor made some attempt to
look at the generative or aesthetic abilities possessed by savant artists. They
compared representational ability (how true to the original image the response was)
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with aesthetic quality. It was found that whereas representational ability was
determined by the overall level of intelligence, the aesthetic quality of the savant art
was above that of the controls.
The above descriptions indicate that, despite their autism, savant artists do possess
some generative ability. The existence of this is illustrated in a further case study of
the autistic artist Richard Wavro (Hermelin et al., 1999). Hermelin et al. sought to
investigate generative capacity by comparing Richard's artistic output with the
photographs from which they were derived. Richard's preferred topic was landscapes
and he would spend hours in the local library looking at photographs of scenes in
books. He would then produce a picture based on a photograph he had seen days,
weeks and sometimes months after he saw it. It was found that Richard made a
number of novel transformations in his artistic responses, for example, he would
enlarge certain details in the picture and occasionally add whole features, such as a
house, to the finished picture. Furthermore, Richard would also exaggerate certain
colours or place minor features to the foreground in order to enhance the overall
composition.
It was concluded that Richard's most notable skills appeared to be in the depiction of
light, colour and space, which he used to produce subtle atmospheric effects. His
simplification and exaggeration of certain features resulting in balanced and
harmonious representations, which were often markedly different from the original
photograph on which they were based. On a more psychological note, it was
suggested by the authors that the generative changes apparent in Richard's art work,
probably resulted from his visual impairment (as well as being autistic Richard also
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suffered from extreme myopia and glaucoma) interacting with memory
transformations.
The generative nature of savant talent, was also subject to a paper by Young and
Nettlebeck (1995). Despite the evidence for generative ability outlined above, they
argue that in areas where artistic creativity is permitted, outputs produced by savants
are often mechanical, with low levels of expressiveness and emotional involvement.
They maintain that the instances of reported creativity arise from a highly developed
recall for visual details, which is then subject to a variety of transformations. They
cite Hennelin and O'Connor's 1990 study, stating that the art work produced by the
savants was not a literal photographic production of the model, as evidence for this
view. However, they fail to expand on how a highly developed memory might
account for this. What is more Young and Nettlebeck cannot account for cases, such
as Richard's, where emotional expressivity is clearly evident in the overall feel of his
compositions to create a harmonious atmosphere.
The review so far has aimed to illustrate how, in the domain of their talent and their
artistic output, savant musicians and artists are able to produce responses deemed as
showing creative aspects. In savant musicians the creative nature of their talent has
been the focus of several empirical studies, while this was not the case in the studies
of savant artists, there is still evidence of a creative transformation in their
compositions. What has not been tested with such groups is performance on
commonly used tests of creativity and generativity, both within and related to their
domain of talent. The only group study which has attempted to assess creative ability
on a standardised test is referred to by Hill (1978). He cites a study by Duckett
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(1976) in which she used Torrance's Thinking Creatively with Pictures (Torrance,
1974) to assess the abstract thinking ability of a group of savants with a variety of
talents compared to a control group matched on age, sex, and IQ.
Duckett's prediction that the savant group would score more highly on the initial
dimensions of fluency, flexibility, originality was not supported. She found that while
the scores of the savant group indicated some creativity, they were only similar to the
norms for 5-year-old children and thus likely to be dependent on mental age. The
exception to this result was on the elaboration dimension, however, although higher
scores were produced on this dimension they were still below mental age equivalent
norms. Interestingly, this superiority was only found in the calendrical calculators
(Miller, 1999) a savant ability not obviously related to generative or creative ability in
the way that say, art or music might be. Unfortunately no other information is
available from this intriguing study, especially with regard to the diagnosis of the
savant group or their controls. At the time of this study very little was known
regarding the generative deficits associated with autism and as such the results may
have been confounded by a lack of diagnostic matching. Certainly, if the incidence of
autism found in Duckett's group was similar to that of the groups documented
previously, it is likely significant findings may have been overlooked.
Since Duckett's study there have been no attempts to measure creative behaviour in
such a standardised or scientific manner, therefore, whether the creative aspects
apparent in savant artists' spontaneous outputs are extendable to established measures
of creativity remains to be seen. Indeed, as yet only one published study has
attempted to address this question. Dowker, Hermelin and Pring (1996) compared the
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performance of a poet, Kate, with Asperger's Syndrome to that of a similarly talented
poet with no developmental disorder. They found that whereas the savant poet's
performance was comparable on artistic merit, her performance on verbal creativity
tests was significantly worse than that of the control poet. The results obtained with
the savant poet provide an interesting comparison with those obtained with the
musicians and artists. Indeed, if we were to disregard Kate's performance on the
creativity tests and only look at her poems, then she does seem to show evidence of
creativity, supporting the previously discussed results obtained with musicians and
artists. The creative and generative nature of her spontaneous poetry is, however,
very different to the performance obtained on verbal creativity tasks, which appear to
relate more to her IQ or autism, rather than her talent. It is difficult to generalise on
the basis of a case study as to how general the creative nature of savant talent is,
nevertheless, from the results outlined above it might appear that the creativity
exhibited by savants is only evident in their actual output, rather than being testable
on established measures.
Apart from Dowker et al. 's (1996) investigation, the studies in which savant creativity
has been identified all involve either an analysis of the actual spontaneous outputs
only or improvisation within the domain of ability. These investigations have not
presented the savants with common creativity measures and as such the full creative
and generative nature of the savants' ability is questionable. This comes under more
scrutiny when one looks at the actual artistic output of such individuals; here one can
make a distinction between transformational ability and creativity. As previously
discussed, the savant musicians are able to improvise in a given style and in some rare
cases produce an original composition (Hermelin et al., 1987). However their
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spontaneous musical output does not generally consist of a totally unique composition
(Hennelin,2001). Likewise, savant artists again produce their outputs spontaneously,
but these are rarely drawn solely from imagination and in most cases are closely based
on real images they have seen. Thus although their transformational abilities do
appear to show a creative quality, which often enhances the overall aesthetic quality
of their compositions, the true extent of their generative abilities is less clear.
Referring back to the savant poet Kate, her poetic output can be seen to be generative
in the truest sense of the word, as it is produced spontaneously and is not based on a
representation of an image as with the artists, or a tune, as with the musicians. What
is more, this poetic ability is far less common than the musical and artistic abilities
more often found in savant talent. It would thus have been of interest to measure the
performance of the musicians or artists on common creativity tasks and similarly it
would have been noteworthy to measure Kate's improvisational ability (in much the
same way that was used with the musicians). In this way a clearer picture would have
developed concerning the flexibility of her talent.
Summary; Savants and generativity
To conclude, although the spontaneous outputs produced by the savant groups, in
domains such as art, music and language, do show clear evidence of creative and
generative qualities, the true nature of these abilities has yet to be established. This is
especially the case for the savant artists. Although a number of studies have referred
to the creative nature of their work, there have so far been no attempts to assess this
ability in a structured setting. The series of experiments to be reported here aim thus,
to provide a systematic account of the creative and generative abilities of savant
64
artists. Attempts were made to distinguish between the abilities previously discussed
(Le. transformation, creativity and generativity) and to investigate the processes that
may account for these, in order to discover if the creative performance of the savant
artists is evident only on spontaneous output or also evident on other related
measures.
2.4 MEASUREMENT OF CREATIVITY
A thesis of this type needs firstly to deal with two pressing issues, the first concerns
the adequate measurement of creativity and generativity. The second relates to the
use of an adequate methodology which will pick up these processes in individuals
with learning difficulties, especially those difficulties related to language and
comprehension. In much the same way that the definition of creativity is fraught with
problems, a discussion of the measurement of creativity could easily fill several
volumes without providing an answer. The method employed to test creativity will
clearly depend on the defmition employed. For the purposes of this thesis creativity
has been defined as the process by which a novel, yet meaningful, response or output
is produced. This means that two factors need to be measured; the creative product
and the process by which this is obtained. As discussed, the artistic outputs which are
spontaneously produced by artistic savants do have creative aspects, and while this
will be covered in more detail with regard to the savants in this group, it is not the
main emphasis of this study. In this series of experiments the aim was to measure the
savant artists' creative and generative ability outside of their spontaneous art work, it
is thus useful to look at the methodology adopted in previous studies of creativity.
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Many early tests of creativity, not concerned with specific artistic or scientific
productions, consisted of pencil and paper tasks that could easily be presented to
groups of individuals with the minimum effort. One of the earliest attempts at a full
scale investigation of creative ability of this type was conducted by Guilford (1950).
Guildford pointed out that all of the tests used by psychologists in America at that
time were convergent, that is they required a predetermined, correct response. He
argued that creative thought is, however, more likely to produce a variety of new
answers through a process of divergent thinking. From his studies on the structure of
intellect (Guildford, 1950, 1957, 1960) he regarded creativity as consisting of a
number of primary abilities; sensitivity to problems, ideational fluency, flexibility,
novelty or originality, elaboration and the ability to resynthesis and reorganise
information. As such the tests he used, including tests such as the object uses
(Christensen, et al., 1960), plot titles (Berger & Guildford, 1960), and consequences
(Christensen, Merrifield & Guildford, 1958), were devised to pick up on these
abilities. For example, many of the tests consisted of a total fluency score and the
ability to produce a number of ideas in a given time was seen as an important aspect
of creativity. Likewise the ability to produce a number of ideas which are figurally or
semantically varied and free from perseveration (flexibility) was also measured.
Novelty or originality were also scorable by looking at how common a response was
and elaboration measured mainly on visual tasks whereby details needed to be added
to two parallel lines.
Such tasks are commonly referred to as ideational fluency or divergent thinking tasks.
However, the factors identified by Guildford have been criticised by a number of
researchers. In particular the trait of fluency, which although found to correlate
66
significantly with factors such as originality (Barron, 1963), is likely to result from
the fact that those with higher fluency score better on other factors simply because
they have produced more responses. As such, ideational fluency tasks are often seen
as little more than tests of quantity (Hocevar, 1979, 1980, 1981). Leading on from
this, other researchers have cast doubt over whether divergent thinking tasks have any
relationship to creative potential (Barron & Harrington, 1981;Wallach, 1976).
Despite such criticisms Guildford's methodology has been very influential in the field
of creativity. Both Getzels and Jackson (1962) and Wallach and Kogan (1965) used
similar tests as those utilised by Guildford and colleagues in their investigations of the
intelligence versus creativity distinction. Interestingly, in both studies visual
measures were added to the original verbally based tasks; Getzels and Jackson used
Cattell's Hidden figure task (1956), whereas Wallach and Kogan presented
participants with a variety of meaningless line drawings which they needed to
interpret. What is more, separate scores were often calculated from one set of
responses, for example, total fluency, the uniqueness of a response and so on, in
keeping with Guildford's components.
A slightly different version of Guildford's work was adopted by Torrance (1974).
Using four of the component areas of creativity identified by Guildford (fluency,
flexibility, originality and elaboration), Torrance developed a number of tests to
measure creativity in a variety of domains (verbal, visual, movement) in ordinary non-
gifted individuals. A full review of these tests and the dimensions they claim to
measure is presented in chapter 4, but the ease of administration and, unusually for
tests of creative thinking, the standardised scoring system, have meant that these tests
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have been very popular in creativity research over the last 40 years. Despite
criticisms regarding the relationship between the types of divergent thinking tasks as
used by Guildford and Torrance and the nature of creativity, their methodology is still
found in many current approaches to creativity measurement. In particular the
separation of dimensions such as fluency, flexibility and originality is frequently
adopted. More recent approaches have, however, tended to move away from the
divergent thinking approach, although many still have the requirement that the
individual produces a variety of responses to a single cue or problem. In the present
series of studies such a criterion is to be defined as meaning generativity rather than
creativity .
In contrast to the traditional methodology described above, the creative cognition
approach (Finke et al., 1992) emphasises the processes that lead to the production of
novel responses. These authors maintain that creativity consists of a generative
process and an exploratory process, and identify a number of measures that they use
to tap such operations. For Finke and colleagues, creative thought arises when the
individual is faced with an unusual challenge, thus the tasks they use to measure this
concept differ somewhat from the more traditional methods. In particular they have
tried to introduce novel tasks, in which they regard the cognitive processes leading to
a response as crucial.
Like the tasks derived from Guildford and colleagues, the methodology used in the
creative cognition approach can also be presented to participants of a variety of ages
and cognitive abilities, with minimum effort and materials. Again, these tasks do not
rely on the individual having produced a historically creative product or being
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considered a creative person. as they aim to look at such processes in the whole
population. Tasks used by Finke and colleagues include measures of creative
visualisation (Finke, 1989; Finke & Shepard, 1986) invention (Finke, 1990) and
synthesis (Finke & Slayton, 1989). They also carried out a number of studies into
structured imagination (Ward, 1991a, 1991b) and insight (Smith, Ward &
Schumacher, 1991; Smith & Vela, 1991). The creative cognition approach to the
measurement of creativity is a particularly useful one to adopt, because it
acknowledges that creative thought can occur in the general population and that such
occurrences can be objectively measured. Although the methodology adopted by this
approach is aimed at identifying the cognitive processes that underlie creativity, Finke
and colleagues recognise that occasionally creative products may arise randomly or
by accident. Here they argue that the processes which lead to production, should not
detract from the final creative product, but rather that both factors (the product and
the process) should be looked at as separate.
Although this review did not aim to provide strong conclusions on the creativity
nature of savant artists' spontaneous, artistic compositions, it is necessary to provide a
brief discussion of the cognitive processes thought to underlie artistic creativity.
Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976) carried out a longitudinal study of creativity
amongst talented art students. They found that artists who were most successful in
later life, thus deemed more creative, treated their artistic outputs like a problem that
needed solving. These successful artists tended not to begin their compositions with
a definite idea of their final product, but let it progress and develop; this concurs with
Perkins' (1981) ideas of the creative process. Gardener (1982) used a cognitive
developmental perspective to explore artistic creativity, describing it in tenus of
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computational and compositional schemas. However, as pointed out by Finke et al.
(1992), Gardener's account is limited in that that he does not provide detail as to the
underlying cognitive process that such schemas may involve.
2.5 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter was to provide the reader with a introduction into the main
issues relevant to this series of studies. Firstly, the problem that all researchers face
when embarking on investigations into the domain of creativity was highlighted,
namely the lack of a tight, workable definition. A brief review of various approaches
to the study of creative ability were presented and it was recognised that a distinction
could be drawn between the creative product and the creative process.
It is surprising that savant abilities should arise in areas that are commonly associated
with creativity, considering the deficits individuals with autism have in generating
ideas. Although a lack of imagination is one of the triad of impairments
characterising autism, research in this area has been neglected up until recently. A
review of the literature into the creative and generative abilities of individuals with
autism was presented and across the board autism-specific deficits were found on a
variety of tests leading several researchers to suggest that a generativity deficit may
be pervasive in autism. It was further suggested that the root of this deficit was an
executive impairment, specifically with regard to goal representation and selection.
Despite the distinction that was drawn between generative and creative processes, a
generativity deficit will clearly have some influence on creativity, especially if the
root of problems develops from a paucity of ideas. However, while some studies have
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indicated a lack of imagination or creativity in the responses of individuals with
autism, others have found that given the right environmental circumstances these
individuals are able to produce creative outputs. This seems to be particularly the
case in studies where the verbal element is greatly reduced. It may thus be that the
language deficits associated with autism mask creative ability to a certain extent. This
is not to say that individuals with autism do not exhibit creative or generative
impairments, but more that these impairments could be reduced or less evident
outside of the verbal domain.
With regard to the creative performance of savant artists, again this area has been
widely overlooked in research. A number of descriptive accounts and empirical
investigations have been reported alluding to the creative or generative nature of their
artistic outputs, but the generative capacity of this group has yet to be investigated in a
systematic way. Despite this, there have been several attempts to measure these
concepts in other domains. Generally it has been found that savant performance is
equal to that of talented, non-autistic controls when the test takes place in the domain
of specific ability. However, this ability rarely influences performance on
standardised measures, or when the output is not a spontaneous production. Finally,
the measurement of creativity was discussed and more specifically how general
intelligence would influence both the presentation and output of such tasks.
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Chapter 3:
Design considerations
3.1 THE SAVANT ARTISTS
As this thesis is concerned with the performance of a small group of savant artists it is
necessary to provide a brief introduction into not only each savant artist's overall
cognitive ability, but also their artistic style and personality. The savant group
consisted of nine artists, two females and seven males; which is consistent with the
sex ratio of 1:3 associated with autism (Steffenburg & Gillberg, 1986). Several of
the savant artists (CH, DP, SQ & SW) had previously been included in studies
conducted by Hermelin and colleagues. Three artists were recruited by the
experimenter following telephone calls made to specialist autistic services affiliated to
the National Autistic Society (NAS), requesting information on any individuals who
had artistic ability above that found in the normal population. Following this
examples of their art work was requested and any individuals with exceptional artistic
ability were visited by the experimenter to confirm that these individuals possessed a
genuine ability. From this investigation, CM, MD and ML were included in this
study. Finally two artists (PM & TM) were introduced to the study as a result of the
attention brought to them from various local exhibitions where they had presented
work. A sample of the artwork produced by each savant artist was seen by an
independent art examiner, who rated all of the samples to be of a standard that would
gain them entry into art school. The age range of participants in this group was from
23 to 43 at the time of testing. Initially an attempt was made to obtain a group of
young savant artists to combine with the performance of the savant group, however,
as the IQ range of the savant artists was already very wide, a decision was made to
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restrict this investigation to the study of adult artists only. Table 3.1 illustrates the
scores of each savant artist on a variety of cognitive tests. Performance IQ (PIQ) was
measured using wither the Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices (PRM; Raven,
Court & Raven, 1988) or the Raven's Coloured Matrices (RCM; Raven 1986).
Verbal IQ (VIQ) was measured using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT;
Dunn & Dunn, 1997). As well as the measures of PIQ and VIQ discussed above. the
scaled scores of four sub-tests from the WAIS-R (Wechsler. 1981) were also obtained
(vocabulary, comprehension, block design and object assembly). These four tests
often represent the most extreme ranges of performance of the Wechsler intelligence
scales in individuals with autism (Happe, 1994a), with the verbal tests providing the
lowest scores and the block design and object assembly the highest.
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3.1.1 Individual Descriptions
CH
I first saw CH in 1998, she is a friendly woman, currently 35 years old. Although
very sociable, much of her behaviour and speech appears learned. She shows many
classic characteristics associated with autism; her eye contact is poorly modulated and
she tends to stare at those she is talking to as if looking to them for clues as how to
respond. She will smile in response but her smile is mechanical and almost a
grimace, she has no gestures beyond occasionally nodding her head. Her prosody is
flat, very slow and halting and she makes constant use of stereotyped and scripted
language. She has severe pragmatic difficulties and she tends to jump from topic to
topic. However, she likes company and particularly likes to talk about what she plans
to do in the future. She is currently working in a hairdressing store part time and
speaks at length about different hairstyles and make up techniques. CH was
diagnosed with autism as a toddler and attended a specialist school for children with
autism from the age of five, before joining her local community college when she was
16 years old.
CH has attended various art classes throughout school at her adult education lessons.
Previously she attended these classes up to four times a week and would also practice
at home for several hours of a weekend. Currently, however, she does not spend any
time on her art work, preferring carpentry, which she is also very talented at, and
practising her make up techniques. Her preferred medium was to paint and,
uncommonly in many artistic savants, she would tend to paint pictures of people,
particularly pictures of fashion models which she would copy from magazines.
Relating to this last point, she would rarely draw entirely from imagination, instead
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used a picture or a photograph for constant referral. An example of CH's artwork is
shown in figure 3.1. CH was very willing to take part in all the tests presented as part
of this thesis, and seemed very eager to please and preferred the testing which
required a drawn response.
Figure 3.1: Watercolour by CH
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CM
CM is a 37 year old male. He currently attends a residential and day centre run by the
NAS, before which he attended a specialist school for children with autism after his
diagnosis with autism at the age of five. His speech developed late and even now,
although he has good comprehension, his spontaneous speech is limited to stereotyped
questions. In particular he likes to question people about their family situations and
where they live, before providing them with his own background details. He
occasionally shows some echolalia and while his vocabulary is adequate, it is difficult
to build a conversation with him. He shows no empathy or insight and asks no
questions of the listener beyond his stereotyped speech. His facial expression is
limited to smiling and nodding, with no other gesturing. He has a keen interest in art
and often attends art exhibitions with his brother.
CM currently attends the day centre two days per week for computer and social skills
training, for the remaining five days of the week he attends an art work shop affiliated
to the day centre. Here he spends two days a week painting and one day on carpentry.
He prefers to paint using a wax and wash technique and likes to draw from life,
particularly still life images of plants and trees. He can use imagination only when
prompted and needs to be talked through the process of thought generation, using a
visual image as an aid. which he adds interpretation to. He has exhibited work at a
number of exhibitions for individuals with autism and has had postcards printed
which are on sale nationally. CM greatly enjoyed taking part in all of the tests
presented as part of this thesis. and on several occasions expressed disappointment
that the test had finished. Figure 3.2 shows the church visible from CM's desk at his
day centre.
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Figure 3.2: 'The view from the window' water colour from life by CM
OP was born in 1959. He was diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome by a consultant
psychiatrist, however, no other details were available about the dates. DP is an
interesting man, he shows very rigid behaviour with a strong reliance on routine.
Often he misinterprets things which can lead to adverse reactions, however,
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throughout the course of this series of studies he was always friendly and willing to
oblige. He shows very stereotyped speech patterns, the rate of his speech is very fast
and his articulation is poor. He shows several obsessional interests, and likes to
collect things, in particular things which are cubed. He has an outstanding episodic
memory and spoke of his school experiences and when he learned to draw. He
attended a local school for children with moderate to several learning difficulties and
currently attended a day service for adults with a variety of developmental disorders
and mental health problems. He found that he could paint exceptionally when he was
at school and was allowed to spend a disproportionate amount of time at school
practising his art work. As well as art he likes photography but will often use up
entire films photographing the same image.
DP still spends most of his time at the day centre painting. He likes to paint pictures
of trains or tractors using water colours. The standard of his art work is exceptional
and it can take him up to one year to complete one painting, of A2 paper size. His
method for painting is incredibly precise, he was taught this by his art teacher at
school and will not paint in any other way. Firstly he selects an image, usually a
photograph from a magazine, occasionally an photograph he has taken, this
photograph is then photocopied twice, one is used as a copy the other is divided into a
grid. A sheet of a A2 paper is then divided into an identical grid and the outline of the
image in each square of the grid drawn onto the paper lightly in pencil. Particular
attention is paid to getting the colouring and shading the exact shade as in the picture
and this alone can take several weeks. An example of one of his paintings is shown in
figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Water colour by DP
MD
Born in 1977, MD is the youngest artist in this group. She attended a variety of
schools for children with mild learning difficulties, and although it was questioned
from a young age. she did not receive a cliagnosis until she was 14 years old, when
she was cliagnosed by a consultant community paediatrician with atypical autism. She
is currently living in a residential home for high-functioning young adults with
autism, which she shares with six others. She enjoys living in the house, but
sometimes likes to get away from the other people. She particularly likes staying in
the self contained flat which is part of the house, as here she has her own space more
and can do the things she likes best. MD comes across as a shy lady, but she relaxes
as she gets to know people. Initially her eye contact was very poor, however this
improved substantially throughout the first interaction. Her intonation is very flat,
however she has good verbal and comprehension skills. She was able to engage in a
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variety of conversations with myself, about her interests; she likes listening to pop
music and watching' Eastenders' on television.
MD becomes quite embarrassed when talking about her art work and needs constant
reassurance. She is currently attending a supported unit for individuals with learning
difficulties at a local college, where she is sitting an AS level art exam this year and
hoping to take A level art next year. As well at the art course she also attends more
relaxed art sessions at a local recreational centre twice a week, which she prefers in
some ways as she is able to do her own thing at these, without being told what to
draw. Recently she has had a piece of her art entered into a national competition. She
also spends much of her free time at home painting, at least several hours a day. She
has always been able to draw, but her artistic ability has improved over time as she
has got older. She prefers to paint using oil paints or water colours, each painting
takes her about 12 hours to complete and she paints for several hours a day. She
prefers to draw landscapes and will obtain travel brochures which she select pictures
from to copy. She tends to use these images as a constant visual guideline although
she has drawn from life. She selects pictures with strong. bold colours and
particularly likes to draw pictures from Italian travel brochures as these show "lots of
bright blue sky, with sea and often mountains". An example of her work is shown in
figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: 'Sailing' water colour by MD
ML
ML was diagnosed with autism aged 7 by a consultant community paediatrician, after
which he attended a school for children with autism, run by the NAS. He currently
attends the same day centre and art workshop as CM, which he has attended since
leaving school. ML has very little speech, although his comprehension is good.
Throughout the experiments which he participated in as part of this thesis, he showed
no spontaneous language and only gave short phrases of two or three words, in
response to questions posed by the experimenter. His speech is very slow and halting,
he often replied to questions with the phrase "I don't know". He has no gestures or
facial expression. In his spare time he has an interest in buses and often travels the
country to go to exhibitions and shows.
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As mentioned ML attends a day centre for adults with autism, four days of the week
are spent at the affiliated art workshop. Most of this time is spent drawing, he likes to
draw linear pictures of buildings he has photographed. He rarely draws from
imagination, and when he does the quality of his output is much reduced. ML has
presented work at a variety of exhibitions and has had postcards printed which have
sold nationally. It was quite difficult to engage ML in many of the studies involved
here, especially those in which he appeared to being having difficulty. Examples of
ML's work are shown in chapter 1 (pp.28) and in chapter 8 (pp.271 & pp272).
PM
PM is a 37 year old man, I first came into contact with, through his correspondence
with the NAS. He lives independently and has a full time job. He previously worked
as a draftsman and once even moved to Saudi Arabia with work, however, he found
the demands of such a job too difficult and after several periods of depression took an
administrative job locally to his parents. PM was not diagnosed with Asperger's
Syndrome until he was 17 years old. when he was diagnosed by Dr Lorna Wing,
although he states that he always knew he was different. In particular he shows
social difficulties and finds it hard to be friends with people and to 'connect'. He has
some stereotyped language and often speaks very quietly, with a tendency to carry on
a long monologue.
PM states that he has always been very talented at drawing and painting. and has a
diploma in art and design. Currently he spends most of his free time drawing as he
fmds it relaxing. He prefers to draw linear outlines with a fine nib pen. which he then
copies and re-colours in different colour schemes. PM is unique in this group of
83
artists in that he draws totally from his imagination. He likes to draw pictures and
patterns in a 'pop art' style, using fibre tipped pens. He tends to draw pictures
relating to one theme (for instance, trees, mermaids and fish or fairies) before moving
on to another. PM has exhibited his work in a number of national exhibitions and also
has had a number of postcards and prints produced which are on sale nationally. He
was very interested in this series of studies, and a useful participant as, due to his high
verbal ability, he was able to describe what he was thinking as he completed the task.
An example of PM's work is shown in figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: "Straights. rounds. bubbles and butterflies" by PM
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SQ is a 36 year old man with Autism. He received this diagnosis from the Maudsley
Hospital in London when he was a toddler. Up until the age of four he attended a
special unit affiliated to his local school but from the age of seven he was educated at
a local specialist school for children with autism spectrum disorders. He currently
lives in supported housing run by his local authority, for adults with autism. By day
he attends a large day centre run by the NAS, where he takes part in a number of
different activities including computer lessons, social skills and carpentry. He is a
sociable man, who likes company. His language is good, and it is possible to build a
conversation with him, however, this is usually one sided and often comes back to his
interest in geography, specifically where he has been and where people come from.
His speech has little variation and although he does have limited facial expression,
this is rarely integrated effectively with his language. He does not use gestures,
although he often nods his head in confirmation, In his spare time he likes to cycle
and to visit the local pub.
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Figure 3.6: Example ofSQ's art work, drawn from lite
SQ has recently lost some of his interest in painting in favour of computer graphics.
In the past he would attend art sessions at the day centre, although this generally
involved carpentry rather than painting and drawing. Most of his artistic
compositions were drawn in his spare time, especially over the weekends. He
preferred to paint in water colour from photographs that he would take on country
walks, each painting would take around five hours to complete. SQ was happy to take
part in all the tests, and would repeat the instructions to himself as he completed
them, to 'remind' himself what he was doing.
sw
SW is a 26 year old man who was at the time of testing, completing a diploma at a
prestigious art college. Diagnosed with autism at the age of eight, SW attended a
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local school for children with autism, affiliated to the NAS. It was at this school that
his artistic ability was recognised by his art teacher and he has gone on to exhibit his
work internationally and to produce a number of books of his art. SW has outstanding
social skills, although these are likely to have improved as a result of the attention
focussed on him surrounding his artistic ability. His language is good, although he
asked no questions throughout the sessions I spent with him. He was very happy to
provide accounts of his recent trips abroad, although he did show some pragmatic
difficulties, particularly in terms of losing his train of thought and the conversation
tended to be one-sided and relating on specific questions. His speech was quite
halting and his eye contact poorly modulated throughout. One area where SW was
especially forthcoming in his speech concerned his art work and he happily presented
his portfolio to me, pointing out why he drew certain pictures and the techniques he
used to do so.
In the past SW's main interest was in drawing buildings and he showed an incredible
memory, to the point where he could look at a building for a matter of minutes and
then sometimes up to days later, he would produce line drawings of the building of
scene with amazing accuracy. More recently his attendance at art school has widened
the techniques available to him and he has also extended his artistic repertoire.
Currently he has drawn a number of scenes from US television shows such a
'Friends', and images from films such as 'Saturday Night Fever' which he likes and
he always carries his sketch book with him so that he can jot down things that he sees,
which take his interest.
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Figure 3. 7: 'The British library reading room' by SW
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TM
TM was brought to the attention of this study following a local exhibition of his work.
He was diagnosed by a consultant psychiatrist in 1991 when he was 22. Despite this
late diagnosis he had throughout childhood and adolescence, displayed many traits
associated with autism. He had no friends at his school for children with mild
learning difficulties, and had trouble developing and maintaining any social
relationships. In addition to this he showed a number of obsessional behaviours, in
particular a strong reliance on routine. Currently he is working part time in a local
library, which he enjoys because of the 'quiet'. He lives locally to his parents, but
independently other than a part-time home help, who assists him with cleaning and
shopping. TM is also an accomplished musician, who plays the organ and sings in the
church choir. He has little spontaneous language, although he can write eloquently,
and it is very difficult to build on a conversation with him as he tends to reply to
questions with short phrases. Indeed, although he has learned some social skills such
as hand shaking and introducing himself, he tends to look quite uncomfortable in the
presence of people he is not familiar with. He too appeared quite frustrated during
several of the more difficult tasks presented to him here and became visibly agitated
and asked to stop several times before deciding to continue until the task end.
TM currently attends a weekly art group, and draws when he has time at home,
usually during the weekends. His artistic ability was not recognised until he was 16
years of age, mainly as he had never given much time to art. However, on a family
holiday poor weather meant he had to stay indoors and it was at this time he realised
his ability. As he began to draw the scene outside using a fme nib pen, he realised he
had the patience to draw the individual details of trees and buses. Now he still prefers
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to draw using this medium, however, he has recently moved on to water colours. He
enjoys photography and likes to paint pictures of the photographs he particularly
likes. Aside from the exhibitions he has presented at TM also produces prints of his
work for sale as cards and post cards and has completed several commissioned pieces.
An example of his early still life work is shown in chapter 1 (pp.29). Below, in figure
3.8, is one of his more recent commissions, drawn from a photograph he took himself.
Figure 3.8: 'The Kings' Choristers Returning From Chapel' water colour by TM
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3.2 TESTING CREATIVITY IN INDIVIDUALS WITH
COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS
3.2.1 The use of appropriate tests
The previous chapter presented a brief overview of some of the many approaches to
creativity measurement in the normal population. The point of many of these tests
was to provide a task that would measure creativity in the general population
regardless of intelligence or previous creativity. This does not necessarily mean,
however, that such tests are particularly applicable for use with individuals with
cognitive impairments or developmental disorders such as autism. In particular many
of these tasks presuppose a certain level of verbal ability and because of the deficits
that individual with autism have with language, this can result in problems in
adequately assessing creativity in such a group. A strong verbal element can be seen
in many of the tests described so far, from the early tests used by Guilford and
colleagues such as the object uses, through so called visual tasks such as those used
by Wallach and Kogan (1965) and including more recent measures adopted by Finke
and colleagues (see Finke et al., 1996).
Despite the verbal component integral in many of these tasks, they have often been
used by researchers with autistic groups. For example, Turner (1997, 1999) in her
study on generative ability, used the object uses task and the pattern meanings task,
both of which it can be argued, require increasingly complex responses in order to
gain higher ratings for originality or imagination. Certainly, in most of the tasks
which require exclusively verbal outputs groups with autism have been found to
perform particularly poorly, regarding either total output (Rumsey & Hamburger,
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1988; Turner, 1997, 1999) or the creativity of response (Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996;
Turner, 1997, 1999). In response to such pitfalls, it might be better to assess
performance by using tasks outside of the verbal domain or those with a minimal
verbal input. Indeed as previously discussed, in tasks requiring only a drawn output
the generative difficulties displayed by autistic individuals are less apparent (Leevers
& Harris, 1998, Lewis & Boucher,I991). This thesis then, concentrates on tasks that
do not require a complex verbal response and instead uses those that are primarily
visual by nature. It is accepted that this may produce some bias in the savant group as
they are gifted in art, but attempts were made to measure creative ability in several
visual domains, not simply those connected to a drawn output. In doing so
participants were presented with a variety of multifaceted tasks, in order to measure
creative and generative ability on a number of dimensions. Although, as stated, the
aim was to present participants with tasks outside of the verbal domain, it is accepted
that most of the tasks involved did have an inherent verbal aspect. Nevertheless,
attempts were made to pick tasks in which the visual aspect is dominant.
3.2.2 The Use of Appropriate Control Groups.
A primary aim of this thesis was to investigate whether the performance of savant
artists was related to their artistic ability, their diagnosis of autism or their overall
cognitive level, consequently, a variety of control groups were used throughout this
thesis. In order to draw conclusions as to the creative capacity of the savant group,
initially three control groups were necessary. Details of these groups are illustrated in
table 3.2.
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The autism control group
Firstly a group of nine participants with autism were obtained, matched individually
to each savant artist on IQ, age, sex and diagnosis. In line with the savant group, PIQ
was measured using either the RPM or the ReM and VIQ using the PPVT.
Participants were matched individually for diagnosis, thus the artists diagnosed with
Asperger's Syndrome were matched with non-talented individuals with Asperger's
Syndrome. None of the members of this control group had ever displayed any artistic
ability, although several took part in art sessions at their local day centre. Each of the
nine participants in this group attended a day centre specifically catering for adults
with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) run by the NAS. Aside from artistic ability
there were no other significant factors which differed between these two groups. The
individuals in the autism control group all displayed the social, communicative and
repetitive behaviour problems as commonly found in individuals with autism. It is
important to note here that in reflecting the diagnosis of the savant artists the
participants in this control group have been diagnosed with a variety of autism
spectrum disorders, however, for brevity in this thesis this control group are referred
to simply as the autism control group. The individual details of this group (age,
diagnosis. PIQ and VIQ) are shown in appendix 1.
The learning disabled control group
A second group included individuals with general learning difficulties (the LDe
group) but without a diagnosis of autism or any related pervasive developmental
disorder. The LDC group were matched closely on a one to one basis with the artists
in the savant group on relative age, sex and PIQ using the RPMor the peM, and VIQ
using the PPVT. As illustrated in table 3.2, the VIQ of the LDe group is somewhat
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larger than in the two groups with autism. This reflects the recognised discrepancy
between performance and VIQ in individuals with autism. However this difference
did not reach significance (see pp.95) and it was felt that it was more appropriate to
match closely on PIQ, due to the non-verbal focus of the tasks used throughout. Eight
of the nine participants who made up the LDC group were obtained from a local adult
education centre, they comprised individuals with a variety of developmental
disorders, general learning difficulties and mental health problems. Although the
clinical diagnosis of each participant was checked in order to clarify that the
participants did not have an ASO, all individuals took part in a brief screening session
subject to a screening process, loosely based on the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule (Lord, Rutter & Dil.avore, 1998). This was to ensure that participants who
possibly had an un-identified ASD were not mistakenly included in the non-autistic
group. The final participant in this group, was obtained via the University of London,
and matched PM, the one savant with very high score on the two IQ tests. Again no
participants in this group showed any artistic ability, presently or in the past.
The mean scores and standard deviations (SO) for each of the mixed intelligence
groups are shown in table 3.2, PIQ was measured using the Ravens' Matrices, VIQ
using the PPVT. The participants in the two mixed intelligence control groups
(autism and LOe) were instructed to draw a picture of a house or a person. This
initial control task was to establish that each participant possessed adequate motor
control and drawing ability to complete the tests and all participants in both groups
were able to do this. The individual details of this group (age, diagnosis, PIQ and
VIQ) are shown in appendix 2.
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Table 3.2: The mean PlO and VIO scores (SD) for the savant artists, the autism
control group and the LDC group.
Group PIQ VIQ Age Male: Female
Savant Artists 84.00 83.66 34.55 7:2
(18.5) (17.49) (5.13)
Autism Control 82.33 84.78 32.22 7:2
Group (16.59) (14.79) (6.59)
LDCGroup 85.55 92.11 32.55 7:2
(19.19) (17.86) (5.77)
No between group differences arose between the three groups on the VIQ or PIQ
scores (PIQ, F(2, 26) = 0.43,p = 0.65; VIQ, F (2,26) = 1.30,p = 0.38).
Two other groups were also important in several of the tasks presented forthwith.
The art student control group
A group of talented A-level art students were included in order to assess the effect of
artistic talent upon creative performance. While this paradigm has been used in
several studies of savant ability, this is the first attempt to use A-level art students as
controls. Previous studies have tended to use either a group of artistically talented
children, matched mental age (MA) to chronological age (CA) or adult professional
artists, however, neither of these methodologies were seen to be acceptable in terms
of ability or training. For example, the use of talented children as controls does not
account for the developmental level of participants, and what is more if matched on
mental age, it is unlikely that the artistic proficiency of the child artists would be up to
that level of that found in the savant group. Also, many relevant developmental
processes (for example; field dependence, Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971) do
not reach maturity until adulthood and thus the results would not show a true picture
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of the levels of ability found in the groups. On the other hand to use professional
adult artists would not be acceptable for similar reasons, although several of the
savant group have received formal training in art, this will not compare to the training
that an adult professional artist will have experienced. It was thus decided that the
closest match in terms of overall ability and training were a group of A-level art
students, not only was their art work judged to be a similar level to that of the savant
group by their art teacher, an A-level art examiner, but they also spent comparable
amounts of time practising art work each week, around ten hours. Furthermore
although the average age of the art student group was between 18 and 19 years,
individuals of this age are seen to be young adults, and thus nearer to the level of the
savant group than a group of MA children would be. The art students that made up
this group were in the top 10 per cent of their year for artistic ability and were
receiving A and B grades consistently for their A-level course work. Each individual
in this group had received an A or B grade at GCSE art in the previous two years.
Thenonnalconuolgroijp
Finally, where necessary when investigating the processes thought to be related to
artistic ability, a fifth group were included in the study. This final group comprised a
group of psychology students, who were matched to the art students on PIQ, VIQ and
sex. Participants in this group had no formal art qualifications and did not participate
in art as a pastime. This group of normal students was included in a subset of studies
inorder to investigate the overall effect of artistic ability on performance.
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The mean IQ scores and standard deviations, for the two student groups are illustrated
in table 3.3. In matching the savant group, both groups of students contained seven
male participants and two female.
Table 3.3: Participant details for the art student and normal student groups.
Group PIQ VIQ Age
Art Student
Normal Student
114.00 (9.00)
116.44 (12.12)
114.67 (12.99)
115.22 (9.08)
17.44 (0.72)
18.72 (0.55)
Pilot studies
As savant ability is so rare the range of IQ apparent in this group and the two IQ
matched control groups varies from borderline to average, or high, intelligence. This
wide overall IQ range naturally has strong implications on the design of each task.
For instance, too difficult a task will result in those at the lower end of the IQ range
performing at floor level, while the opposite would have those of higher ability at
ceiling. In order to avoid these potential complications a variety of training tasks
were introduced in order to establish that all participants were aware of the task
demands and thus ensure that any results were due to ability and not a lack of
comprehension per se. In addition to this a group of individuals who were not used as
control participants were incorporated into a 'pilot testing group'. This group
included several participants with autism and general learning difficulties, with a
range of IQ scores, who were given early versions of the tasks and the training
materials to establish that the task instructions were easily understood by participants
performance at a variety of cognitive levels.
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Inler-raler reliability
In investigations such as this, where often the scores given reflect subjective
judgements despite clear scoring criteria, it is important to have good reliability
within scores. For this reason, the responses of five participants in each group were
randomly selected and where relevant (that is where a response was not based on a
subjective measure such as time of completion) scored by an independent second
rater, blind to the participants' group. Overall the percentage of agreement was in
excess of 80010for each test and kappa values were in excess of .70. Any
discrepancies were resolved through discussion.
3.3 AIMS
The research presented here incorporates two main aims, the first of these to identify
the generative capacity of a group of savant artists. The second, to investigate if their
overall creative or generative ability is either impaired, inhibited or facilitated by their
autism. Participants were presented with a variety of multifaceted tasks, which aimed
to measure creative and generative ability on a number of dimensions. The use of this
stringent methodology aimed to ensured that results were not due to any extraneous
factors and allowed the examination of a number of separate factors, such as
intelligence, autism, and artistic ability, to be investigated simultaneously.
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Chapter4:
Initial Investigations:
Savant Creative and Generative Ability, an Empirical Study
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This present chapter provides a introduction into the creative and generative
capabilities of savant artists on a standardised test of creativity. Chapter 2 highlighted
the interesting paradox arising when one considers that savant artists display ability in
a creative domain, regardless of the deficits associated with their autism. Yet despite
this obvious inconsistency between ability and diagnosis, there has yet to be an
empirical investigation into the creative and generative capacity of such individuals,
although there are many anecdotal accounts of the creative nature of their artistic
outputs (Herrnelin et al., 1999; Pring et al., 1997; Sacks, 1995; Selfe, 1977, 1983).
This first study aims thus to assess the creative or generative ability of a group of
savant artists using a standardised test of creativity. In much the same way that the
generative capacity of savant musicians was measured within the musical domain
(Hennelin et al., 1987; Hennelin et al., 1989; Sloboda et al., 1985) this initial
investigation measures savant performance in the domain of drawing. For this
purpose the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT) was selected (Torrance,
1974). The TTCT measures creative performance over three tasks and in four
domains; fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration. The performance of the
savant artists was compared against that of two IQ matched control groups; a group of
non-talented individuals with autism and a group of individuals with general learning
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difficulties. The performance of a group of talented A-level art students was also
measured. The results are discussed separately for each of the creativity dimensions.
As was discussed in chapter 2 creativity is in itself an ill defined concept, the
measurement of which is thus fraught with problems. Although there are a number of
tests which claim to measure creativity very few of these are accompanied by
standardised administration instructions and norms. For these reasons any tests that
are intended to assess creativity ability need to be discussed in detail, in order to fully
understand which aspects of creative ability they claim to measure.
The To"once Test of Creative Thinking
The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking were devised by Torrance in the 1970's in
an attempt to devise an adequate and convenient test of creative potential on verbal
and non-verbal tasks. The original format consisted of two equivalent verbal forms
and two equivalent figural forms, the tasks were suitable for use with a wide range of
age groups, from primary schools to the work place, and could be administered to
groups in order to save time. Torrance (1974) suggested that the tests could have a
variety of uses, from providing a more detailed understanding of the human mind and
development and detecting potential skills which may otherwise remain undetected, to
assessing the effects of teaching procedures or practices and providing cues for
remedial programmes.
Torrance defined creativity in similar terms to the classic definition, but like Baron
(1989) and Boden (1994) amongst others, rather than seeing creativity as a term
which should be reserved for rare particularised kinds of ability, people or products,
100
as many traditional definitions did, Torrance chose to focus on "the production of
something new", and the process by which this is produced. Creativity was defined by
Torrance as "a process of becoming sensitive to problems, gaps in knowledge
...identifying the difficulty searching for solutions ...formulating hypothesis ..testing
and re-testing these ...and finally communicating the results" (1974, pp.8). This
definition is more in line with the current views of creativity as a problem solving
ability discussed in chapter 2, and in particular Torrance refers to Newell et al.'s
(1962) description of creative problem solving (see pp.44).
Whereas more classical tests of creativity or divergent thinking looked at a variety of
response patterns (fluency, flexibility and so on) the TICT was the first to actually set
out to measure these dimensions independently of one another and to provide a set of
standardised scores. The TTCT consists of two equivalent verbal tests and two
equivalent figural forms. Both verbal forms consist of seven tasks, each believed to
require a different mental process and divergent direction. Examples of the tasks
include; asking the participant to come up with ideas to improve a toy to make it more
fun to play with; the unusual uses task as first used by Christensen et al. (1960) and
questions about possible causes and consequences such as "what would happen if
clouds had strings?". The figural forms each consist of three activities, on form a and
form b these activities are identical although, the stimuli differ slightly. In the present
study figural form a was used and a more detailed account of the rationale behind this
test will be presented. The first of the three activities is the picture construction, here
participants are presented with a tear-shaped piece of sticky paper, which they are
instructed to stick on a response booklet and to use as the basis of a drawn response.
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The second task in the Tl'CT was the incomplete figure activity. This test is an
adaptation of the drawing completion test used by Barron (1958) and Kinget (1953).
Here participants are presented with 10 meaningless squiggles or lines, which they are
required to transform into a meaningful picture. The stimuli for this task were created
in such a way that each figure could be clearly incorporated into a common response.
To produce a creative response then, the participant must overcome the urge to
complete the figure in the easiest way possible. The third task, or condition, in the
figural ITeT is the repeated figure task. Here, participants are presented with 30 sets
of parallel lines of three separate widths apart and the main element tested here is the
ability to produce multiple responses from a single stimulus. The repeated figures
activity is similar to the incomplete figures activity, in that both require the ability to
bring structure and completeness to that which was once incomplete, to make a whole
out of a part. The instructions for each of these tasks are written at the top of the
response booklet, with emphasis on terms such as "unusual", "original" and
"different" .
What really sets the Torrance tests aside from those previously used in psychology are
the scoring guides mentioned previously. The Tl'C'I was the first creativity test to
provide not only a comprehensive, detailed scoring guide, but also a set of
standardised norms for different population groups. The figural form of the ITeT is
scored on four dimensions. each thought to contribute to creative output. The
dimensions used are very similar to those used in early studies of creativity, and
identified in factor-analytical studies (i.e. Guildford, 1950). The first dimension
measured is fluency. Fluency refers to the total number of responses per activity or
overall. Torrance argues that the fluency dimension is particularly useful as a tool for
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interpreting the other scores. For example, a high score on fluency does not
necessarily highlight a creative thinker and individuals that score highly on the
remaining three dimensions often score lower on fluency, as they spend more time on
each response. The second dimension is that of flexibility. This concerns the ability
to produce a variety of semantically different ideas and shift mental sets. Again
Torrance points out that this dimension should be viewed in relation to the fluency
score and suggests that a flexibility index could be obtained by dividing the flexibility
score by the fluency score and multiplying by 100. This equation results then in a
fluency independent, percentage score.
The third dimension measured on the ITCT is originality, this refers to the
participant's ability to generate novel or unusual ideas and high scores on this
measure are often associated with intellectual energy (Torrance, 1974). As suggested
with regard to flexibility, this score must be seen in relation to the fluency score and
here again Torrance suggests using an originality index. High scores on this
dimension are dependent on the individual overcoming the gratification associated
with an immediate, yet common, response. These norms provide a measure of the
frequency of response and thus a somewhat independent measure of originality. The
final dimension measured by the TTCT is that of elaboration, reflecting the
individual's ability to develop and elaborate ideas. As each of the dimensions can be
seen to measure a distinct area of creative thought, it was suggested by Torrance that
they should be studied separately. This has an added advantage in providing a more
comprehensive account of creative potential and the areas in which an individual
shows a particular ability. For example, a participant may be particularly original, but
lack the ability to develop their initial idea, as evident on a high score for originality
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and a low elaboration score. The use of an index accounting for the overall effect of
fluency illustrates earlier points made in Chapter 2 regarding the difference between
creativity (originality) and generativity (fluency), allowing them to be studied
independently.
The Relationship Between The TTCT And Other Factors: Although a test in which
the response is drawn. the TTCT is not related to artistic ability (Torrance, 1974) as it
is the quality of the idea which is important not the quality of the drawn response.
Given the problems associated with creativity research in general, discussed in more
detail in chapter 2, the TTCT can be seen to provide a good tool for assessing creative
ability and test-retest reliability is consistently found to be high (Treffinger, 1985).
Furthermore there is longitudinal evidence correlating scores on the TTCT with
Treffinger's (1985) creative achievement criteria With regard to the relationship
between intelligence and creativity as measured on the TTCT, Torrance argues that
the tests do not correlate with intelligence. However, although the relationship with
academic achievement is questionable, it has been suggested that high intelligence is
necessary for publicly recognised creative achievements (Yamanda & Tam, 1996).
More recently in a re-examination of Torrance's original data Plucker (1999) argues
that while intelligence may be an indicator of creative achievement, it is a weak
predictor when measures of divergent thinking are considered. These two concepts
thus, may be considered independent constructs, at least in individuals with IQ in the
average range and normal development.
The main criticism aimed at the Torrance tests concerns construct validity (Chase,
1985). Particular criticism focuses at the use of the separate dimensions and a number
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of studies have highlighted the limited discriminant validity of the fluency, flexibility,
originality and elaboration scores (Hocevar, 1979; Chase, 1998). In particular it was
found that originality and flexibility sub-scores became unreliable when fluency was
partialled out (Hocevar & Michael. 1979). The results of such studies suggest, as
Clapham (1998) points out, that fluency is the primary dimension measured by the
nCT. Following on from this Heausler and Thompson (1988) argue that the use of
the separate dimensions primarily represent a general factor and do not provide
meaningful information when looked at separately. Such criticisms were supported
by Clapham (1998) who looked at, not only the validity of the separate dimensions,
but also the structure of the two forms, using 334 psychology students. Clapham
concluded that separate dimensions contributed only a little to the overall variance of
scores and factor analysis showed that the sub-scores reflected one general creativity
factor. Still, despite this finding it was argued that although the sub-scores were
highly related, they did provide some useful information and provided a pattern of
results indicating that on this test a general score alone cannot adequately represent
creative ability
Using the ITer with individuals with lower intelligence
Although the Torrance tests were not designed for specific use with individuals with
borderline or below average intelligence, they were designed to be used over a wide
age and ability range, beginning with children as young as four years of age. As the
TTCT does not involve complex verbal instructions it is very useful for use with
individuals with lower intelligence. As mentioned in chapter 2, the TTCT has
previously been used successfully with a savant group (Duckett, 1976) and a group of
children with autism (Craig & Baron-Cohen, 1999). In Craig and Baron-Cohen's
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study participants with autism and Asperger's Syndrome groups were matched closely
with a non-autistic group on VIQ and with a group of normally developing children,
matched on CA to the clinical groups' MA. They used the incomplete and repeated
figures conditions from the figural form a. On the repeated figures test, when the
composite scores were analysed, an overall autism-specific deficit was found. When
the dimensions of fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration were analysed
separately, in support of previous findings (Jarrold, 1997; Turner, 1999), fluency was
found to be particularly impaired in both the autism and the Asperger's groups. Craig
interprets these results in terms of executive function deficits, maintaining that a
fluency deficit provides evidence of perseveration.
Craig and Baron-Cohen's explanation is, however, somewhat flawed as, although a
fluency deficit can be seen in terms of an executive dysfunction as evidence of
impaired activation, a reduced fluency score does not provide evidence of
perseveration. As stated earlier, a perseverative response is a response that is either a
repetition or variation of a previous response, or a semantically similar response.
Perseveration would thus be measured on the flexibility dimension and evident in a
lower flexibility score. A low fluency score on the other hand would indicate an
executive function deficit at the activation level and would indicate a true generativy
deficit. As such, the group means on the dimension of flexibility appear considerably
lower in both autistic groups, but no significance is reported. Craig and Baron-
Cohen's results would have been more useful if they had made adjustments for the
confounding effect of fluency. A lower fluency score would mean that the scores on
the other dimensions would also be lower, as participants completed fewer responses
could be scored. It may thus be that the autistic groups produced responses that were
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as original and flexible as the two control groups but that this finding went unnoticed
due to the low fluency score.
Following the repeated figures test, Craig gave the incomplete figures test to
participants. Again the group with autism performed particularly poorly on this test.
However, although there was no significant difference between the groups with ASD
and the two control groups using the composite scores, significant differences were
found on the results of the separate dimensions. However, despite the group with
autism performing significantly worse on the dimensions of flexibility and both ASD
groups producing less original responses, there was no difference in the fluency
scores between groups. Craig argued that the fluency deficit apparent on the repeated
figure test is due to the identical nature of the stimuli in this task. What Craig
overlooks though, are the differential demands involved in the two tasks.
Specifically, the incomplete figure test involves only 10 stimulus figures, whereas
there are 30 figures involved in the repeated figure task. The failure to find a fluency
effect on the incomplete figure task is likely to reflect the fact this was a shorter task
in which many of the participants scored at ceiling level.
One particularly interesting fmding to come out of the incomplete figure task is that
although the performance of the autistic group was equal to the two control groups on
fluency, they performed significantly worse on both originality and flexibility.
Firstly, it should be reiterated that, a high score on originality is dependent on the
individual going beyond the common, most frequent, response and as such delaying
the instant gratification that would result from such a response. It would appear that
the autistic group had difficulty in doing this and, particularly in this sub-test where
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the common response is often relatively clear, could not go beyond the initial evoked
response. This finding is consistent with the executive dysfunction account in that the
autistic groups were unable to inhibit this first, common response.
With regard to flexibility, the points raised earlier regarding perseveration appear to
be strengthened and it appears the group with autism and the group with Asperger's
syndrome both performed significantly worse on this dimension. This is somewhat
surprising as one might expect that a perseveration score would be more evident on
the repeated figure test. This is because on the repeated figure test the participant is
required to produce a multiple response from a single cue, which as Turner (1999)
maintains is a condition that often elicits perseveration, especially when the response
is drawn. Turner argues that this perseveration is more likely on tasks where the
response is drawn as participants also have to overcome the motor response associated
with their previous response.
Craig and Baron-Cohen's (1999) finding that the results are not consistent across
dimensions nor sub-tests, provides support for looking at each dimension separately.
More importantly, however, and as touched on in the discussion of the above results,
the dimensions measured on the ITCT correspond closely with an area in which
individuals with autism have been shown to have impairments. These impairments
include a lack of flexibility, a low fluency pattern, and a lack of imagination (see
Chapter 2 for details). The dimensions measured on the TTCT also fit in with the
executive dysfunction account of the generativity deficits in autism, as suggested by
Jarrold(1997)and Turner (1997, 1999).
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Test Modifications
It is evident from the above discussion that the figural form of the TTCT is a useful
test with which to investigate the generative capacity of a group of artistic savants. It
has clear scoring guidelines and standardised norms, has been successfully used
before with learning disabled and autistic groups and the dimensions measured by this
test correspond closely with areas found to be impaired in autism. What is more, it
fits well with the theoretical background of generativity in autism. But, despite these
positive attributes a number of modifications would be necessary in order to make the
test more suitable for administration to a mixed intelligence group.
Following pilot testing the picture construction task was excluded from this
investigation as it provided no useful information with regard to flexibility or fluency.
Furthermore. pilot studies indicated that the presentation of a number of stimulus
figures on one page tended to de-motivate participants and to reduce this in the
investigations described here. figures were presented in small booklets with one figure
per page. In an attempt to reduce the confounding effect of fluency on the other
dimensions in the repeated figures task the overall number of stimulus figures was
reduced. thus giving a more insightful result on the other three dimensions.
Regarding the testing conditions, rather than using instructions written on the top of
the testing booklet, instructions were given verbally to each participant. Although the
TICT manual states a training period is not necessary. this is referring to the use of
the test with individuals of normal intelligence. As researchers have pointed to the
importance of a warm up period in producing optimum performance with groups with
lower intelligence (Leevers & Harris, 1998) a training task was introduced in this
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study. This consisted of a variety of practice stimuli, generated by the examiner, with
the aim of clearly illustrating to each participant the aim of the study.
Aims
The aim of this first investigation was to assess the performance of a group of savant
artists on a standardised test of creativity in the domain of their talent. Although this
is the first study that attempts to empirically test the generative capacity of a group of
artistic savants, it is possible to make a nwnber of predictions based on previous
studies and reports.
With regard to fluency mixed results have been reported in the literature depending on
the task used. However, as Jarrold (1997) and Turner (1997, 1999) argue there is
sound evidence for a fluency deficit in autism. What is unknown is how much the
talent possessed by the savant artists may ameliorate this deficit. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that in an attempt to reduce the confounding effect of fluency on the
other dimensions, the nwnber of stimulus figures in the repeated figures task was
reduced to ten. Hence an autism-specific fluency deficit may not emerge.
Individuals with autism produce less imaginative responses than those produced by
controls, so we might expect the two groups with autism, the savant artists and the
autism control group, would show lower scores on the dimension of originality.
Originality also involves a measure of inhibition, in that the individuals must inhibit
the common response elicited by the stimuli in order to generate a novel response. As
inhibitory impairments are associated with autism, we may expect the two groups
with autism to perform significantly worse than the LDC group. Alternatively one
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interesting hypothesis is that the perceptual processing style associated with autism,
referred to as weak central coherence, could result in more original responses on this
type of task. It has been reported by a number of researchers (Frith, 1989. Frith &
Happe, 1994, Shah & Frith, 1983, 1993) that individuals with autism have a
processing style that favours piecemeal, context-independent information. It is
proposed that this attention to detail and to the parts of an object may facilitate
performance on this task, as it involves making a whole picture out of a constituent
part. As such the ITCr can be seen as the reverse of the EFT, in which participants
are required to identify a part from a meaningful picture. Individuals with autism
have been shown to perform above IQ matched controls on this task (Shah & Frith,
1983) and thus we might expect the two autistic groups to be advantaged relative to
the LDC group. In particular as it has been noted that although reduced facilitation by
meaning is found on sentence processing (Frith & Snowling, 1983, Happe, 1997)
children with autism are able to extract meaning from pictorial stimuli, hence are able
to perceive an overall whole in this domain (Ameli, Courchesne. Lincoln. Kaufman &
Grillon, 1988; Bryson, 1983). In particular better performance is expected from the
savant group, who show superior segmentation skills to IQ matched autistic controls
(Pring et al., 1995). Furthermore as Pring et al. (1995) and Mottron and Belleville
(1993. 1995) argue, savant artists are capable of producing global, coherent visual
responses
There is no evidence of an autism-specific deficit on elaboration (Lewis & Boucher,
1991) and as Hermelin et al. (1987, 1989) found, often savant musicians produced
more elaborate responses than controls. Although more research is needed into this
dimension it is expected, in line with the results outlined above. that the savant group
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will perform significantly better than the autistic and LDC control groups on this
measure as a result of their superior artistic ability. Finally regarding flexibility a
number of studies have indicated that individuals with autism have some difficulty in
producing flexible responses (Turner, 1999), thus it is expected that the two autistic
groups will perform poorly on this task. A lack of flexibility has been linked to a
perseveration deficit and Turner identifies two types of perseveration; recurrent
perseveration (repeats) and 'stuck in set' perseveration (semantically related
responses). It has been noted that individuals with autism have difficulty in producing
a variety of responses for a single cue, it is thus likely that perseveration will be more
evident in the repeated figure task where participants are required to generate a
number of responses for a variety of parallel lines. With respect to the performance of
the savant group it has been noted that autistic savants tend to stick to drawing one
thing, for example buildings or trains (Sacks, 1995). In some ways this can be
considered to be evidence of 'stuck in set' perseveration and as such we can predict
that the performance of the savant artists will be more similar to the autism control
group.
The following study compares the performance of closely matched groups on a
standardised test of creativity.
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Experiment 1: The TTCT
4.2 METHOD
4.2.1 Participants
Four groups of participants were included in this investigation; the savant artists, the
autism control group, the LDC group and the art student group. Full details of the
participants in each of these groups is described in Chapter 3.
The scores produced by the art student group will be presented in the descriptive
sections for broad comparison purposes but not included into any statistical analysis.
this is because performance of the art student group was clearly far superior to that of
the three mixed ability groups. The main focus of this study was the performance of
the savant artists and whether this was due to their overall intelligence, their autism or
their artistic ability. One area of interest was how the performance of the savant
group compared to a group with similar ability and no developmental disorder or
delay. As it happened the art student group produced scores so far above that of the
other three groups that they were of a different order and to include their data would
serve only to confound the analysis of the remaining three groups. For this reason
only the scores for the three mixed intelligence groups (the savant artists, the autism
control group and the LDC group) were included in statistical analysis.
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4.2.2 Materials
Two tasks from the ITCT (figural form a) were used, the incomplete figures and the
repeated figures task. The incomplete figure condition consisted of 10 meaningless
squiggles, an example of two of these stimuli figures is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Example of the two stimuli figures presented in the incomplete figures
condition of the ITer
The stimuli for this task were presented in the same order as in the original booklet,
but were presented to participants in the form ofa small booklet, 215mm x 267rnm in
size. The second task was the repeated figure task. The stimuli for this task consisted
of ten sets of parallel lines three separate widths apart. Again the order of
presentation was the same as in the original TICT booklet, although fewer stimuli
were presented to the participants. The first two lines were 8mm apart, followed by
four sets at 13mm apart and four sets at 20mm apart, as illustrated in figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: The stimuli figures presented in Ihe repealed figures task
I
As well as the experimental stimuli used for this task a number of separate stimulus
figures were generated by the experimenter for the training period. These practice
stimuli were similar enough to the experimental stimuli to illustrate the task
requirements but not so similar as to give participants responses they could replicate.
For example, where the repeated figures activity consisted of ten parallel lines, the
practice stimuli consisted of three two sided triangles.
4.2.3 Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room at either their day centre or
home, with the exception of the art student group who were tested in small groups at
their sixth form college. Participants were informed they would be completing a test
of creativity or imagination, whereby they would be producing a variety of pictures.
They were reminded at this point that this was not a test of drawing ability, but of the
creativity, thus it was not how good their drawings were which was important, but
what they drew.
Participants were then presented with the training booklet. As stated in the
introduction to this chapter, this booklet included a variety of stimulus figures, similar
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to the original TTeT stimuli. Participants were shown the first example figure and
told that the aim of the test was to make a picture using the part and to elicit an initial
response the experimenter provided the answer for this initial figure. A second
practice figure was then shown and this time the experimenter asked what they
thought they could make out of the part. After this the participant was encouraged to
draw the response. At this point the experimenter encouraged each individual to add
details to the original stimulus in an attempt to convey the original written instructions
which emphasise the addition of detail to the stimulus. An effort was made to
maintain exactly the same instructions to each of the participants. A fmal practice
figure was presented in order to establish that the instructions had been fully
understood, to stress the need to give a different response each time and not to try and
draw the same thing. These instructions were modified slightly for the art group in
which an example figure was put onto a board at the front of the classroom and the
instructions given to the group, rather than individually.
After the training period participants were presented with the incomplete figure
booklet, and the following instructions, "Here is a booklet filled with parts of pictures,
or squiggles like we have just seen. What I want you to do is to make each of the
squiggles into a picture like we have just done. You can draw anything you want, as
long as you use the line in your picture." Each appropriate response was
congratulated, and for each inappropriate response, such as not using the lines or
repeating a previous response, one warning was given. If participants could not
complete a response they were informed to leave it out and to go on to the next
design, with the opportunity to complete any figures which were missed out at the end
of the condition. No time restriction was imposed.
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4.3 SCORING, RESULTS & DISCUSSION FOR EACH
DIMENSION
As the TICT is a large task, consisting of two conditions, each scored on four
dimensions, the results will be presented separately for each dimension, including the
scoring guidelines, results and discussion.
4.3.1 Fluency: How many responses can be produced?
Fluency: Scoring
The fluency score was comprised of the total number of responses completed by each
participant. In keeping with previous studies which looked at fluency (Turner, 1999),
all responses in which the participant made an attempt to incorporate the stimulus
figure into a picture were scored under this dimension. This included responses in
which the picture did not resemble the title, as well as abstract patterns and designs.
The only responses not included in this score were either responses in which the
participant scribbled on the response booklet or several incidents where the stimulus
figure was simply redrawn. Such scoring criterion allows the identification of a true
generativity deficit regardless of the appropriateness of the response. The fluency
dimension was thus a closed task, as the stimuli consisted of 20 figures.
Fluency: Results
Fluency measures the total number of ideas that an individual can produce, for this
reason a composite fluency score, comprising of the sum of the fluency scores on the
two sub tests will be presented and used in further analysis. However, as the two tests
may tap different abilities the mean scores and standard deviations (SD) for the two
sub-tests are also presented in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: The mean scores (SD) for the dimension offluency on the ITeT
Incomplete figures Repeated figures Total
Savant 8.40 (2.13) 8.44 (3.l3) 16.90 (4.7)
Autism 8.00 (2.92) 7.11 (3.02) 15.11 (5.40)
LDC 9.11 (2.03) 9.78 (0.44) 18.90 (2.31)
Art Students 10.00 (0.00) 10.00 (0.00) 20.00 (0.00)
As Table 4.1 shows, the pattern of data is similar for both of the conditions across
groups. For this reason the total, composite scores across both conditions will be used
for further analysis. The art student group performed at ceiling on this task. The
fluency score was also very nearly at ceiling level in the LOe group, although
performance was more dispersed in the incomplete figures condition as illustrated by
the higher standard deviations.
A one-way ANOVA was carried out on the total scores of the savant, autistic control
and Loe groups. Despite the indication of an autism-specific deficit on this
dimension this difference did not reach significance (F (2,32) = 1.70, p = 0.20, 112 =
0.12). Moreover, further inspection of the apparently poor performance of the autistic
group shows that although the mean performance of these two groups was lower than
the LDe controls, the scores were not consistent within the groups and some
individuals were scoring at ceiling level. No correlations were found between PIQ or
VIQ (as measured on the RCM / RPM and PPVT) and fluency in any of the three
mixed intelligence groups: savant, autism control group and LOC groups (r below
O.4S,p = 0.22).
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Analysis of error scores: Initially it was planned that analysis would be conducted on
the error scores produced by the groups in this study, in keeping with previous studies
(Turner, 1999), especially as the scoring methodology was relatively loose in relation
to the type of response counted in the fluency score. However, the number of
unacceptable responses produced was so low that this was deemed unnecessary.
Indeed, only one participant in the savant group and two in the two IQ matched
control groups produced any responses which were classed as errors and this was only
on one item each.
Fluency: Discussion
The hypothesis proposed in the introduction, that there would be an autism-specific
deficit on this domain was not supported. A trend towards this result was highlighted
but this did not reach significance. It may thus be that the TTCT was not sensitive
enough to pick up this difference. This result may reflect the closed nature of the
task, as many of the participant's in the LDC and art student group consistently
performed at ceiling level on both tasks. As mentioned in the results section, four of
the participants in both the autistic and savant groups did indeed perform at ceiling
level, thus if the test had been extended it is likely we would have seen much more
dispersion in the scores of these two groups. However, the methodological decisions
to reduce the number of figures was made with consideration to a number of other
factors and extending the study would have had implications for the scores of the
other three dimensions. It should be noted that previous studies which have identified
a deficit in this domain have used open-ended tasks, or tasks in which the participant
must produce as many responses as they can in a given period of time, such as word,
design and ideational fluency tasks.
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The failure to find a significant effect on this dimension may also be due to the type
of stimuli used in this task. The nature of the task was such that the participant was
required to complete a given figure rather than to generate a response from scratch, as
in previous studies in which autistic participants have performed particularly poorly.
Itmay be that the type of stimuli used in this task acts as a prompt, which enables the
autistic participants to generate a number of responses. This would certainly seem the
case when looking at the results of previous studies that have used stimulus figures
(Leevers & Harris, 1998). No correlations were found between fluency and
intelligence, although this is likely to reflect the fact that several participants
performed at ceiling level.
The qualitative difference between creativity and generativity has been discussed
throughout this thesis and this initial study provides further indication of this divide.
As previously discussed quantity as measured by fluency gives us no indication of the
quality of the responses and a high fluency score in normal participants is often
equated with low scores on the other dimensions (Torrance, 1974). It has already
been discussed that the primary deficit in autism may be one of generativity with
some positive imaginative results reported (Leevers & Harris, 1998) although this
result is not consistent (Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996; Turner, 1999). The discussion of
the remaining three dimensions will explore this distinction in more detail.
In conclusion, the dimension of fluency can be seen to measure the generative ability
of the participants on a drawing task. Although the savant group and autism control
group showed a slight tendency to produce fewer responses than the two non-autistic
groups, this difference failed to reach significance. Considering the spontaneous
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nature of savant art, and artistic ability in genera], and the failure of this test to
highlight a difference between the talented and non-talented groups, the validity of
this test as an adequate measure of generative ability is questionable.
4.3.2 Originality: How Novel is the Response?
Originality: Scoring
The scoring for the dimension of originality followed that outlined in the TICT
manual (Torrance, 1974). Based on a standardised set of norms, each response
produced by the participant was given a rating depending on statistical rarity. In the
incomplete figures task, commonplace responses were given a score of zero, with the
most original responses given a score of two and those falling between given a score
of one. The scoring for the repeated figure task was slightly different. Here
responses were scored on a zero to three scale, based on a second set of norms. It is
necessary here to refer to the distinction made in the introduction chapter between
artistic creativity and cognitive creativity. The TICT can be seen to measure the
types of cognitive creativity referred to by Finke et al. (1992). Originality as
measured on this test concerns the idea produced, rather than the expression of the
idea and as such is not related to the artistic expression of the response. Examples of
common and original responses in the incomplete figures task are given in figure 4.3
and figure 4.4 respectively. Examples of a common and original response in the
repeated figures task are illustrated in figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.3: Examples of two common responses on the incomplete figures task
Response a: a bird Response b: a tree
Figure 4.4: Examples of two original responses on the incomplete figures task
\J •"f
\ .
, 1\ .
Response a: aflying clock Response b: a gateway
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Figure 4.5: Examples ora common and original response on the repeated figures
OD
Q
d~
1
Common response: a house Original response: a chick
As previously discussed in the introduction to this chapter, it has been consistently
found that the scores on the dimensions of originality, elaboration and flexibility are
highly related to the fluency score. As a result of this, many studies have found no
discriminant validity between the dimensions. This problem was addressed by
reducing the number of stimulus figures in the repeated figure task. However, as
illustrated in the fluency dimension, the two autistic groups did produce fewer
responses overall, even though this difference did not reach significance it could still
confound the results on the other measures. As such the scores of the two autistic
groups on these dimensions will be confounded as a result of their lower response
rate. Here we are concerned with the scores for each of the dimensions independent of
the fluency scores and therefore it was necessary to transform the raw scores in order
to gain e fluency-independem score for this dimension. To do this a mean response
score was gained for each individual, by dividing their total originality score by their
total fluency score.
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Originality: Results
The total scores and standard deviations for the dimension of originality are shown in
table 4.2. These consist of the combined scores from the two tests. both the total
scores are shown and the mean response score and standard deviations (SO) for the
two tasks combined.
Table 4.2: The total combined means (SD) and response scores tor the dimension of
originality on the ITeT
Total originality scores Mean response score
Savant 21.89 (9.45) 1.14 (0.33)
Autistic 17.89 (14.48) 0.95 (0.58)
LOC 19.44 (11.22) 0.91 (0.51)
Art Students 36.50 (1.90) 1.66 (0.08)
The performance of the art student group is again clearly above that of the three
mixed intelligence groups, as can be seen on both the total scores and on the mean
response score. What is more. the very low standard deviations found with regard to
this group indicates that there was very little variance between their responses.
Despite the confounding effect of fluency, the mean total score of the savant group is
still higher than the LDC group. Due to the data not conforming to parametric
assumptions a Kruskal Wallis test was used to analyse this data, using the mean
response scores. Analysis found there to be no significant group difference (X2 =
1.54. P = 0.46).
Before a discussion of these results is presented. it is worth noting that there are
several problems with using the combined score in this task instead of looking at the
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scores of the two tests separately. Firstly, the two tests are scored using different
ratings scales, so the repeated figure scores will account for a larger part of the total
score. What is more, the two tests can be seen to tap into different abilities. It may be
more difficult to produce original responses in the incomplete figure task, as this task
requires the participant to inhibit the obvious responses in order to generate an
original response. In the repeated figures task the emphasis is on the inhibition of the
previous response in order to produce a number of different responses from the same
stimuli. For these reasons the two tasks will now be analysed separately, the mean
total scores and responses scores, along with the standard deviations (SD), for the two
conditions are shown in table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Mean total scores and response scores (SD) tor the incomplete figure task
and {he rel!£ated figure task
IDcomplete Figure Repeated Figure
IDcompiete MeaD respoase Repeated MeaD respoase
Figures scores Figures scores
Savants 9.00 (4.00) 1.04 (0.33) 10.10 (5.84) 1.10 (0.58)
Autistic 8.56 (6.02) 0.97 (0.51) 7.67 (8.58) 0.93 (0.87)
LDC 9.56 (4.53) 1.03 (0.39) 10.22 (7.28) 1.03 (0.73)
Art Students 14.4 (2.5) 1.44 (0.25) 18.50 (3.24) 1.85 (0.32)
As with the total scores, the performance of the art group is clearly superior in both
conditions. The response pattern produced by the savant group appears to be more
similar to that of the LDC group than the autistic controls on both conditions,
however, when the scores from the three groups were analysed on the two conditions,
no group difference was found (Incomplete figures, X2 = 0.46, p= 0.62; repeated
figures, X2 = 0.79, p = 0.67).
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In order to investigate the performance of the three mixed intelligence groups in more
detail, the number of responses receiving the maximum score for originality were
calculated. Again these scores were converted into percentages in order to account for
any confounding fluency effect. The mean percentage of highly original scores are
shown in table 4.4 along with the standard deviations (SD).
Table 4.4:The mean percentage of highly original responses produced in the ITer
by the three mixed intelligence groups (SD)
Incomplete Figures Repeated Figures
0/0 %
Savant 37.59 (23.47) 30.00 (16.58)
Autistic 31.27 (22.27) 15.85 (20.56)
LDC 36.94 (14.35) 30.37 (23.48)
Total
%
33.46 (16.33)
25.13 (19.66)
33.16 (17.71)
The performance of the savant group is more akin to that of the LDC control group
than the autistic controls, again the high standard deviations in all three groups points
to high within-group variance found on such tasks. A Kruskal Wallis conducted on
these scores indicated no differences on any on the conditions (incomplete figures: "I)
= 0.32, p = 0.85; repeated figures: X2 = 3.05, P = 0.22; total scores: X2 = 1.87, P =
0.40)
Analysis on each of the three mixed intelligence groups individually, indicated no
significant intelligence by originality correlation, using Spearman's rho, in either of
the groups with autism and the levels of association were particularly low in the
savant group. With regard to the LDC group, there was a significant correlation
between PIQ and performance on the repeated figures task, using the fluency
independent, transformed scores (PIQ: rs = 0.87,p < 0.01). What is more, whereas no
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inter-test relationship was indicated in the two autistic groups (rs below 0.48, p =
0.19), when the scores of the LDC group were analysed individually there was a
strong correlation between the repeated figures test and the incomplete figures (r s =
0.85,p < 0.01).
Originalirv: Discussion
Where the fluency dimension could be seen as a measure of generative ability,
originality can be equated with creativity, as it taps the ability to produce new and
novel ideas. What is more, as the TICT provides a set of standardised norms we can
assess the statistical rarity of the responses. The performance of the savant group on
this measure did not differ significantly from the two IQ matched control groups.
Interestingly, as well as the large within-group variation evident in the large standard
deviations, when the raw scores produced by each participant were studied it was
found that there was a great deal of within-participant variation, especially within the
two groups with autism. This means that each participant produced a variety of
common and unusual responses, therefore the ability to produce original responses
was not constant within individuals.
One explanation for both the lack a significant group difference and the large
variation within-group concerns the relationship between originality and intelligence.
As the within group IQ range is so wide in the three mixed intelligence groups, it is
possible that the intelligence plays a large role in performance on this task. Certainly
the scores on the dimension of originality appear to be strongly associated with
intelligence, as shown by the far superior performance of the art student group. We
may expect the art group to produce more original responses as their repertoire of
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ideas is likely to be larger as a result of their education. This conclusion is supported
by the failure to find a significant difference between the three mixed intelligence
groups, especially as these groups were matched closely on IQ
Turner (1999) found that, as with fluency, originality was not associated with
intelligence in individuals with autism, in her study participants with autism and
normal range IQ scores, performed as poorly as those with autism and below average
IQ. The results of this study support her finding, with the only IQ and performance
relationship found between the LOe group on the repeated figures task. Thus, while
intelligence can explain the variation within the LOe group, it cannot account for the
varied performance of the savant or autism control groups. This is a very interesting
point, at least on this task. It appears that in autism, originality is an independent skill
not related to intelligence nor talent, as indicated by the equal performance of the two
autistic groups. Furthermore there were no inter-task correlations between the
repeated figures and incomplete figures in the two autistic groups, suggesting that in
these groups the two tests are tapping different abilities, this is in stark contrast to the
high inter-test correlation found in the LDe group. A further explanation for the
failure to find a significant effect of group on this dimension concerns the scoring of
originality itself. Specifically it may have been that the task did not distinguish
clearly between responses.
In the introduction to this chapter, two separate hypotheses were outlined regarding
the performance of the two autistic groups on this dimension. The first of these
referred to the lack of originality or imagination associated with autism and the
evidence surrounding this reported autism-specific deficit. The second prediction
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concerned the possibility that autistic individuals, in particular the savant group, may
produce more original responses due to an idiosyncratic perceptual ability. A
discussion of these two explanations is provided below.
Firstly, there was no evidence of an autism-specific deficit on this task and this may
be due to the non-verbal nature of the task. As discussed in the introduction, the area
of creative or generative ability in autism has been widely overlooked in the literature
and there are only a handful of studies with which to compare the results of this study.
Previous studies highlighting an originality or imagination impairment have all
required relatively complex verbal responses, at least in order to move away from
conventional responses. In this study the performance of the two autistic groups was
equal to that of the LDC group and this may reflect the non-verbal nature of the
response. Although the TTCT did involve a verbal aspect, as participants were
required to verbalise the title of the response, this occurred after they had drawn their
response, and usually only required a one word label. This contrasts with tests such as
the pattern meaning and object uses in which original or imaginative responses will
often involve a detailed sentence. Here again the Leevers and Harris (1998) study can
be used as support, as although originality was not specifically tested they provide a
number of examples of the original responses provided by some autistic children on
their drawing task, a task which had only minimal verbal demands. It may also be
that there is a difference between the types of creativity tested in the two domains, for
example verbal tasks may assess conceptual creativity whereas non-verbal tasks in the
drawing domain may tap perceptual creativity. This argument is strengthened when
one looks at the correlations within the LDC group. Here, a strong relationship was
found between non-verbal IQ and originality on the repeated figures task, but, when
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the relationship between verbal IQ and performance was analysed it, albeit narrowly,
missed significance.
The second hypothesis outlined in the introduction concerned how the unusual
perceptual style of the savant and autistic groups may enable them to produce original
responses. It was suggested that the context-independent, piece-meal perceptual style
found in autistic individuals, might prove beneficial in this instance and that the
ITCT could be seen as a generative version of the EFT. This is because, rather than
having to find a part in a whole, the TICT required participants to make a whole out
of a part. It was hypothesised that the autistic individuals' focus on the parts of
objects may allow them to generate unusual responses and that this effect would be
even stronger in the savant group, not only because art often involves depicting things
in unusual ways (Van Sommers, 1984) but also as this processing style has been
found to be stronger in artistic savants (Pring, et al., 1995). This prediction was not
supported by the results, with the two autistic groups performing at a similar level to
the LDC group. Even when the percentage of high scores are studied the savant
group produced the same amount of highly original responses as the LDC group. On
one hand it seems that a heightened segmentation ability does not necessarily benefit
performance on this task. Although, as yet the segmentation style of these savant
artists has yet to be measured, therefore it cannot be concluded for certain that the
autistic groups tested here do show superior segmentation abilities. At any rate, a
note of caution needs to be applied since a number of studies have failed to replicate
this finding using the EFT (Brian & Bryson, 1996; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers,
1991). Although the view that some parts could be more easily incorporated into a
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response has the propensity to explain the large within-participant variation found on
this task.
A closer look at the differences between the two tasks may help us gain an insight into
the performance of the three mixed ability groups on the dimension of originality.
Here, the two sub-tests can be seen to measure different abilities. In the repeated
figures the emphasis is on producing a number of ideas from a single stimulus figure
and hence is more relevant to the flexibility dimension. The emphasis on the
incomplete figures task is on producing an original response by overcoming the
common response elicited by the stimulus figure, hence if the creative and generative
deficits shown by individuals with autism are due to an inhibitory impairment we
would expect poorer performance on this measure. However, this was not shown to
be the case and the autism control group produced the same number of highly original
responses on this task as the savant and LDe groups on the incomplete figures task.
It may be that there are two processes operating simultaneously here, inhibition and
unusual perception. On the one hand an inhibitory impairment possibly associated
with an executive deficit could result in poor performance, whereas the unusual
segmentation ability associated with autism and artistic ability could result in some
original responses, thus explaining the wide within participant variance in the two
groups with autism. This variance could relate to the stimulus figure, with some
figures requiring less inhibition in order to produce an unusual response.
To summarise on performance on the measure of originality, there were no significant
differences between the three mixed intelligence groups. The main finding on this
dimension was the wide within-group variation. In the LDC group this was mainly a
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result of the impact of intelligence, still, this was not found to be the case in the two
autistic groups.
4.3.3 Elaboration: The Addition of Detail
Elaboration: Scoring
Elaboration measures the amount of detail added to a drawn response, thereby
representing the participant's ability to carry out and develop an idea. The TTCT
manual states that credit should be given for each pertinent and meaningful detail
added to the original stimulus figure. In this way every new detail, added to the initial
meaningless stimuli, was given a point and the total number of new additions
constituted the overall elaboration score. This scoring methodology did though create
some confusion with regard as to what exactly was considered to constitute a
minimum response. In order to clarify this point further it was decided, for the
purpose of this study, a minimum response would refer to the simple outline of the
response, minus any defining detail at all. An example of a minimum response given
by a participant is shown in figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Example of responses given by participants constituting a minimum
response on the elqboration measure ofthe ITer
Response a: a horse Response b: a head
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It is accepted that the scoring methodology adopted for this study is somewhat more
stringent than suggested by Torrance (1974), nevertheless, it was noted that many of
the participants simply drew the outline of a response, with out adding any other
meaningful features or details. Should the scoring have followed that suggested in the
manual, a participant who drew a face with simple features (slits for eyes and nose for
example) would have been given the same score as an individual who drew only the
outline of a head as their response. Further to this and in line with the methodology
suggested by the manual, credit was only given to each new response, thus if a
participant drew a tree and added several identical leaves, they would only score one
point for elaboration, rather than a point for each leaf drawn. But, if a participant drew
a tree with a variety of different types of leaves, they would be given credit for each
different type. An example of the scoring methodology is shown in figure 4.7.
Figure 4. 7: Example of elaboration scoring the incomplete figures task
Points awarded for thefollowing:
String effect
Shading
Reflection
Bottom of the balloon
Balloons
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The confounding effect fluency may have on the remaining dimensions has already
been discussed in the preceding section and the same discussion applies for the
scoring of elaboration. Thus a participant who draws a low number of very elaborate
responses will score poorly on overall elaboration as a result of their low fluency
score. To take account of this effect, once again the overall elaboration scores were
divided by the fluency score to give a mean response score, that is the mean number
of details added to each figure. Any inappropriate responses were excluded from this
score as were any exact repeats.
Results: Elaboration
As the scoring of elaboration was the same on both the incomplete and repeated
figures tasks, and as such can be considered to measure the same ability in both
conditions, the total elaboration scores for the two tests were combined. These group
means and standard deviation are shown in table 4.5 along with the mean response
scores and standard deviations (SD)
Table 4.5: The Mean 10101 and overall combined response scores (SD) tor Ihe
dimension ore/aboralion in lhe ITeT
Total elaboration score Mean response score
Savant
Autistic
LDC
Art Students
44.44 (36.90)
12.77 (11.90)
30.22 (46.41)
149.20 (50.49)
2.23 (1.52)
0.66 (0.56)
1.37 (2.10)
6.78 (2.29)
The superior performance of the art student group is again clearly evident on the
results from the elaboration measure, with the autism control group appearing to
perform particularly poorly here. The large within-group variation shown by the high
standard deviations in the three mixed ability groups, illustrates the importance of
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individual differences on performance. Due to the large standard deviations, non-
parametric tests were used to analyse the mean response scores produced by the
savant, autism control group and LDC group. Kruskal-Wallis analysis on the
transformed scores of these groups indicated a significant group effect (X2 = 6.04, p <
0.05). Follow up Mann Whitney tests, using the Bonferroni adjustment rate, showed
that the savant group produced significantly more elaborate responses than the autistic
controls (W = 11, P < 0.025). The difference between the savant and LDC group
failed to reach significance (W = 23, p = 0.12). The total scores, mean response
scores and standard deviations (SO) for each condition, for the four groups on both
conditions are illustrated in table 4.6.
Table 4.6: The mean total and response scores (SD) tor the two conditions on the
dimension of elaboration in the ITeT
Incomplete Figures Repeated Figures
Mean Mean
Total score response score Total Score response score
Savants 15.00 (11.53) 1.69 (1.08) 26.56 (29.34) 2.89 (2.78)
Autistic 5.56 (4.47) 0.67 (0.51) 6.67 (8.53) 0.83 (0.95)
LDC 19.00 (31.30) 1.92 (3.11) 9.44 (14.37) 0.95 (1.44)
Art Students 69.40 (21.40) 6.94 (2.14) 65.7 (29.35) 6.57 (3.22)
The pattern of results seen when the scores of the two conditions are looked at
individually is somewhat surprising, with the LDC group producing more elaborative
responses than the savants in the incomplete figures condition. This performance
does not extend to the repeated figures task where the performance of the savant
group is much higher. The performance of the art students on the other hand remains
constant across the two conditions, as does the performance of the autism control
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group. When one studies the standard deviations produced by the four groups,
however, the variance within the LDC group on the incomplete figures task is
particularly high. and thus the mean scores do not give us a clear representation of
the average performance of this group. The scores of the three mixed ability groups
were again analysed using the Kruskal- Wallis, this difference did not reach
significance (X2 = 3.20,p = 0.16).
On the repeated figures task a significant group effect was found between the savant,
autism control group and LDC group (X2 = 7.25, P < 0.05). Follow up Mann Whitney
U tests, using the Bonferroni adjustment, found that the savant group produced
significantly more elaborate responses than both the autism control group (W= 14.5,
P < 0.025) and the LDC group (W = 14.5, p < 0.025). Due to the differential
performance across the two conditions by the savant and LDC groups, Wilcoxon tests
were used to analyse the performance of savant and LDC group between the tests. A
trend was found within the LDC group for superior performance on the incomplete
figures task, although, when the Bonferroni adjustment was applied this difference
missed significance (Z = -1.97,p = 0.04). There was no effect of test in the savant
group (Z = -1.40, p > 0.025).
One explanation for the large standard deviations evident on this dimension is the role
of intelligence, particularly because the IQ range of the three mixed intelligence
groups is so varied. Using Spearman's Rho, significant correlations were found
between IQ and mean combined response scores in the LDC group (rs = 0.88, P <
0.01), and also using the mean response scores on the incomplete figures (rs = 0.73,
p< 0.05) and repeated figures (rs = 0.93,p < 0.01). A further significant relationship
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was found between IQ and overall mean response score in the autism control group (rs
= 0.68, p < 0.05). None of the correlations between IQ and ability reached
significance in the savant group (rs below O.23,p = 0.55).
Elaboration: Discussion
A number of striking findings are evident in the results of the elaboration measure.
The first point for discussion concerns the finding that the savant group produced
significantly more elaborate responses than the IQ matched autism controls on the
combined mean response scores and both the autistic and LDe groups on the repeated
figures test. This is the first measure so far in which the savant group have differed
significantly from these two groups and thus elaboration can be seen as a key skill in
savant performance, This finding supports the hypothesis outlined in the aims section
of the introduction to this experiment. There it was suggested that the savant group
would produce significantly more elaborate responses than the two non-autistic
groups as a result of their superior drawing ability. However, the question now
remains what is it about their drawing ability that allows the savant artists to produce
better responses than the autism and LDC groups, especially when the measures of
fluency and originality failed to pick up such a difference?
One explanation concerns the level of manual dexterity involved in this task. The
figures were presented in small booklets and the elaboration measure comprised the
total amount of new details added to this stimulus. Thus a certain level of ability was
necessary in order to add small details to the initial given figure. As the savant group
are better at drawing than the non-talented groups we can assume that they possess
superior manual dexterity in this domain, allowing them to produce more detailed
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responses. Indeed, Hermelin et al. (1994) found that artistic savants possessed better
motor control on a variety of tasks including several unrelated to drawing. It is
unlikely that manual dexterity alone can account for all of the savants' superior
performance on this task and this becomes clear when one looks closely at how
elaboration is measured. Elaboration refers to the addition of each new idea or detail
to the stimulus figure. The emphasis here is on new idea, thus it involves generation
of details in a theme and this coupled with their superior drawing ability, might mean
the savant artists are able to produce responses which are significantly better than
their IQ matched control groups. As such the measure of elaboration can be seen to
assess both creativity and generativity.
Although the performance of the savant group was found to be better than the two IQ
matched control groups it was still far below that produced by the group of art
students. In some respects this finding can be seen to support the view that the
superior savant performance, in terms of the autistic and LDC groups, was not due to
manual dexterity alone. The art student group were picked as they were seen to be the
best matched group in terms of talent, the assumption being that the ability levels of
the two groups are very similar, this being so it would be considered that their manual
dexterity on a drawing task would also be similar. That the performance of the savant
group was so far below the art students, indicates that there are other factors at play
on this task, than simple drawing ability. Thus, while the savant group were able to
elaborate more effectively on a theme than their IQ matched controls, they could not
do this as well as a group of normally developing art students.
138
The difference between the savant group and the art students also highlights another
factor important on the measure of elaboration - intelligence. What is particularly
important here is that although intelligence was found to be an important factor in the
performance of both the LDC group and the autism control group, it was not related to
performance in the savant group. Therefore, whereas intelligence can account for the
large variation within these two non-talented groups, it cannot account for the large
variance within the savant group. Furthermore, this wide variance was not found in
the talented art group, thus the question arises what is it that results in this wide
variance if not intelligence?
A further point for discussion concerns the performance of the groups across the two
conditions. It was found that the LDC group produced significantly more elaborate
responses in the incomplete figure task, whereas this pattern of results was reversed in
the savant group. Although this difference did not reach significance in the savant
group, there was a trend toward higher performance in the repeated figures task over
the incomplete figures task. In the discussion of originality we mentioned that the
two conditions were not equal in terms of difficulty and the results from the savant
group on this measure appear to support this view. It is suggested then, that again the
incomplete figures task can be seen as more difficult than the repeated figures as it
incorporates a relatively unusual stimulus figure. The stimuli for the repeated figures
on the other hand appear to have presented the savant group with more scope for
elaboration resulting in higher scores on this condition. As mentioned previously this
was not the case in the LDC group who performed significantly better on the
incomplete figures task, although the very large standard deviations evident on this
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condition highlight the variance within this group, making it difficult to generalise
these findings.
In relation to fluency and originality, elaboration has been overlooked with regard to
research into generative ability. Lewis and Boucher (1991) found no evidence of an
elaboration deficit on this measure but few other studies have addressed this measure.
Certainly, if we refer back to the previous suggestion that elaboration can be viewed
as a type of fluency, this autism-specific deficit is somewhat unsurprising and
provides further evidence of a pervasive generativity deficit in this realm. What is
interesting is that the savant group did not show this deficit, despite their autism,
indicating that their artistic ability allowed them to be more generative and creative on
a task where the response was drawn.
To conclude for the dimension of elaboration, again the performance of the art
students was found to be significantly above that produced by the three mixed
intelligence groups. However, the savant group produced significantly more elaborate
responses than the autism control and LDC groups. There was also a great deal of
within-group variance on this dimension. Whereas intelligence was highly correlated
with performance in the autism and LDC groups, this was not the case in the savant
group.
4.3.4 Flexibility: The Ability to Switch Conceptual Set
Flexibility: Scoring
Flexibility measures how able the participant is at producing ideas that are
semantically different. The scoring of this dimension followed that suggested in the
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ITeT manual. Here each response was included in an overall semantic category, for
example, clothing, buildings and so on. Each response was given a category number
and the flexibility scores consisted of the total number of different categories. As
such the flexibility dimension is a closed ended task and it was possible for
participants to score at ceiling level if they produced 20 semantically different
responses.
As flexibility measures the number of responses belonging to separate semantic
categories it is not possible to calculate a mean response in this instance. One way in
which a fluency-independent score could be obtained would be to calculate the
percentage of category scores with respect to the total number of responses attempted,
which were semantically different. This methodology would, however, result in a bias
toward those participants who produced less responses overall gaining higher scores,
as the less responses are given the easier it would be to make these responses
semantically different, or flexible. For this reason the raw flexibility scores were
used, although it is recognised that this scoring method does mean that results will be
skewed towards those participants who completed more responses. Whereas on the
previous dimensions of originality and elaboration any exact repeats of previous
responses were excluded, they were included in the analysis of this dimension.
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Flexibility: Results
The total flexibility scores and standard deviations (SO) are shown in table 4.7.
Table 4. 7: The mean total scores (SD) tor the dimension offlexibility in the ITCT
Total flexibility Score
Savant
Autistic
LDC
Art Students
12.67 (3.43)
10.22 (3.72)
12.89 (5.33)
18.00 (1.33)
The performance of the art student group is again clearly superior to the three mixed
intelligence groups and nearly at ceiling level, indicating the ease this group had at
producing flexible responses on this dimension. A one-way ANOVA on the savant,
autism and LDC groups indicated no significant group difference (F (2,24) = 1.05,p =
0.35, 112 ;: 0.08) on the total fluency scores. Table 4.8 shows the mean scores and
standard deviations (SO) for the dimension of flexibility across the two tests'.
Table 4.8: The mean scores mD) tor each condition on the dimension of flexibility in
the TTCT
Incomplete Figures Repeated Figures
Savant 7.00 (1.50) 5.67 (2.5)
Autistic 5.78 (2.68) 4.44 (5.89)
LDC 7.00 (2.45) 5.89 (3.06)
Art Students 8.90 (1.29) 9.10 (1.29)
I Due to the differing nature of the two tasks, one might expect a slightly different response pattern across the two
tests. As already mentioned, where the emphasis in the incomplete figures test is to overcome the common
response elicited by the stimulus figure in order to generate a novel response, the emphasis in the repeated figures
condition is to produce a number of different responses using one stimulus figure. As such it was predicted that
flexibility would be to be lower in the repeated figures test. This is particularly the case in the autistic participants,
a group shown to have inhibitory impairments, as they would have to inhibit a previously correct response in order
to generate a new response using identical stimulus figures.
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In order to investigate the effect of test, in particular the hypothesis that individuals
with autism will perform particularly poorly on repeated figures test, the data from the
all four groups was entered into a repeated measures ANOV A. A significant main
effect of condition was found aIthough this effect was small (F (1.24) = 8.79, p < 0.01
TJ2 = 0.27). The interaction predicted earlier, that the autistic group would perform
more poorly on this measure was not found to be significant (F (2.24) = 0.03, p = 0.97
TJ2 = 0.03). It is clear from the mean scores on the two conditions that this effect is
mainly attributable to the poor performance of ail three, mixed IQ groups producing
less flexible responses on the repeated figures task. There was no main effect of
group (F (2.24) = 1.094, P = 0.35, TJ2 = 0.27).
The scoring on this dimension makes no distinction between semantically
related responses (stuck in set perseveration) and exact drawn repeats
(recurrent perseveration). As previous studies have found that autistic groups show
more exact repetitions than control groups, an attempt was made to analyse the
amount of exact repeats. However, as with the number of errors produced and
discussed in the fluency section of this chapter, the actual amount of repeated
responses was very low indeed. Repeats were only produced on the repeated figures
task, and by only one individual in the savant group and two participants in the autism
control group and LDC groups. As such these results could not be investigated using
statistical methods.
The flexibility results of the three mixed intelligence groups were entered into
a correlation matrix. no significant relationships were found within the autism control
group and the group of autistic savants using Pearson Product-movement correlation
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coefficients (r below 0.28, p = 0.45). Moreover, in the LDe group, a significant
correlation was found between PIQ and VIQ and the total flexibility score (PIQ: r =
0.72, p < 0.05; VIQ: r = 0.71, P < 0.01) as well as on the incomplete figures task
(PIQ: r = O.66,p < 0.05; VIQ: r = .71,p < 0.05) and the repeated figures task (PIQ: r
= 0.85,p <0.01; VIQ: r = 0.83,p < 0.04).
Flexibility: Discussion
As with the scores of the other three dimensions, the performance of the art students
on flexibility was again clearly superior to that of the savant, autism control group and
LDC group. Interestingly there was no difference between the scores of the three
mixed intelligence groups on either of the two conditions. This pattern of results
mirrors the pattern found with regard to fluency, with a trend towards the autism
control group producing slightly less flexible responses than the savant and LDC
groups. One explanation for the failure to find a significant effect on this dimension
may reflect the closed nature of the task. It is possible that if the task been extended
over more trials, the trend towards the autism control group performing worse on this
dimension may have reached significance. However, this conclusion is tentative due
to the possible confounding effect of the two groups with autism producing less
responses overall and the unsuitability of using a fluency independent score on this
dimension.
It was predicted that the autism control group, and possibly the savant group, would
perform less well OD the repeated figures. As discussed in chapter 2 a number of
previous studies have highlighted the difficulties that autistic individuals exhibit when
required to produce a number of different responses from a single stimuli figure. This
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prediction was in part supported, in that both autistic groups did perform less well on
the repeated figure task. However, the performance of the LDC group highlights that
this effect is not specific to autism. There are a number of explanations that can
account for this finding. The first refers to the different types of stimuli used in the
two tasks. On the incomplete figures task, the participant is presented with a relatively
unusual figure and their response depends on how they are able to convert this figure.
The emphasis on the incomplete figure task is on perceptual ability rather than
semantic flexibility. For example. a participant may show a tendency to becoming
stuck in one semantic set, yet, if they are unable to convert the stimuli into a response
which is in keeping with that mental set it is possible they will be able to go beyond
this inflexibility to create a semantically different response. On the other hand in the
repeated figure task the participant is presented with the common stimulus figure of
parallel lines. In comparison to the incomplete figure task. the parallel lines could be
made, with relative ease, into a variety of different responses. As such it would be
more likely that participants prone to this type of thinking could get stuck in a
semantic set and thus less able to produce a variety of flexible responses. This
explanation is supported by the finding that no repeat responses were produced on the
incomplete figure task.
While it is likely that the stimuli differences can go part of the way to explaining the
significant test effect, the finding that the art students performed equally on both of
the conditions indicates that general ability may also contribute to this result. As was
mentioned with regard to originality, it may be that the three mixed intelligence
groups were unable to inhibit their associations linked with semantic retrieval,
possibly as a result of their lower IQ. Coupled with the bias to semantic generation in
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the repeated figures, these three groups may thus show this significant tendency to
produce semantically related responses.
The failure to find a significant autism-specific deficit on flexibility is at odds with
previous findings. Lewis and Boucher (1991) found that in a free drawing condition
the responses of autistic children were more semantically related than those produced
by controls. Further to this, and in support of the previous hypothesis, Turner (1999)
found that on ideational fluency tasks, including the object uses and the pattern
meanings task, high-functioning, autistic participants produced significantly less
flexible responses than a group of IQ matched controls. Interestingly this pattern was
not found when the scores of lower functioning participants were studied; with the
low-functioning autistic group performing comparably to a group of IQ matched LDC
controls.
As mentioned Turner's finding may go some of the way to explain the failure to find
significant group effects in this study. The range of intelligence found within the
three mixed IQ groups may have meant that significant group differences which may
have occurred amongst the higher functioning individuals were overlooked. The high
correlations indicated in the LDC group go some way to confirming this suggestion,
compared to the two groups with autism where again it seems deficits were
widespread. One can tentatively conclude that a significant deficit would have arisen
if the scores of the higher ability participants were compared, at least in the case of
the autism control group.
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In conclusion for the dimension of flexibility, the three mixed ability groups
performed equally. There was a significant effect of condition, with participants in
the three mixed ability groups showing a pattern towards poorer performance on the
repeated figure task. Again the performance of the LDC group was strongly related to
IQ. This pattern was not evident in the savant or autistic groups, this lack of
relationship can be seen to be evidence of a deep rooted autistic deficit in flexibility,
which may have been concealed by the low ability of many of the participants.
4.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to provide an insight into the creative and generative
capacity of a group of savant artists on a standardised creativity test, related to the
domain of their expertise. The Tl'CT was thought to be a particularly good measure
to use initially as it separated performance into a variety of areas, allowing any
strengths or weaknesses the savant group might posses to be highlighted. Three
control groups were used in this study, in order to identify if the performance of the
savant group was due to either their diagnosis of autism, their general level of
intelligence or their artistic ability. The art group was found to produce far superior
responses on the measures of originality, flexibility and elaboration. The savant
artists were found to use elaboration significantly more often than the autism control
group and all three mixed ability groups were less flexible on the repeated figures
than the incomplete figures.
Returning to the performance of three mixed intelligence groups, no significant
difference was found on the dimension of fluency, although an autism-specific deficit
was indicated. It is likely the lack of significance arose due to the closed nature of the
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task and this view is given support when one looks at the results obtained by Craig
and Baron-Cohen (1999) on this test previously. They failed to find a fluency effect
on the incomplete figures task, a task with only ten stimulus figures, but found an
autism-specific fluency deficit on the original, 30 figure format of the repeated
figures, suggesting that had the task been extended an autism-specific fluency deficit
may have been indicated on this task.
On the dimension of originality again there were no differences between the savant
group and the two IQ matched control groups. The two hypotheses outlined in the
introduction, that an unusual visual processing style might facilitate performance in
the two autistic groups or alternatively that the two autistic groups may perform
significantly worse on this dimension as a result of an inhibitory impairment, were not
supported although it is possible that the two processes cancelled each other out.
Originality thus seems to result primarily from intelligence and this appeared to apply
especially to the LDC group, as shown by strong correlations between PIQ and VIQ
and originality.
As hypothesised the performance of the savant group was superior to the autism
control group on the dimension of elaboration. While this finding is thought to result
from the artistic ability of this group, intelligence still plays a large part in
performance here, as illustrated by the superior performance of the art student group
and the strong IQ correlation found in the LDC group. Interestingly, this supports
Duckett's finding discussed in the introduction, it may thus be that the ability to
elaborate is associated with savant talent in general. This point is particularly relevant
as it contradicts the view that elaboration is associated with drawing skill alone.
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Finally on the dimension of flexibility, no significant group differences were found
between the savant group and the two IQ matched control groups. This is in contrast
to the prediction that the two groups with autism would perform poorly on this
dimension as a result of "stuck in set" perseveration associated with their autism.
One recurring issue that has arisen throughout the discussion of the various
dimensions is the effect intelligence has on performance. A number of researchers
have suggested that intelligence is not correlated to creative ability or at least not the
divergent type of thinking measured by this test (see Torrance, 1974). Whilst this
may be true when discussing the creative achievements of individuals with IQ in the
normal range, it is not the case when looking at individuals with impaired cognitive
functioning. As such the TTCT can be criticised for not representing a true measure
of creative ability. What is particularly interesting is that whilst correlations with IQ
were highlighted on every dimension with regard to the LDC group, they did not
occur within the two autistic groups. This result suggests that whereas low
performance on creativity scores in the LDC group was a result of a low IQ, in the
two autistic groups deficits were widespread across all ability ranges. This autism-
specific finding provides evidence of deep rooted generative deficits, which may have
been obscured by the wide ability range of the groups. Such reasoning provides
support for results outlined by Turner (1999) in which deficits were often found in the
high-functioning group with autism, but not between the two lower functioning
groups. This problem is inherent when studying groups with such a wide intelligence
range. Indeed the results of this study support suggestions made by a number of
psychologists several decades ago, stating that creativity and intelligence can only
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become independent after a critical IQ level has been exceeded (Taylor, 1964;
Vernon, 1964)
In general this study did not provide support for previous studies in which autism-
specific deficits have been highlighted and aside from the IQ influence discussed
above, there may be other factors which have lead to these results. Methodological
considerations concerning the closed nature of the tasks and the fact that the TICT
did not provide a singular starting prompt from which individuals were required to
generate a number of different responses, have been highlighted as playing a part in
failure to find such a deficit. Further attention was brought to the use of a prompting
figure or starting point, specifically that this prompt may have resulted in the
participants with autism, producing results which were comparable to the LDC group.
Indeed, as Leevers and Harris (1998) found in their replication of Scott and Baron-
Cohen's (1996) study, the use of a starting figure can enhance performance in
individuals with autism. What is more, it may be that individuals with autism are
more able to express ideas when there is no strong verbal aspect.
In terms of the executive dysfunction hypothesis, this study provides little evidence of
an inhibitory impairment specific to the autistic groups, although this was not
specifically tested in this study. There is minor support for the view that the autistic
groups have impaired activation, but this needs to be followed up with an open-ended
task. There was no support for the view that the autistic groups produce more errors
that would be associated with a monitoring impairment. Nor did they produce more
perseverative responses of recurrent or "stuck in set" type, as was predicted,
associated with an impairment in shifting mental set.
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With regard to central coherence, it was tentatively suggested that an idiosyncratic
perceptual style might facilitate creative performance in individuals with autism and
particularly in the savant group. Again this hypothesis received little support.
Furthermore, it is important to note that while a number of studies (Happe, 1996,
2000; Jarrold & Russell, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Pring et al., 1995; Shah
& Frith, 1983, 1993) have identified this style to be stronger in individuals with
autism, not all studies have supported these findings (e.g, Ropar & Mitchell, 1999,
200 1). This is particularly the case with the EFT (Brian & Bryson. 1996; Ozonoff et
al., 1991). In the introduction it was suggested that the ITeT could be viewed as a
generative version of the EFT. The hypothesis that the groups with autism will
perform better on this task, is thus dependent on the result that such individuals have
superior disembedding ability, which as mentioned is not a consistent finding. In
particular concerning the savant group, although this group have been found to have
better segmentation ability on the block design (Pring et al., 1995) their ability on the
EFT has yet to be tested. Furthermore, as mentioned in the discussion of originality it
may be that the results of this measure reflect a playoff between the deficits
associated with executive functioning and the assets linked to their perceptual
processing. Further studies are warranted to prise apart these processes, which could
be competing against each other, before any firm conclusions are drawn.
Finally tasks such as the ITeT aim to pick up creative thought in the population as a
whole, not in individuals with a specific skill in one domain. It can be argued that the
creative ability of the savant group, as evident in their artwork, is above that of the
non-talented controls. If creativity is looked at in such a way then the ITeT can be
criticised for not adequately measuring this concept in relation to art. However, as we
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mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this study was to identify any creative or
generative skills that the savant group possessed unrelated to their artistic output. The
results from this initial study indicate that while the savant group can be considered
artistically creative, this ability does not extend to performance on a standardised test.
In summary, the aim of this initial test was to measure a group savant artists' creative
and generative performance on a standardised test of creativity, in the domain of their
ability. It was found that the performance of the savant group was determined by
their overall level of cognitive functioning on the measures of fluency, flexibility and
originality. In contrast, the performance of the savant artists on the dimension of
elaboration was above that of the two IQ matched control groups, although it was not
up to the level of the art students. This result indicates that the artistic talent of the
savant group, in this respect, compensates for what would be expected considering
their general cognitive abilities. It should also be considered, to what extent the
qualities measured in this test are general characteristics, such as the TTCT was
designed to measure, or are more domain-specific factors.
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Chapter 5:
Figural Synthesis and Creative Discovery
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the aim was to investigate the performance of the savant group on a
test of creativity in which the response mode was not drawing. By studying
performance outside of the area of the savant group's talent it will be possible to
establish how domain-specific their creative and generative ability is. In particular,
although the Tl'CT was not a measure of artistic ability, one criticism that could be
aimed at this task was that the response mode may bias in favour of the artistically
talented groups. In this context, Perkins (1981) argues that creativity is not a general
quality but tends to be restricted to certain specific domains. As Bell (1965) points
out, there are a number of instances where creative scientists were able to make
contributions only in their own narrow field of study. This view is supported by Baer
(1998) who refers to a growing body of evidence, which suggests that rather than
being domain transcending, creative achievement is specific to certain areas. In
contrast, Finke et al. (1992) argue while it is possible that cognitive strategies may
promote creativity in one area (especially if the individual has a particular ability in
that domain) there is no reason that such strategies could not be extended to others.
That is providing the strategies in question are suitably flexible in order to
accommodate changes in structure or context.
There have been a number of studies into the domain-specific nature of the savant
artists'talent. While some studies have found that superiority is only evident on tasks
that contain an element of drawing (Hennelin & O'Connor, 1987b, 1990), positive
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results have also been obtained where the emphasis has not explicitly focussed on
drawing tasks (Hermelin et al., 1994). While such tasks are unrelated to drawing, the
skills they measure can be seen to be closely associated with this particular ability.
Savant artists have also been consistently found to obtain superior scores to controls
on visual processing tasks which measure segmentation ability (Hermelin et al., 1994,
Pring et al., 1995; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1987a; Mottron & Belleville, 1993, 1995).
The link between a segmented processing style and artistic ability has also been found
in normal artists (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1983;
Pring et al., 1995).
To summarise, when the performance of savant groups is compared to non-talented.
IQ matched, control groups on equivalent tasks in and out of the artistic domain, the
artistic ability of the savants artists results in superior performance only on those
related to drawing. Greater scores are also found on measures that may tap skills
related to this ability, such as segmentation or manual dexterity. One interesting
study which illustrates the domain-specific nature of savant talent was conducted by
Hermelin and Pring (1998) who directly compared the use of linear perspective, a
skill commonly associated with savant artistic talent, on a drawing and construction
task. They found that while the savant group was able to apply linear perspective and
size constancy to drawings. their performance on a construction version was only
equal to their IQ matched, non-talented controls. In fact, only one of the nine savant
artists tested was able to apply perspective in the construction task, compared to all
nine of the gifted controls. It was concluded from this result that whereas the savants'
performance on the drawing task was dependent on their talent, their performance on
the construction task was determined by their overall level of intelligence. The
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question thus remains to what extent the savants' creativity and generative
performance is dependent on the modality of response.
To test the ability of a group of savant artists out of the domain of drawing, the
paradigm used by Finke and colleagues in their study of creative cognition was
modified for use with mixed intelligence groups. As discussed fully in chapter 2,
Finke, et al. (1992) proposed a model which attempted to identify the cognitive
processes and structures behind creative thinking using the experimental methodology
of cognitive psychology. The Geneplore model makes a distinction between a
generative stage and an exploratory stage of creative discovery. One process thought
important during the generative stage is mental synthesis. This refers to how separate
components are mentally combined to form new configurations in order to provide
various creative possibilities or unexpected visual discoveries. There is a range of
evidence highlighting the role visualisation plays in the creative process (see Shepard,
1978, 1988). Finke et al. (1992) outline several examples of how mental imagery has
been essential in the creative discoveries of great thinkers such as Einstein, Faraday
and Feynman. More relevant to this study is the case reviewed by Finke (1986) of an
adult artist who lost his sight, but used visualisation to paint landscapes by imagining
how the landscape would look. Further to this, in his 1978 review of mental imagery,
Shepard states that mental imagery is central to creative discovery in fields as diverse
as psychology, literature and physics.
Studies ofcreatille synthesis
Although introspective accounts of how visualisation aids creative discovery are
somewhat unreliable, they do help to highlight the importance of imagery in creative
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or generative thought. Moreover, the role of imagery in creativity has also been tested
empirically under laboratory conditions and it is these studies, rather than
introspection and interpretation, which allow us more insight into the nature of this
process and how it can aid creative discovery. The first empirical investigation to
look at the generative nature of mental synthesis was conducted by Finke and Slayton
(1988). Whereas previous studies of imagery had focussed on mental assembly (e.g,
Thomas & Klatzky, 1978) Finke and Slayton questioned whether people could make
genuine discoveries in imagery. Participants were presented with three figures at a
time from a set of 15 alphanumerical shapes, which they were instructed to combine
in any way to make some type of recognisable shape or object. The presented stimuli
could be rotated and the size changed as long as the dimensions and overall shape
remained constant. Participants were instructed first to write down the title and then
to draw their response. Each response was scored on resemblance to the title given
and originality. Recognisable responses were produced on 38.1% of trials of which
15% were deemed as creative. From this study Finke and Slayton concluded that
visual discoveries could be reliably induced under laboratory conditions. This
methodology has also, more recently, been employed in tests of working memory (see
Helstrup & Logie, 1999, for a review).
Though the aim of Finke and Slayton's (1988) study was to measure creative
synthesis in normal individuals, their methodology can be applied to the study of
creative and generative ability in savant artists. Nevertheless, there are still a number
of methodological concerns needing to be addressed. While this paradigm can be
seen as an adequate measure of the abilities in question, the task in current form relies
on complex verbal instructions and does not include a training condition, as such it is
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unsuitable for use with individuals with lower intelligence. The main problem
envisaged here concerns the instruction to imagine how the shapes could be combined
menially and it is unlikely that the lower functioning individuals in each of the three
mixed intelligence groups would be able to comprehend these requirements.
Visual versus mental synthesis
It has been noted by a number of researchers that when participants are able to
physically manipulate parts, there is no significant improvement in their performance.
Finke et al. (1992) refer to a study by Neblett, Finke and Ginsburg (1989) in which
the stimulus figures were presented to participants on transparencies and found that
there were no differences between the number or the quality of responses in the
imagined and real conditions. This finding was supported by Anderson and Helstrup
(1993). One further advantage that physical synthesis has over mental synthesis is
that it places less emphasis on working memory and as such provides a method of
assessing visual discovery which is free from memory constraints.
Again, as with the ITeT, the methodology of this task needed be modified in order to
make the test applicable for use with individuals with learning disabilities. Firstly the
number of stimulus figures was reduced from the t 5 used by Finke and Slayton
(1988), to eight. As the aim of this task was to assess generative ability out of the
domain of drawing, the methodology employed by Anderson and Helstrup (1993) was
adopted. Here, rather than present participants with transparent overlays, they
presented cardboard shapes. As in this task the aim was to assess the responses
generated spontaneously by each participant, it was decided that in this task
participants would be free to pick the shapes that they wanted to include in a response.
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One criticism aimed at the TTCT was that is was not an effective tool with which to
measure fluency, as it was a closed test. For this reason, in this task participants were
given a five minute time limit in order to produce their responses. Moreover,
participants were required to generate their responses from scratch rather than being
presented with the type of prompt or starting figure used in the TTCT. A further
modification concerns the scoring of the measure of originality. Again the TTCT was
criticised for measuring the originality of a visual response on only a semantic title.
To overcome this, originality on this task was measured on how unusual the output
was visually, rather than on the rarity of the title given to it. This would allow any
unusual representations of common objects to be recognised as creative. Also, rather
than presenting participants with three shapes only, this study incorporated three
conditions. In the first condition all groups were instructed to create a response
consisting of two shapes, followed by a three shape condition and lastly using four
figures. All participants were presented with the conditions in this order.
Aim
The aim of this study was therefore to assess the creative and generative capacity of a
group of savant artists on a test which did not require a drawn response.
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Experiment 2: Figural Synthesis, Construction Task
S.2 METHOD
5.2.1 Participants
The same participants used in experiment 1 took part in this study; the savant artists,
the autism control group, the LDC group and the art student group. See chapter 3 for
full details.
5.2.2 Materials
Eight shapes from Finke and Slayton's (1988) investigation were chosen for this
study. These figures, illustrated in figure 5.1, were chosen on the basis of pilot
studies because they could be easily incorporated into a variety of designs. As well as
five common, geometrical figures (square, triangle, rectangle, circle and semi-circle),
the shapes included three others (i.e. a cross, letter J and figure eight). These less
common shapes were included to elicit more unusual responses. The stimuli were
quasi two-dimensional, and made out of thick cardboard. They ranged from 80mm in
length to 80mm in width. Two-dimensional figures were chosen as these were more
akin to pictorial representation.
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Figure 5.1: Stimuli used in figural synthesis task
DD
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5.2.3 Procedure
Participants were all tested individually in a quiet room in their school, centre or
home. The experimenter laid the eight stimuli shapes in front of the participant. They
were not laid out in any particular order or rotation and the only specification was that
they were not overlapping and each figure could clearly be seen. For the first
condition participants were presented with the semi-circle and the letter J. They were
instructed to add two of these shapes together to make a recognisable representation.
This was then demonstrated by the experimenter who manually placed the semi-circle
on the top of the J figure, and participants were then asked what this combination
could be. Acceptable responses here were either an umbrella or the letter J. The
inclusion of this trial was to visually demonstrate the task to participants, as well as to
assess their initial representation skills and all individuals were able to do this. The
two shapes were then added back to the remaining six and participants were instructed
to see what they could make using two at a time. They were reminded that they had
to produce answers that "looked like real things" and to name each response. After
the instructions had been given, individuals were given five minutes to come up with
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as many responses as possible. The examiner drew each given response and wrote
down the title given by participants. It was noted in pilot studies that one shape was
often used as a prompt. for example the rectangle as a pole for a sign and then a
streetlight. As the strategies used to produce responses were of interest here, the
figures were not disassembled after each title was given, however, individuals were
reminded that they could reuse the shapes. Finally participants were given two
warnings for each type of error. that is if they used an incorrect number of shapes or if
their response did not seen to resemble the given title.
Each individual was given a break between conditions. of around 30 minutes, during
which they went back to their lessons or previous activity. On return they were
presented with the same eight shapes and requested to do as they had on the previous
task, but this time using three figures to make a recognisable response. No training
was incorporated in this condition as pilot studies indicated that the task requirements
had been suitably understood previously. Also. giving an example in this more
difficult condition may have given participants prompts as to possible responses.
Again two warnings were given for each type of error (incorrect number and
unrecognisable response). This task was followed again by a break of at least 30
minutes. In the final condition participants were presented again with the same eight
figures and informed that this time they had to use four of these. Again pilot studies
did not show a training example to be necessary for comprehension on this task.
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5.3 SCORING, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As with the TICT, this figural synthesis task was scored on a number of measures,
thus in order to present the results clearly, the scoring, results and discussion will be
presented separately for each measure obtained.
5.3.1 Fluency: The Total Number of Responses Produced
Fluency: Scoring
The first measure was the total fluency score. This score comprised the total number
of responses produced and named by participants and, as suggested by Turner (1999),
included any repeats or errors. This scoring was in accordance with the methodology
adopted previously on the TICr and is also in line with that used by Finke and
colleagues in their creative synthesis tasks. The total fluency score will result in a
measure of overall generative ability, irrespective of the quality, or creativity, of the
response.
Fluency: Results
The mean scores and standard deviations (SD) for total fluency on each of the three
conditions are shown in table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Mean overalI fluency scores (SD) for the three conditions across groups on
the figural $jInthesis task.
Number offi res resented
Two figures Three figures Four figures
Savants 8.56 (3.54) 6.89 (5.16) 5.11 (2.42)
Autistic Controls 7.77 (4.27) 5.33 (2.12) 2.78 (2.33)
LDC 15.44 (8.49) 11.11 (8.35) 8.56 (6.48)
Art Students 14.00 (5.48) 12.00 (6.42) 8.56 (4.55)
The mean scores indicate an autism-specific deficit evident on the measure of fluency.
Both the savant group and the autism control group produced noticeably less
responses on all three conditions, than the two non-autistic control groups. Again the
standard deviations are very large, indicating wide variance within groups. The mean
scores across the three conditions are illustrated in figure 5.2. Here the performance
of the two groups with autism can be seen to be distinct from the LDe and art student
groups. Furthermore, the performance of all three groups decreases as the number of
shapes increase.
Figure 5.2: The mean scores tram each group on the three conditions on the measure
o(fluency in the figural $jInthesis task
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The results of all four groups were analysed using a mixed design, two factor
ANOVA, with condition (two figure, three figure and four figure) as the within-
participants factor and group (savant, autism control group, LDC group and art
student group) as the between-participant factor. A main-effect of condition was
found (F (2,64) = 29.75, P < 0.01, "12 = 0.5), within-participant contrasts found a
significant linear trend (F (1,32) = 62.38, p < 0.01, "12 = 0.66) indicating all groups
produced less responses as the number of figures increased. The interaction did not
reach significance (F(6,64) = 1.46,p= 0.21, TJ2 = 0.12).
A main effect of group was also found (F (1,32) = 119.38, P < 0.05, TJ2 = 0.32).
Following Brace, Kemp and Snelgar (2000) as the number of planned comparisons
were equal to the number of conditions, post-hoc t-tests were completed without the
need for any adjustments. Using the total fluency scores across the three conditions,
the savant group were found to produce significantly less responses than the art
students (t = -2.29, p < 0.05, d = 1.08). The difference between the savant group and
the LDC group narrowly missed significance however, the importance of this result is
indicated in the large effect size difference between these groups (t = -1.78,p = 0.09,
d = 0.85) there was no difference between the two groups with autism, (t = 1.14, p =
0.27, d = 0.5) This finding supports the prediction of an autism-specific deficit on the
measure of fluency, although the savant group did show a slight sparing of ability
comparative to the autism control group as indicated by the effect size statistic. No
correlations were found in any of the three mixed ability groups with either PIQ or
VIQ (r < O.5I,p = 0.17).
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Fluency: Discussion
The finding of an autism-specific deficit on the measure of fluency is in keeping with
previous studies and can be seen to provide further evidence towards a pervasive
generativity deficit apparent in the individuals with autism. Further to this, it provides
more evidence for the domain-specific nature of savant ability as this finding is in
contrast to the results of the drawing based, TICT. While the savant group did
produce more results than the autism control group, their performance was also below
that of the two non-autistic groups. The finding an autism-specific fluency deficit is
consistent with impairments in executive function, in particular the SAS as proposed
by Shallice and colleagues (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice, 1988, 1994; Shallice
& Burgess, 199]). The relationship between the SAS and the generativity deficits
found in autism was raised by Jarrold (1997) and discussed in chapter 2. Jarrold
suggests that the primary deficit in generation in autism is a result of poorly specified
goal states, which could result in a paucity of ideas. Similar results were suggested by
Turner (1995, 1999) and the results of this study do indeed support this view.
A further explanation for the contrasting results found on this task and the TICT
concerns the differential task demands of the two tests. Specifically the TICT was a
closed test whereas this figural synthesis task was open-ended, in that participants
were required to produce as many responses as possible in a given time. Related to
this, in the TICT the participants were presented with stimulus figures to add details
to. As was discussed in chapter 4, the stimuli in the TICT may have acted as a visual
prompt. Furthermore it has been found that deficits are less likely when there are
environmental prompts to aid performance (Charrnan & Baron-Cohen, 1993; Jarrold,
Boucher & Smith, 1994b; Turner, 1997). Whereas the stimuli used in the TICT may
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have prompted performance, the lack of such a starting point on this figural synthesis
task may have resulted in the reduced fluency found on this measure.
5.3.2 Representational Fluency: Providing a Recognisable Response
Representational responses: Scoring
A second, more interesting measure is the representative fluency score. This refers to
responses that were clearly recognisable as a representation of the title they were
given. Responses were scored separately by three independent examiners, according
to how well the patterns produced corresponded to the titles they were given. If two
out of the three examiners scored a response as recognisable that response was
included in this score. This scoring methodology was adapted from that used by
Finke and Slayton (1988) and subsequent studies (see Helstrup & Logie, 1999).
Examples of unrepresentative responses are illustrated in figure 5.3, representative
responses can be seen in figures 5.5 and 5.6 under the discussion of originality.
Figure 5.3: Examples of unrecognisable responses given in the figural synthesis lask
Response a: a truck response b: a butterfly
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response c: a penguin
Representational responses: Results
Table 5.2 shows the mean response scores and standard deviations (SD) judged by
two out of three independent examiners as being representative of the title they were
given by the participants. As there was a significant group effect on the measure of
fluency, the fluency independent, percentage of scores judged as representational are
also illustrated.
Table 5.2: The mean total scores (SD) and percentage scores for representational
resu..onsesu..roducedin the figMral~nthesis task
Total representational scores % of representational scores
2 figures 3 figures 4 figures 1 figures 3 figures 4 figures
Savants 8.11 (3.56) 4.78 (3.83) 3.11 (2.02) 95.3 (11.14) 73.1 (34.53) 55.9 (31.52)
Autistic 6.33 (3.67) 4.22 (1.78) 1.44 (3.46) 83.1 (19.84) 76.6 (32.36) 43.6 (44.01)
LDC 10.33 (6.32) 7.44 (7.70) 4.44 (3.46) 73.1 (25.41) 69.6 (28.15) 61.1 (27.01)
Art Students 13.78 (5.67) 12.67 (4.50) 8.44 (4.36) 97.5 (4.48) 94.0 (6.33) 97.1 (6.73)
Whereas the performance of the savant group appears poor in comparison to the art
students and the LDC group when the total number of representational scores are
examined for each condition, their performance is more comparable when the
percentage scores are considered. As the percentage scores are fluency independent,
it is these scores which will be discussed. Here, the performance of the savant group
is above that of the LDC group on the two and three figure conditions, but drops
sharply on the more elaborate four-figure condition. This relationship is clearly
illustrated in figure 5.4. Here again the performance of the two groups with autism
can be seen as distinct from the two non-autistic groups. Both the savant group and
the autism control group illustrate a visible drop on the four-figure condition in
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comparison with the LDC and art student groups, whose ability to produce
representational responses remains more constant across conditions.
Figure 5.4: The mean percentage scores (or representational responses. produced by
the (our groups on the figural synthesis task
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Again, a mixed ANDV A was used to analyse the percentage scores of these three
groups. Main effects were found on condition (F (2,64) = 12.44, p < 0.01, ,,2 = 0.32)
and group (F (3,32) = S21.01,p < 0.01,,,2 = 0.31). More interesting however was the
significant interaction effect (F (6,64) = 2.71, p < 0.05, ,,2 = 0.34). In order to
investigate this interaction, the performance of each group on the two and four figure
conditions was compared. Due to the low N in these studies, the analysis is very low
on power, this and the large standard deviations evident on all conditions mean it is
preferable to compare within-group as there is less of an effect of individual
differences (it is important to note however, that despite the low N, the effect size
calculations do indicate medium effects which warrant further investigation).
Although it is standard practice to make adjustments for multiple comparisons of this
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type, in this case the low N means that such adjustments may mask any significant
differences. For this reason planned t-tests were conducted on the scores, and the
significance level kept at 0.05. It is, nevertheless, accepted that this does increase the
probability of a type one error. The performance of the art students and the LDC
group was not found to differ across the two and four figure conditions (art students: t
= 0.40, P = 0.69, d = 0.07; LDC: 1 = 1.50, P = 0.17, d = 0.23). Significant large
effects were found in both the savant group (I = 4.07, p < 0.01, d = 1.67) and the
autistic group (I = 2.20, p < 0.05, d = 1.16), with both groups producing less
representational responses in the four figure condition. This relationship is clearly
evident in figure 5.4. Therefore an autism-specific deficit can be seen on this
measure, with the autistic groups performing below the two non-autistic groups as the
task became more difficult.
The results of this task were entered into a correlation matrix', Again, no IQ
relationships were found in either of the two autistic groups (r below 0.41, p = 0.28),
however, a significant correlation was found between PIQ and representational ability
in the LDC group (r = 0.69, P < 0.05). Also entered into the correlation were the
results obtained on the ITCT. Interestingly a negative correlation was found, in the
savant group between the overall percentage of representational responses and the
transformed originality sores on the incomplete figures task in the ITCT (Overall
originality: r = -0.68, P = < 0.05; incomplete figures: r = - 0.80, p < 0.01). the
opposite relationship was found in the LDC group (incomplete figures: r = 0.64; p <
0.05; repeated figures: r = 0.83,p < 0.001; overall originality: r = 0.87,p < 0.001).
2 As in all the following statistical analysis reported in this chapter it was the fluency independent,
percentage SCORS that were entered in to the correlation matrix.
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Representational responses: Discussion
The discussion of representational performance needs careful consideration. The
results indicated that whereas the performance of the LDC group and art student
group remained constant across the three conditions, in the two groups with autism
the number of representative responses decreased as the number of figures increased.
This result was somewhat of a surprise, although a fluency deficit was expected in the
total scores, there is no strong evidence that the representation skills of individuals
with autism are poorer than that of their IQ matched controls (Pring & Hennelin,
1993). Indeed, as illustrated by Pring et al. (1995) savant artists were as able as
artistically gifted MA to CA matched children at reconstituting an abstract visual
puzzle. although they did seem to use a perceptual strategy rather than the semantic
strategy adopted by the controls. Also, of each of the three measures to be discussed
in this chapter, representational ability appears least related to generative ability.
Indeed, it was in part expected that when the overall fluency score was controlled for
by using percentage scores, the results here would mirror the meaningful picture
puzzle result produced by Pring et al. (1995), whereby the performance of the savant
group was still above that of the autistic controls. As is evident, this was not the case.
It is interesting that the performance of the two groups with autism significantly
differed on the two and four figure conditions. This result can thus be seen as
evidence for the domain-specific nature of savant talent. It is possible that the poor
performance of the two groups with autism results from a limited processing capacity.
However although there is some evidence for a deficit in working memory (Bennetto,
Pennington, & Rogers (1996), this finding is not consistent (Ozonoff, 1997; Russell et
al., 1996). Although then, it is unlikely that the cause of this autism-specific deficit
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lies in a limited processing capacity one can still look toward an executive
explanation for this pattern of results. Indeed the findings from this measure are
concordant with the points raised by Jarrold (1997) as discussed in chapter 2,
regarding a deficit in goal selection or representation. While on the one hand a deficit
at this level could result in reduced generativity, poorly specified goals would also
result in a lack of adequate response monitoring and hence more errors. It may then
be that the savant artists, like the autism control group, were not able to correctly
monitor their performance and update rules in their mind. As the stimuli used in this
task remained the same, participants needed to constantly readdress and update what
they were doing in order to generate continually representational responses.
A high rate of errors was also reported by Turner (1997, 1999), particularly on the
design fluency task, whereby it was not necessary to pre-formulate a response before
production. In this way the figural synthesis, construction task is similar to the design
fluency task and this could explain the difference in the high error score on this task
(as evidenced by low representative scores) but not in the TTCT, where the response
needs to be fully conceptualised before it is drawn. What is more it was noted that
there was an observable difference in the strategies used by the participants with
autism and those without. Whereas the LDC and art student groups seemed to
produce their responses via trial and error, that is they manually manipulated the
shapes in a number of combinations before naming only those which were
representational, the two groups with autism tended to name every combination of
shapes they produced. It may thus be that the autistic participants in this study were
unable to modify their response when it did not resemble a real object and thus simply
named an object in order to complete the task. This observation is consistent with a
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deficit in monitoring incorrect responses and possibly related to poor goal
specification.
So why then does the performance of the participants with autism drop so much on
the four figure condition? This result might reflect the strategies used to generate
responses. A nwnber of participants from all four groups commented that they were
producing their responses from stored memory representations. Certainly in the two
and three figure conditions, many of the responses were instantly recognisable from
everyday life, examples being a house (inverted triangle on square), a man (circle on a
cross) and so on. But, as the number of figures increases so the possible internal
representations available for the earlier conditions reduce. Participants are, therefore,
forced to rely on their generative ability and a deficit arises in the savant group and
their autistic controls, as found in previous studies. In this way only the four figure
condition can be considered a true measure of generative ability, as participants are
forced to generate something completely original, not based on internal memory
representations. The performance of the two groups with autism contrasts with that of
the LDC group who, despite performing consistently across the three conditions, did
produce less responses than the these two groups in the two and three figure
conditions, although this difference was not explicitly tested. The strong IQ
correlation found within the LDC group indicates that the overall score was brought
down by those participants with lower IQ's. It might thus be that where they have
appropriate memory schema to use, the groups with autism benefit from their
segmented processing style, allowing them to produce more representative responses.
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Individuals with autism do not have overriding problems with reconstituting visual
representations, using a perceptual strategy (Hermelin et al., 1994; Pring et a1.,1995)
or perceiving meaning from pictorial stimuli (Ameli et al., 1988; Bryson, 1983).
However, they do show semantic difficulties, specifically when extracting meaning
from stimuli. This processing style can be seen in a number of studies, as outlined in
previous chapters, and fits in with the central coherence account of autism. Here it
was suggested that individuals with autism have difficulties in pulling together
information for higher level meaning (Frith, 1989; Happe, 1999). The deficit on this
figural construction task at generating meaning may then be closely linked to the
difficulties these individuals have in extracting meaning. Thus, while individuals
with autism and savants in particular, show a facility for constructive imagery,
possibly associated with a segmented visual processing style, this ability does not
appear to extend to generating meaningful, visual responses when no prompt is
provided.
While the above explanations are consistent with the autism-specific deficits we find
on this task, they do not immediately account for the negative relationship that is
found within the savant group and originality on the TICT. In particular it is unclear
how the executive deficit hypothesis may account for this finding or how an
impairment in the selection and maintenance of goals would result in good
performance on one task and poor performance on another. Rather it seems more
likely that the type of relationship found in the LOC group would arise, whereby the
results of both tasks appear to be related to a general factor likely to be intelligence.
The later suggestion that the poor performance of the two groups with autism might
be related to a semantic deficit, again does not help us to understand this correlation,
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after all in both tasks the individuals need to name a perceptual output. If then, a
semantic deficit was the cause of the impairment on representational ability, why was
the pattern of results not similar to those obtained on the TTCT?
Although this negative relationship cannot be attributed to executive explanation or a
central coherence explanation as related to a semantic deficit, the segmentation
hypothesis, that individuals with autism have enhanced detail focussed processing,
can go part of the way to explaining these results. Firstly, both tasks are perceptually
based, that is they require making a whole response out of parts. In the TTCT, in
order to produce an original response the individual needs to inhibit the common
response that the stimulus figure may elicit initially, this is particularly the case in the
incomplete figures task. It was suggested that a perceptual processing style that
emphasises parts of visual arrays may facilitate performance on this task, as
individuals with a particularly segmented perceptual processing may be able to see the
stimuli figure as part of a more original response. Thus it is possible that segmentation
is so strong in these individuals, that they found it difficult to generate a global,
meaningful response.
5.3.3 Originality: Producing an Unusual yet Meaningful Response
Originality: Scoring
The final area measured on this task was originality. Here again, all responses were
scored separately by three independent judges. The judges were instructed to score
the responses on how original the representation was, not how original the title was.
Originality was defined as an unusual but meaningful response, thus in this case, a
response that was novel yet, still recognisable as a representation of the title it was
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given. Clearly, often an original title would be accompanied by an original
representation and this would be credited as an original response. The reasoning for
such guidelines was not to prevent the scoring of original title and response
combinations, but to ensure that original representations of common words were
recognised. Examples of original responses can be seen in figure 5.5. The distinction
between common titles and common responses can be seen in responses a and b.
Response a is a common representation of the common response title of train. This
response is scored as recognisable but not as original. Response b was also titled
train, however this is an unusual representation of a train hence it is scored under both
representational and originality measures.
Figure 5.5: Examples common responses given by participants in the figural synthesis
task.
response a: a tree response b: a train
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response c: a house with a path
Figure 5.6: Examples of responses rated at original by at least two out of three
examiners in the figural synthesis task.
response a: glasses response b: train (front view) response c: video camera
Initially it was intended that the originality score would include some measure of
frequency, unfortunately, the variety of responses produced by participants meant that
this was not possible. It was, however, noted that the less frequent responses were
more often scored as original. In scoring originality the judges had already seen the
responses when scoring for representation, thus they were familiar with the types of
responses produced. This and the randomised presentation meant the any primacy or
recency effects were diminished. Again following the methodology adopted by Finke
and colleagues, a response was seen as original if scored by two out of three
independent judges. As scores have to be recognisable in order to be original the
percentage scores were calculated from the representational scores rather than the
total fluency scores, this again is in line with previous studies in this area (Anderson
& Helstrup, 1993; Finke & Slayton, 1988; Neblett et al., 1989). What is more, in the
light of the previous discussion concerning the deficits that affect individuals with
autism, calculating the originality percentage using the number of representational
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responses, rather than the overall fluency score, meant that the originality results
could be looked at independently of any other influencing factors.
Originality: Results
For the measure of originality. both the total number of responses scored as original
and the percentage of representational responses judged as original are illustrated in
table 5.3 along with the standard deviations (SD).
Table 5.3: Mean total originality scores and percentage originality scores (SD)
produced on the figural $j'nthesis task
Total origiaality scores 0;' of representational responses
scored as onldnal
1figures 3 figures 4 figures 1figures 3 figures 4 figures
Savants 2.11 (1.54) 1.00 (1.41) 1.66 (1.87) 23.8 (12.03) 17.6 (21.57) 44.4 (44.10)
Autistic 1.11 (1.36) 1.11 (1.26) 0.33 (0.71) 18.1 (19.69) 22.5(23.13) 16.6 (35.63)
LDC 2.22 (2.49) 2.00 (2.74) 1.11 (1.96) 15.2 (15.94) 17.8 (17.78) 13.7 (20.97)
Art 3.S5 (3.39) 3.00 (1.22) 3.78 (1.8S) 21.9 (16.73) 25.1 (10.06) 47.0 (26.36)
Students
The standard deviations on this task are particularly high and likely to be due to a
number of individuals in all groups. being unable to produce any original responses.
Even when the percentage scores are studied a great deal of variance is still evident in
the three mixed intelligence groups. As a result non-parametric analysis was used on
the data which is illustrated graphically in figure 5.7
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Figure 5.7: The mean percentage scores for the measure o[originality in the figural
synthesis task
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Figure 5.7 shows a clear interaction effect, with the savant and art student groups
producing more original responses in the four-figure condition, whereas the
performance of the two non-talented groups drops slightly as the task difficulty
increases. This is a particularly important result as, unlike on the two previous
measures, the performance of the savant group appears to result from their artistic
ability rather than their general cognitive level or their diagnosis of autism. The
pattern of results produced by the savant artists here clearly reflects that of the art
student group, whereas the performance of the autistic controls mirrors that produced
by the LDC group.
As parametric tests were not possible on the originality data set due to the large
within- group variance, the Wilcoxon test for within-pair differences was used to test
any differences between the two and four figure conditions within the four groups.
The art student group were found to produce significantly more original responses in
the four figure condition (Z = -2.38, p < 0.05), there was a strong trend toward the
savant group producing significantly more responses on the more elaborate four
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figure condition, although this narrowly missed significance (Z = -1.64, p = 0.09).
The difference in the two non-talented groups failed to meet significance (autistic
controls: Z = -0.21,p = 0.83; LOe: Z = -0.73,p = 0.47).
With regard to the between-group differences, Kruskal-Wallis analysis indicated that
there were no significant group differences between either the two or three figure
conditions (2-figure: X2= 1.54,P > 0.05; 3-figure: ,./ = 1.18, p >0.05). A significant
between-group difference was found on the four figure condition (X2 = 7.88, p <
0.05), further analysis indicated that the savant group did not differ from any of the
control groups (autistic controls, W = 24.0, p = 0.28; art students, W = 38.0, p = 0.86)
although it did approach significance in the LOe group, before any adjustments were
made (LOC group, W = 24.0, p = 0.09). While the art student group did not differ
significantly from the savant group on this condition they did produce significantly
more original responses than the autistic control group and the Loe group (Autistic
control group, W = 13.0,p < 0.01; LOC' W = 13.0,p < 0.01). Despite the limitations
incurred by using non-parametric analysis on the originality scores it is possible to see
an interesting interaction effect, with the two talented groups showing a tendency
towards producing more original responses in the four figure condition compared to
the two non-talented groups. While the savant group did not perform above the level
of their IQ matched controls, unlike these controls neither did they differ from the art
student group.
Again the results of this test were entered into a correlation matrix, which also
included the results obtained on the Tl'C'I. Interestingly in contrast to all of the
results so far this test yielded an IQ relationship within the savant group. Here a
179
negative relationship was found between VIQ and the overall percentage of
representative responses scored as original (rs = -0.68, p < 0.05). This was the only
correlation found regarding IQ and originality (rs below 0.47,p = 0.19).
Originality: Discussion
The results for the dimension of originality are the most interesting of this study.
Here the performance of the savant group produces a pattern of data identical to that
evident in the art student group. Furthermore, as the savants did not differ from the
art students on the crucial four figure condition, compared to the non-talented control
groups, it can be concluded that the artistic ability of the savants, compensated for the
poor performance that would be expected from of their general level of cognitive
functioning. What is more, the savant result is likely to have been adversely affected
by the failure of several participants in this group to produce any responses that were
seen as original. Although it has been argued that there is no relationship between IQ
and creativity in the normal population (see chapters 2 and 4), the results of this study
do indicate that a certain level of intelligence is necessary in order to produce
responses that are deemed original. This finding has already been discussed in
relation to the originality results gained on the TTCT and the results of this task
appear to support this view. Again no IQ and performance relationships were
indicated in the autism control group, illustrating that other factors determine
performance on this task. The finding that the only significant correlation was the
negative relationship between the savant group regarding VIQ and originality adds
further evidence to the suggestion that creative ability does not increase with IQ.
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It is interesting that while an autism-specific deficit was evident on the measures of
fluency and representational fluency, performance on originality appears to result
from their artistic ability. The savants' tendency towards producing more original
responses in the four figure condition is also in line with the elaboration results of the
nCT. It may thus be that it is only when these individuals are able to be more
elaborate, with the increasing number of shapes, that their true ability becomes
apparent. One possibility for the spared performance of the savant group on this task
might be due to their segmented processing style. It may be that as a result of this
they are more able to produce meaningful responses out of abstract parts, particularly
as a number of studies have indicated that savant artists have richer internal picture
lexicons (Hermelin et al., 1994; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1987a). Thus, as discussed
with regard to representational fluency, it could be that when the savants do not have
stored memory representations to fall back on they are forced to generate responses
themselves. A processing style that focuses on parts might then prove beneficial, as it
will enable the individual to incorporate the stimulus shapes in more inventive ways.
Similarly, the skills measured on this task can be seen to be akin to those involved
with the block design, in that again a global whole must be made out of abstract parts.
However, this suggestion does not fit easily with the semantic deficit account
suggested in the discussion of representational ability.
It is interesting that despite the earlier arguments concerning the domain-specific
nature of savant talent, we should find a positive result on originality on this task but
not in the TIeT. This could in part be due to the two tests defining and measuring
originality in different ways. In the nCT originality was scored totally in terms of
frequency; while based on a drawn response it was the title of the response that was
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compared to a list of standardised norms. In this way the task was confounded by
verbal ability and no accommodations were made for unusual representations of
common titles. As such originality was based purely on the verbal title given to each
response. On this figural construction task, although not using a set of standardised
scores with which to compare responses, the example in figures 5.5 and 5.6 illustrates
the perceptual emphasis placed on the scoring of this task, as here the same title
(train) is scored as a common response or an unusual response, depending on the
visual representation. This figural synthesis task can thus be seen as a purer measure
of perceptual originality.
Clearly, the test used here is not solely a test of perceptual ability and, like all tasks
requiring a named response, it does have a strong verbal, semantic element. This
point can be illustrated by the observations of one savant, TM, who despite producing
a variety of easily recognisable responses (e.g. ice cream) was unable to think up the
correct title and thus could not be credited. It is, unfortunately, very difficult to
overcome such inherent, verbal constraints in tasks such as this, as they all too
commonly involve a meaningful element. Yet, as the train example shows, the
emphasis in this task was based on perceptual ability as far as possible. Indeed it may
have been the emphasis on the verbal title that obscured any differences on the TICT.
The ingrained verbal aspect of these tasks puts individuals with autism at a
disadvantage due to their poorer verbal ability, hence, it is even more surprising that
the savant group show an ability related result on this task.
This final point also relates to the negative correlation that was found between VIQ
and originality in the savant group. Initially this result seems a confusing one, after
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all when one considers that even on a perceptual task such as this, the response title is
a verbal one, it would be expected that those with lower VIQ would be less able to
name their responses. As we have mentioned, even though the scoring of this task
was perceptually based, often the original responses produced would be the more
unusual titles. Also, if individuals with poorer vocabularies, such as the savant TM in
the example given above, were unable to name a response they would receive no
credit. Why then do we find, in the savant group only, this negative relationship
between VIQ and originality? Again we can turn to the previous explanation
regarding perceptual ability, in this task scoring was based upon how visually unusual
the response was, not how unusual a title was. Although, more often, the most
unusual responses were given the rarer response titles, it needs to be recognised that
these titles were not particularly unusual given the wider context, and within the
vocabularies of even individuals with lower VIQ's (for example, video camera, traffic
lights being examples of the more difficult titles). It could be then, that the
individuals with lower vocabularies have a more perceptually based processing style,
and thus find it easier to generate original, perceptual responses as they are possibly
less confined by semantic associations.
5.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this figural construction task was to measure creative and generative
ability on a task outside of the domain of drawing. On the measures of fluency and
representational ability, the performance of the savant artists was determined by their
autism. For total fluency this result is in line with the previous results, outlined in
chapter 2, highlighting an autistic deficit in generative ability (Scott & Baron-Cohen,
1996; Jarrold, 1997; Turner, 1997, 1999). The savant group also performed poorly on
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the representational measure, showing a drop in performance as the number of figures
increased, compared to the consistent performance found in the groups without
autism. The representational fluency result stands in contrast to those gained on the
originality measure where the savants' performance was comparable to that of the art
student group, thus performance on this measure can be seen to be related to artistic
ability.
The results gained on the fluency measure can clearly be attributed to the generative
deficits and impaired activation, associated with the savant artists' diagnoses of
autism. What is interesting here is that despite the generative nature of their ability,
the savant artists were unable to generalise this ability into a test that took place
outside of direct drawing, despite the task still being in the visual-motor domain.
Perhaps one could question the usefulness of measuring creative ability outside of
drawing in this instance, however, it is worth keeping in mind that visual-motor
abilities are necessary for many creative activities relating to art, although not
requiring a response that is drawn or painted, for instance sculpture. Further to this
the results of the fluency measure on the TIeT were inconclusive due to the closed
nature of the test, hence it may be that savant artists do show generative deficits
regardless of the domain of response.
The cause of the poor performance of the groups with autism on the representational
measure, although related to their diagnosis, was less clear cut. Here two
explanations were proposed to account for the pattern of results, each related to
current theoretical accounts of autism. The first was based on the premise that
individuals with autism have executive deficits, specifically in monitoring their
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behaviour and updating goal states, as argued by Jarrold (1997) and Turner (1999).
Specifically it was suggested that poor goal specification may lead to individuals with
autism being unable to update rules in their mind, this being of particular importance
in a task requiring the reuse of the same figures and the rejection of unsuitable
combinations. It was suggested that this difference was particularly evident on the
four figure condition as it was here that individuals were required to go beyond stored
memory representations to be truly generative.
While the executive approach provides an adequate explanation for the results gained
on this task, an alternative account was proposed with a basis in the central coherence
theory proposed by Frith (1989) and Happe (1999) amongst others. While the
executive account of the poor performance of the two groups with autism on the
representational fluency measure, focuses on a monitoring deficit, the central
coherence explanation needs further clarification. Specifically here the question can
be raised as to whether the results obtained on this measure are due to a semantic
deficit or an idiosyncratic perceptual processing style. Initially it was suggested that
the poor representational fluency exhibited by two groups with autism. was a result of
their inability to generate meaningful information from abstract stimuli. It was
suggested that this result was similar to that found by Shah and Frith (1983) in which
individuals with autism were found to be unaffected by visual meaning when
identifying a shape within a picture. However, this is not a consistent finding (Brian
& Bryson. 1996) and there is still some debate about the underlying causes of this
fmding, be it semantic independence or detail based processing, as discussed in
chapter 2.
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It may be then, that the poor performance of the savant and the autism control group,
is a factor of this segmented processing style. Indeed it was suggested in the
discussion of representation fluency that the responses produced by the individuals in
these two groups were so detailed or focussed that they failed to be recognisable to
the people scoring them, who presumably exhibit normal, global perception. Perhaps,
had the overall, productive language skills of the individuals in this group been better,
then it may have been possible to get them to explain how their responses resembled,
in their eyes, the title they provided it with.
It is this later discussion which is more compliant with the results obtained on the
originality measure, hence the central coherence account has the propensity to explain
both the deficits and the assets reported on this task. Here it was suggested that the
superior performance of the savant group was facilitated by their ability to incorporate
the stimulus figures in more inventive ways. Clearly this is in contrast with the
previously proposed semantic deficit explanation and the extent to which each level of
processing influences performance needs further investigation. A further issue to
discuss regarding the idea that a segmented processing style might facilitate
performance on the originality measure, relates to why this effect is only found in the
savant group, when it is supposed to be a universal processing style in autism. One
explanation that can be put forward to account for this discrepancy is linked to the
work of Pring et al. (1995) in which it was found that savant artists have even better
segmentation skills than their autistic counterparts.
Finally the results of this study provide further support for the view that generative
ability and creative ability are two very different concepts, a point raised in chapter 4.
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Generativity relates to the total number of responses produced and the results of this
task indicate, in line with previous results outlined in chapter 2 (see Turner, 1999),
that individuals with autism do show a deficit in this regard. Despite the spontaneous
nature of savant drawn output, in tests this generativity is not evident. Creativity on
the other hand is concerned with the quality of the response, how novel it is. In this
respect the talent of the savant group allows them to go beyond the constraints
associated with their general cognitive function and thus to produce original
responses. This is possibly related to an unusual perceptual style, which places
emphasis on parts. This perceptual style may explain the lack of difference between
the autism control and LDC groups in that it allowed the non-talented participants
with autism to overcome the creative deficits they display on tasks with a verbal or
behavioural basis. This difference is likely to be due to the task type, as has been
discussed every effort was made in this task to measure perceptual creativity and to
distance the scoring from verbal constraints. Previous studies have all tended to
measure creative ability using tasks requiring complex verbal responses (for example
see Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996; Turner 1999). Considering the semantic deficits
associated with autism, such tasks do not provide a true picture of creative ability in
autism.
To conclude, the results from this figural synthesis task provide an interesting pattern
of results and again illustrate the distinction between generativity and creativity.
Whereas the performance of the savant artists on the measures of fluency and
representational ability are clearly dependent on their diagnosis of autism,
performance on the originality measure was related to their artistic ability. In terms of
the processes underlying this performance it was suggested that the poor generative
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ability of the savant artists on this measure was a result of the pervasive generativity
deficits associated with their autism. This supports previous findings which have
located the root of this deficit as executive in nature. An executive explanation was
also proposed to account for the lower representational fluency scores of the savant
group, specifically regarding the ability to effectively monitor behaviour and update
rules. It was suggested that the poor performance produced by the savants on this
measure resulted from their inability to select appropriate goals. An alternative
explanation regarding representational ability was suggested relating to central
coherence, although it was unclear as to whether this was a result of a semantic deficit
or a segmented visual processing style. One strength of the central coherence account
is that is can also explain the superior performance of the savant artists on the
originality measure, in that an unusual perceptual style might result in original
responses when scored on a visual basis. Clearly the results of this task have raised a
number of questions as to the processes underlying generative and creative
performance and the next two chapters seek to address such questions. Firstly, the
nature of central coherence, be it semantic or perceptual, is investigated. This is
followed by a study of the executive abilities of the savant group, again relating to
both domain-specific and domain-general factors.
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Chapter6:
Visual Segmentation or Semantic Independence
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The unusual processing style evident in individuals with autism is well documented.
Early studies report the superiority of autistic children at the visuo-spatial sub-tests of
IQ batteries such as the WISC, in particular performance on the block design and
object assembly sub-tests (Bartak, Rutter & Cox, 1975; Lockyer & Rutter, 1970).
Further to this Hennelin & O'Connor (1967, 1970) found that not only did children
with autism fail to show a benefit from meaningful stimuli in a rote memory task, but,
that they also displayed an overall preference for processing material spatially. Such
a processing style was investigated in more detail by Frith and colleagues throughout
the 1980's and 90's (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Shah & Frith, 1983, 1993). From these
studies Frith, and later with Happe (Happe, 1999; Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 1994 )
generated the central coherence account of autism, with particular relevance to the
non-triad features of the disorder. Discussed in more detail in chapter 1, the central
coherence account postulates that the strong cohesive force that pulls together
information in order to construct higher level meaning, is not present (or at least only
present to a lesser extent) in individuals with autism. Instead, the focus of perception
is on detail, at the expense of the overall gist or global picture.
Evidence for this hypothesis can be found in a number of empirical investigations.
On a semantic level, several studies (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happe. 1997) found
that children with autism failed to use context in a homograph, reading task. On a
more perceptual level, Happe (1996) found that children with autism were less likely
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to succumb to visual illusion, possibly as a result of their failure to perceive the
overall context of the image. However, Ropar and Mitchell (1999, 2001) failed to
find any support for this finding. The failure of such children to benefit from a
canonical pattern presentation in a dot counting task (Jarrold & Russell, 1997) can
also be seen as evidence of a locally focussed perceptual style. One test in which
children with autism perform consistently well is on the block design and a number of
studies have reported the performance of participants with autism is above that of
their IQ matched controls on this measure (Happe,1994a; Ropar & Mitchell, 200 1).
Shah and Frith (1993) concluded that this superiority was a result of the autistic
participants' segmentation abilities as they showed no improvement, compared to
controls, on a pre-segmented version of the task. Interestingly, this segmentation
ability does not appear to be confined to visually presented stimuli and has also been
found to distinguish the performance of autistic participants on musical tasks (Heaton,
Hermelin & Pring, 1998).
In a recent paper Happe (1999) provided a comprehensive review of the current
scientific reasoning behind the central coherence hypothesis. Like Frith earlier,
Happe defined central coherence as a cognitive style, evident in all individuals to a
lesser or stronger extent. Further to this Happe distinguished between three levels of
this detail based processing; perceptual coherence, visuo-spatial construction
coherence and finally, verbal-semantic coherence. While not refuting Happe's trio, a
simpler distinction has been made throughout this thesis, specifically concerning
visual perception. This dichotomy concerns the difference between explanations that
look to superior disembedding or segmentation abilities and those that have focussed
on a freedom from contextual or semantic constraints. Indeed, this distinction can be
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seen in many definitions of central coherence, which state that this processing style is
characterised by "a tendency to process local vs. global information, and a failure to
process incoming stimuli in context" (Happe, 1994b, pp 873).
This perceptual versus semantic distinction can be seen in a number of studies. In
Jarrold and Russell's (1997) dot counting task, the slower counting scores of the
children with autism were seen to be due to their failure to use the canonical pattern,
possibly as a result of their failure to perceive the global whole. Likewise the superior
performance commonly found on the block design task can be seen to be due to
greater visual segmentation skills (Shah & Frith, 1993). One test in which the
distinction between semantic and perceptual processing styles is very clear, however,
is on the EFT. Indeed, when Shah and Frith (1983) first reported their finding they
proposed that the superiority of autistic children on this task resulted from the fact that
they were unhindered by the overall meaningful context, within which the simple
figure was embedded. Brian and Bryson (1996) investigated the factors underlying
Shah and Frith's finding, specifically looking at whether superior performance was
due to perceptual segmentation or contextual independence. Interestingly, in contrast
to the previously outlined finding, they found no group differences on equivalent,
meaningful or abstract conditions, concluding that Shah and Frith's finding was a
result of developmental phenomenon rather than a true islet of ability in autism. Their
finding supports a previous result reported by Ozonoff et al (1991), in which no
autism superiority was found on either the EFT or the block design.
Despite the negative findings outlined above, several recent studies have reported
similar results to those reported by Shah and Frith (1983). Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen
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(1997) found that high-functioning adults with autism were significantly faster on the
adult version of the EFT and, as the groups were also matched closely on age, the
results could not be explained in terms of developmental processes. They argued that
Brian and Bryson's (1996) failure to find this effect was due, in part, to the stringent
statistical processes employed. Further to this they highlighted differences in
participant characteristics, with Brian and Bryson using a group with a range of
pervasive developmental disorders rather than a group with a strict diagnosis of
autism or Asperger's syndrome. Similarly, Ropar and Mitchell (2001) reported that
children with both autism and Asperger's syndrome were faster than mental age and
IQ matched control groups, however, the group with autism were older than the other
groups in the study, hence again the results could be due to developmental processes
rather than being autism-specific.
While the results of the two studies outlined above do provide further support for the
hypothesis that individuals with autism are better able at visual disembedding, they do
not support the idea that autism is associated with "less capture by meaning". This is
because both studies made use of the standard adult EFT, which presents participants
with abstract images rather than the meaningful pictures utilised in the children's
version. For this reason it would appear that this processing style is perceptual in
nature rather than the outcome of semantic or contextual freedom. However, in
relation to this last point it is necessary here to bring attention to an observation made
by Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997). In their task, individuals were asked to describe
the complex figure before beginning their attempt to identify the hidden figure. The
authors commented that individuals in the normal control group more often than not,
described this figure as a meaningful image, for example a staircase. This self applied
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context and general human tendency to impose meaning, may thus have contributed
to their slower scores, in a similar way to that suggested by Shah and Frith (1983).
In her 1999 review, Happe stated that central coherence was a perceptual style,
evident in the whole population to a greater or lesser extent. One group of individuals
in which this processing style appears to be particularly strong, is in those gifted in the
visual arts. What is more, a number of studies have found a that children or young
adults. gifted at art, are faster than non-gifted controls on the EFT or similar tasks
(Getzels & Csikszentmibalyi, 1976; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1986b; O'Connor &
Hermelin, 1983; Ryder, Pring & Hermelin, unpublished manuscript). It follows thus,
that if this processing style is associated with both autism and artistic ability, it should
be very strong in autistic savants gifted at art. As yet, the performance of artistic
savants on a disembedding task such as the EFT has not been tested, however, as
already discussed there is a growing body of evidence which indicates that their
segmentation skills are above that found in the non-talented individuals with autism or
the learning disabled population (O'Connor & Hermelin, 1987a), and in some cases
above those found in the population as a whole (Hermelin et al., 1994).
The question of whether this processing style is perceptual or semantic is also relevant
in the study of the artistic savant. Although this question has yet to be directly tested it
was addressed to some extent in Pring et al.'s (1995) paper. Discussed in more detail
in chapter 1. they found that on the abstract block design task, the two artistically
gifted groups performed equally to the autism controls and above the non-gifted,
mental age matched controls, this pattern was reversed in the meaningful picture
condition. The authors interpreted this finding in terms of the strategies used by each
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of the groups to aid completion. Specifically they argued that whereas the two groups
without autism were able to use semantic information processing in the meaningful
task, the two groups with autism tended to rely mainly on perceptual processes. That
the participants with autism, seemed not to utilise the semantic information presented
to them, indicates semantic independence may play an important role on performance
on tasks such as the block design and EFT.
Before the aims of the present study described in this chapter are outlined, it is of
interest to note that several studies have identified a relationship between performance
on tasks such as the EFT and creativity, especially the type of creativity measured in
divergent thinking tasks (Chada, 1985, Noppe-Lloyd, 1977). Interestingly the Hidden
Figures test (Cattell, 1956), a task very similar to the EFT, was incorporated into
many early creativity batteries (Guildford, 1950, 1957). One explanation for this
association was proposed by Ryder et al. (unpublished manuscript), who suggest that
performance on both types of task, may be facilitated by contextual independence.
They point out that good performance on many measures of creativity is reliant on the
individual achieving freedom from common, semantic associations. For example, on
the object uses test, higher scores are obtained by individuals who are able to isolate
the perceptual qualities of the object and consider how such qualities can be used for a
different purpose. They suggested that the finding that art students score highly on
such tasks (Hartley & Greggs, 1997, Lloyd-Bostock, 1979, Ryder et al., unpublished
manuscript) is a manifestation of this overall processing style. Interestingly, this
effect seems to occur spontaneously or unconsciously in autism as illustrated by an
example given by Happe (1994b). Here, she describes a child with autism who, when
asked to label the objects in a toy bedroom, named a pillow as a piece of ravioli,
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purely based on the physical attributes without recognition of the overall context of
the bedroom
Aims
The following studies sought to investigate firstly, the hypothesis that a perceptual
style that favours segmentation is associated with both autism and artistic ability.
This being the case, it was expected that the performance of the savant artists would
reflect earlier studies and be up to the level of a group of gifted, non-autistic art
students. Further to this, it was hypothesised that both groups with autism would
produce superior scores to the LDC group. A second aim of this investigation was to
highlight the nature of this perceptual style, specifically whether superior performance
arose as a result of a visual segmentation or semantic, contextual independence.
To examine these hypotheses, modified forms of both the meaningful and abstract
version of the EFT were presented to participants. If, as suggested, the groups with
autism and those gifted at art, experienced a contextual independence a significant
interaction would occur. This interaction would arise as a result of these participants
experiencing less distraction from the overall semantic context of the meaningful
condition compared to the non-autistic or non-talented groups. If, on the other hand
this processing style is primarily perceptual, then the autistic or gifted groups would
simply produce significantly superior performance on both conditions, with no
interaction effects. In order to investigate this hypothesis fully, the inclusion of a fifth
group of non-gifted students was necessary to assess the influence of artistic ability.
Finally, to investigate whether any superior result is due to a superior visual
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disembedding ability or any other factors, a fragmented version of the EFT was
generated to correspond to the segmented block design used by Shah and Frith (1993).
Experiment 3: The Embedded Figures Test
6.2 METHOD
6.2.1 Participants.
Five groups of participants took part in this study; the savant artists, the autism
control group, the LDC group, the art students and the normal students. Full details of
each of these groups and the justification behind their inclusion is presented in
chapter 3.
6.2.2 Materials
Meaningful condilion
Stimuli were adapted from the children's EFT (Witkin et al., 1971) for the meaningful
condition, and the standard adult EFT (Witkin et al., 1971) for the abstract and
fragmented conditions. The stimuli for the meaningful pictures task were picked
depending on how closely they resembled the real object they was supposed to. The
children's EFT involves two hidden figures referred in the manual as tent and house
(an example of house is shown in figure 6.1). 20 psychology undergraduates rated
each complex figure on a 5 point likert scale, depending how closely each resembled
the real object. The four meaningful pictures with the highest mean score for
resemblance for the 'house' figure were chosen (rowing boat, digger, present, robot)
along with the five best resemblance pictures for the tent hidden figure (television,
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pram, ship, jug). An example of one of the meaningful figures (rowing boat) and the
hidden figure (house shape) are illustrated in figure 6.1.
Figure 6.J: Example of stimuli used in the meaningful condition of the EFT
Several other modifications were made to the original stimuli, in order to render it
useful for this task. In the original form the figures were considerably larger and
coloured. Pilot testing indicated that this resulted in the task being very easy for all
participants, hence it is likely that the results would simply have been indicative of
speed of processing, rather than discriminating amongst processing styles. What is
more it was necessary to attempt to make the meaningful condition comparable to the
more difficult, abstract, adult version. For these reasons the overall size of the images
was reduced by 75% and the colours removed. The black and white images were then
displayed on laminated white cards of 90 mm x 120mm.
Abstract condition
The stimuli for the abstract condition were taken from the standard adult EFT (Witkin
et al., 1971). The adult EFT consists of two equivalent versions (form A and form B),
that do not differ in terms of difficulty. Of the total 24 complex figures in the two
forms, there were 8 simple figures. In keeping with the stimuli chosen for the
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children's version, two hidden figures were picked for the abstract condition, figures
A and 03• In order for performance on the meaningful and abstract conditions to be
comparable it was necessary to modify the original stimuli in terms of size and overall
difficulty. Firstly, the colours were removed from the complex figures and the size of
each figure increased by 75%, which made them comparable in overall size to the
meaningful images.
In order to equalise the overall complexity of each image, each of the original abstract
figures were simplified by reducing the number of lines involved, without altering the
hidden figure. 15 undergraduate art students and 15 undergraduate psychology
students with no artistic background, were then asked to rate each image in terms of
the overall complexity of each figure. Following this adjustments were made by
increasing or reducing the amount of lines in the abstract condition, so that the two
conditions were comparable. The nine meaningful and abstract figures were rated by
the same group, depending on how deeply embedded the hidden figure was. This was
done by presenting these participants with a card on which the hidden figure was
illustrated adjacent to the complex figure. This was presented to participants for five
seconds, after which they were shown the true location of the hidden shape, and asked
to rate, on a one to five scale, how well hidden the simple figure was. Again
following analysis the figures were amended to bring the two conditions in line. An
example of one of the abstract figures and the hidden shape is shown in figure 6.2.
3 Unfortunately, for hidden figure G, there were only two complex figures available. In order for the
abstract condition to be comparable to the meaningful condition, in terms of the number of times each
hidden figure was used, it was necessary to have three hidden figures. For this reason the hidden figure
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Figure 6.2: Example of stimuli presented in the abstract condition oUhe EFT
o
The fragmented condition
Stimuli for the fragmented condition were also modified from the standard adult EFT
(Witkin et al., 1971). Here the simple figures of C and E were used. In order to allow
the overall image to be broken up or fragmented effectively, the hidden figure of E
was simplified into a square rather than the original 'cube' form. The aim of this
condition was to assess the participants' ability to recognise a simple figure out of the
overall embedded context. Again the original figures were simplified, following the
same guidelines outlined above and presented on laminated cards. As this was a
simple shape discrimination task, it was necessary for the overall image to be broken
up into several distinct parts, as illustrated in figure 6.3.
D, which was very similar in appearance to figure G was modified and incorporated into complex
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Figure 6.3: Example of the stimuli presented in the ftagmented condition ofthe EFT
The hidden figures
The hidden figures were presented as black outlines on separate laminated cards
80mmx80mm.
6.2.3 Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room at their centre, college or
home. Before testing began participants were presented with each of the meaningful
condition items, and asked to name what each picture was. This was to ensure that all
items in this condition were indeed meaningful and could be identified by the
participants. The naming condition was presented before the full requirements of the
task were made known to participants, hence is unlikely to have had any confounding
effect on results. All participants were able to name each figure.
Training condition
A training condition was then presented to ascertain that all participants fully
understood the instructions. The training session consisted of three extra items, one
from each of the conditions, presented in a fixed order beginning with the fragmented
figure, followed by the meaningful condition and finally the abstract condition. The
figure 16.
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training stimuli for the meaningful condition was taken from the children's EFT,
however, a different hidden figure was used for the abstract and meaningful
conditions taken from the adult EFT. A felt tip pen was given to the participants to
draw their responses onto the laminated cards, which could easily be wiped off
following any mistakes or after the correct response had been identified. Participants
were given the following instructions; "I'm going to show you some pictures, some
will bejust patterns and others will be pictures of real things. I'm also going to show
you a picture of a small shape. I want you to see if you can find the shape in the
bigger picture, shall we practice? This is the hidden shape, now this shape is hidden
in this picture, can you find it? I want you to draw around the shape if you can find it,
can you find it?" On the practice items, no time restriction was included. All
participants were able to identify the hidden figure.
The Test Items
The order of presentation was randomised amongst participants, with all three
conditions interspersed within the same testing session. Participants were then given
the following instructions; "that was very good, now we are going to do some more.
I will show you a small shape and I want you to find it in the bigger picture. Some
pictures will be quite hard, but the shape is always there and always the right way up.
When you have found the shape tell me and then I want you to draw around it with the
pen. If it is not right, we can wipe it off with a tissue. Please work as quickly as you
can." The hidden figure was then placed in front of participants and timing began on
presentation of the complex figure. Following the instructions in the manual a note of
the time was made when participants informed the examiner that they had identified
the shape. If the response was incorrect participants were informed and their answer
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removed from the laminated card. The time was only recorded when the correct
response had been identified. An upper time limit of 180 seconds was imposed for
each figure and this was the time recorded for any participants who failed to find the
hidden figure.
6.3 RESULTS
Although the items were presented together, the main aim of this study was to
investigate the relationship between the abstract and meaningful conditions, for this
reason, the results of these two conditions are presented first. In ail conditions the
median scores were calculated for each participant, this was due to several
participants in each of the groups having particular difficulty with one or more items,
resulting in several outliers which would have obscured such participants' overall
ability on this task
Meaningful vs. abstract
As errors were allowed to be corrected, they contributed to the overall time taken to
identify the hidden figure. The mean completion times in seconds for the five groups,
together with the standard deviations (SD) are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Mean (median) time in seconds (SD) taken to identify the embedded figure
on the meaningful and abstract conditions.
Meaningful Condition Abstract Condition
Savants
Autistic
LDC
Art Students
Normal Students
5.70 (3.58)
11.29 (8.91)
15.03 (7.77)
4.71 (2.67)
4.74 (1.29)
6.54 (5.37)
10.42 (6.82)
16.14 (8.32)
4.43 (2.69)
6.92 (2.78)
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These results are depicted visually in figure 6.4. Contrary to the contextual
independence hypothesis the performance of all groups is relatively constant across
the two conditions, with no indication of an significant interaction effect. There does
appear to be a significant group effect, with the savant artists performing comparably
to the both the gifted art students and the non-gifted group.
Figure 6.4: The mean limes laken 10 identify the hidden figure in the meaningful and
abstract conditions in the embedded figures test.
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These observations are supported by the results of a mixed 2 x 5 ANOVA, with
condition (meaningful and abstract) as the within-groups comparison, and group as
the between-participants variable4• A main effect of group was indicated (F (4,40) =
6.91,p < 0.01, ,,2= 0.41). Both the main effect of condition and the interaction were
4 As was pointed out in the method section, although every attempt was made to equalise the two
conditions, it is accepted that they may not be of equivalent difficulty however, the consistency
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non-significant ( F (1,40) = 0,70, p = 0.41, 112= 0.02; F (4,40) = 0.65, p = 0.63,
112 = 0.06). A Post hoc bonferroni revealed that the LDe group were significantly
slower than the savant artists and the two groups of student groups at identifying the
hidden figure (p < 0.01).
Fragmented stimuli results
Again as errors were allowed to be corrected, the overall completion times are
reported for the five groups on the fragmented condition, these scores are shown in
table 6.2.
Table 6.2: The mean (median) scores in seconds (SD) tor identification ofthe hidden
figure in the fragmented condition ofthe embedded figures test
Group Fragmented identification
Savant
Autistic
LDC
Art Students
Normal Students
2.06 (1.22)
4.56 (4.20)
4.97 (3.68)
1.37 (0.51)
2.03 (0.95)
Again the it appears that the performance of the savant group is more akin to that of
the two normal groups. A one-way ANOV A indicates that there was a significant
group difference (F (4,40) = 3.56, P < 0.01, Tl2= 0.26), post hoc bonferroni indicated
that this was due to the superior performance of the art student comparative to the
LDC group (p < 0.05).
between participants in all five groups indicates that the two conditions were indeed very similar in
terms of the embedded nature of the hidden shape and the complexity of the overall images.
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6.4 DISCUSSION
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the nature of visual processing in a group of
savant artists with autism. Specifically performance was measured using a variation
of the adult and children's embedded figures test, a test which had so far never been
administered to savant artists. The use of an abstract and meaningful condition meant
that it was possible to directly investigate if any superior performance arose as a result
of perceptual or semantic processes. As an attempt was made to equalise the
difficulty of the two conditions it is important to note that this should. in general,
produce similar recognition times on the two tests. What was specifically being tested
here was the interaction between the groups; those with contextual independence
would thus show a greater advantage on the meaningful condition, as they would not
be slowed down by the context of the image. Dealing first with the results obtained
from the abstract and meaningful conditions; although the performance of the savant
group was up to the level of both the art and normal students and above the LDC
group, it did not differ significantly from the autism control group. This, and the
equal performance of the two student groups, is discrepant with the hypothesis that
performance on the EFT is related to artistic ability. What is more. the failure to find
a significant difference between the autism control group and the LDC group, also
fails to support the argument that weak central coherence is autism-specific.
Nevertheless, that the savant artists did still produce faster responses than the LDC
group, indicates that it is possible that a combination of autism and artistic ability
facilitated performance on this task. Null results are unfortunately problematic with
respect to drawing inferences and it was most disappointing to find that the picture
was not really clarified.
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More interesting perhaps. is the exploration of nature of this perceptual style and the
within-group comparisons on which this investigation rests. In the introduction the
question was raised as to whether this processing style was perceptual or semantic. the
results of this investigation found no advantage in any of the groups. for the
meaningful condition over the abstract condition. Indeed. performance was consistent
within all groups on the two tasks. The lack of an advantage arising from contextual
independence in the groups with autism (or indeed the two artistically gifted groups)
indicates that the primary process governing performance in all groups was a
perceptual one. Thus it is possible to conclude that the superior performance of the
savant group, comparative to the LDC group, results not from semantic independence
but perceptual segmentation. This is supported by the results of the fragmented
condition when the performance of the LDC group equalled that of the savant group,
reflecting the results obtained by Shah and Frith (1993) on their pre-segmented block
design task.
What is also interesting is that this study did not uncover an art related ability, despite
the previous support for this effect outlined in the introduction. Here no significant
difference emerged between the savant artists and the autism control group. nor the art
students and the normal students. In the case of the two student groups. this may
reflect the comparative ease with which all participants in these two groups completed
the task, in particular as the adult version was modified in terms of difficulty in order
to make it presentable to individuals ofa range of lower IQ's. Thus it may have been
that the task was not difficult enough to discriminate between participants of normal
intelligence. With regard to the savant group, however, the result is more perplexing,
especially considering a number of tasks have highlighted superior segmentation
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ability in this group. This superior performance has mainly been found on tasks such
as the block design (Pring, et al., 1995), or tasks in which participants have to re-
assemble a meaningful picture from parts (Hermelin et al., 1994; O'Connor &
Hermelin, 1987a) and although these tasks do not measure disembedding ability
previous studies have highlighted a strong relationship between performance on these
two different tests (Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, Jimenez, 2000; Ropar and Mitchell,
2001).
There are then, two possible explanations for the failure to find a difference between
the savant artists and the autism controls in the study. The first is that the savant
artists in this study do not possess stronger perceptual segmentation skills as a whole,
this explanation is, however, somewhat unlikely considering positive findings to this
effect that have been found on several previous studies. A second explanation looks
at the different processes that may be involved in performance on the two tasks.
Specifically that the block design can be seen as a active, construction task, in that
participants actively have to construct the blocks to match the two-dimensional
design. The EFT, on the other hand can be seen as a passive identification task,
which involves the location of a hidden figure, but no ongoing, active manipulation.
While the processes employed in each task might be similar for untalented individuals
it might be that savants gifted at art show an advantage when the task involves a
motor component. In order to investigate these questions, performance on the block
design was investigated. This was measured in all groups, along with intelligence, as
part of an initial battery of tests. Several of the savant artists had taken part in this test
as part of a previous study, in these cases the original scores were used and
participants not re-tested.
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Experiment 4: The Block Design
6.S METHOD
6.5.1 Participants
The same participants who took part in experiment 3, the EFT, took part in the block
design experiment. These were: the savant artists, the autism control group, the Loe
group, the art student group and the normal student group.
6.~.2 Materials
The block design is a subtest of the Weschsler Intelligence Scales (Wechsler, 1981).
It consists of nine identical blocks (32mm x 32mm), each with two red sides, two
white sides and two red and white, diagonally split blocks. The block design task is
incorporated into both the adult and children's scales, however, the adult version is
used in this instance. For the adult version, twelve patterns, illustrating the designs to
be constructed, were presented on individual cards measuring 10Smm x 10Smm.
6.~.3 Procedure
The block design was administered in accordance with the instructions given in the
WAIS (Weschler, 1981). Participants were given a specific time period in which they
were required to assemble the blocks so that the upward faces matched the pattern
illustrated on the card. A score was assigned depending on the amount of time taken
to produce the design. This raw score was then converted into a standardised score,
with a score often representing average performance.
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6.6 RESULTS
The standardised mean scores for the block design and the standard deviations (SD)
are reported in table 6.3.
Table 6.3: The standardised block design scores rsD)
Groups Block Design
Savant
Autistic
LDC
Art Students
Normal Students
12.22 (1.92)
8.22 (2.17)
6.89 (3.69)
14.22 (1.92)
12.00 (1.50)
Reflecting the scores on the EFT, the performance of the savant group appears
comparable to that of the non-gifted students. A one-way ANOVA, indicated a
significant group effect (F (4,40) = 14.83, p < 0.01, ,,2 = 0.60), post hoc bonferroni
analysis indicated that the savant group had a significantly higher score than the LDC
group and the autistic controls (p < 0.001), there was no significant difference
between the two student groups, nor the two mixed intelligence control groups.
6.7 DISCUSSION
The results of the block design task are in accordance with the results reported by
Pring, Hermelin and colleagues outlined in chapter 1, in that the savant artists were
significantly faster than not only the Loe group, but also the autism controls. What
is more, in further support of their hypothesis that segmentation ability might be a
building block for artistic talent, the performance of the artists was up to the level of a
group of artistically gifted controls (see Pring at al., 1995). However, this 'building
block' appears only to be relevant to the artists with a diagnosis of autism as, contrary
to previous findings, despite the art students producing faster responses overall than
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the IQ matched. non-gifted control students, this difference failed to reach
significance. Likewise, there was no support for an autism-specific islet of ability on
this measure. A full interpretation of these findings is presented after a discussion of
the relationship between the two tests.
A comparison of the two tests
In the discussion of the EFT result it was suggested that the two tasks (the EFT and
the block design) might tap different abilities. In order to investigate this suggestion
the results of all participants were entered into a correlation matrix. As performance
was consistent on the meaningful and abstract conditions, the median scores for
combined performance on the meaningful and abstract conditions were calculated for
each individual. Interestingly, although there was a strong correlation between the
EFT and the block design in the autism and LDC groups' (Autism; r= -.77,p < 0,01,
LDC; r = -.84, p< 0.01), there was no significant correlation within the three
remaining groups. This is illustrated in figure 6.5.
S The negative relationship evident is a result of the differential scoring methodologies employed on the
two tasks. On the EFT, where response time was measured, lower scores indicate superior
performance. On the BD, however, the scores were scaled with higher scores representative of better
ability.
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Figure 6.5: Scatter plot illustrating the mean (median) response times (or the (our
groups on the combined conditions of the EFT and the standardised scores on the
block design.
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In order to investigate the group differences between the five groups on the two tests,
the combined meaningful and abstract means for the EFT and the block design
standard scores were converted into z-scores these are illustrated in figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6: The z-scores [or combined EFT and Block design in the five groups.
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Figure 6.6 indicates an interaction effect between the two tests and different groups.
It is important to reiterate at this point that the EFT and the BD were scored on
opposite scales. That is a higher score on the EFT was indicative of poor performance
as it was based on recognition time. On the other hand, the block design results were
based on standardised scores, where a higher score represented poor performance. As
figure 6.6 illustrates the standardised scores it is possible to see here that the
performance of the LDC and autism groups produced scores over and under the mean
scores on the EFT and block design respectively. The performance of the two
students groups and the savant group, however produced scores under the overall
group mean on the EFT and above this on the block design. In order to investigate a
possible interaction effect the standardised scores were entered into a mixed ANOVA.
A large significant interaction effect was found ( F (4,40) = 11.87, p < 0.01, ,,2 = 0.56)
indicating that there was a meaningful difference in performance between the savant,
art student and normal students and the LDC and autism control groups.
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The IQ scores for the three mixed intelligence groups were also entered into the
correlation matrix, there were no significant correlations within the savant group. In
the autism control group block design performance positively correlated with PIQ (r =
.59, P = 0.9), and VIQ with performance on the EFT (r = .71, p < 0.05), indicating
that good performance on the EFT was linked with lower verbal ability. In the LDe
group, again there was a strong correlation between PIQ and block design (r = 0.71, P
< 0.05) and both PIQ and VIQ on the EFT (PIQ; r = -.80, p< 0.01, VIQ; r = .69, P <
0.05), the negative relationships indicated between EFT and IQ indicated higher IQ
was related to faster recognition times, hence superior disembedding performance.
6.8 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this series of studies was to examine firstly, if this group of savant artists
possessed a greater attention to detail as a result of either their diagnosis of autism or
their artistic ability and secondly to investigate the nature of this processing style.
Initially three modified versions of the EFT were presented to the savant artists and
four control groups. Overall it was found that the performance of the savant artists,
although up to the level of the normal art students and above the LDC group, did not
differ from the autism controls. What is more, the lack of any significant interaction
effect between groups on the meaningful and abstract conditions, indicated that none
of the groups displayed any benefit from contextual independence, and superior
performance appeared to result from the enhanced segmentation ability that would
benefit both conditions.
When the results of the block design are studied in conjuncture with those gained in
the EFT, the results become much more interesting. That the block design was a
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purely perceptual test, in that contextual cues could not be used to aid performance,
again indicates good performance is due to a visual processing style rather than
semantic independence. Overall the results gained by the savant group on this
measure stand in contrast to those gained on the EFT, as on the block design they
were found to produce significantly better performance than the autism control group.
The difference in results on the two tasks is intriguing, especially considering the
number of studies which have reported a high correlation between the block design
and the EFT (Jarrold et al., 2000, Ropar and Mitchell, 2001), a result mirrored in the
both the autism and LDC groups. If then, the two tasks are both measuring essentially
the same ability, in this case possibly a focus on perceptual detail, why did the EFT
fail to discriminate between the two groups with autism whereas the block design did?
In order to address the above question, it is necessary to look closely at the differential
task demands of the two tests. Specifically it was suggested in the discussion of the
EFT, that these two tasks may actually involve different processes for good
performance. Here the hypothesis was proposed that whereas the EFT is a passive
recognition task, the block design can be seen as an active construction task in that
participants are constantly manipulating the blocks in order to achieve the end result.
The lack of a correlation between the two tasks in the savant group adds further
support to this suggestion. It may be that the superiority of the savant group
compared to the autism controls on this task, results from the strong visual-motor
component inherent in this task. Although participants were required to trace around
the hidden figure in the EFT, this was only done after they had visually located the
shape. This explanation fits closely with points made by Hermelin and colleagues in
the chapter 1 (Hermelin et al., 1994; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1990). Here it was
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argued that drawing ability was dependent on the conversion of visual input into a
motor output and several studies found that the savant group were superior to their
control groups at recalibrating visual feedback into motor ability. In essence this is
what is required on the block design task and it may be this motor element which
distinguishes between the savants and the non-talented controls. To that end, it can be
argued that local processing alone is not sufficient to produce superior performance in
the savant group, if the task does not have a motor element.
It is recognised that the performance of both the normal and art students was also
superior to the autism control group on the block design and this may in fact represent
the robustness of the block design task comparative to the EFT, although it is the
difference between the autism control group and the savants on this measure which is
of particular interest here. It is also, nevertheless, interesting that neither performance
on the EFT nor the block design appeared, on the whole, to be facilitated by artistic
ability; shown in the failure to find a significant difference between the art students
and the normal students. With regard to the EFT, this may reflect the comparative
ease with which all students performed the task. Indeed the task demands on the
abstract condition were considerably reduced, not only in an effort to make the two
conditions comparable," but also in order that the task be suitable for presentation to a
range of individuals with learning difficulties. As such it may be that the task
demands were not high enough to discriminate between individuals of normal
intelligence and those with a specific developmental disorder such as autism (hence
the failure to find a difference between any groups and autism controls on this task)
6 It is recognised that despite the efforts, outlined in the method section, which were made in order for
the meaningful and abstract conditions of the EFT to be compared, that the two conditions were not
necessarily of equal difficulty. However, the focus of this task was on within and between group
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let alone between the two sets of students. As to why a difference was not evident on
the block design between the two student groups, this could reflect the standardisation
of scores on this measure, which reduces the intricacies of performance and the
standard scores were higher amongst the art student group on the block design. These
methodological concerns can thus account for the failure to highlight an art related
superiority on this measure, despite previous positive findings and this does seem like
a likely explanation given the good performance of the savant group, in particular on
the block design task.
Another point that requires some discussion is the failure of both of the tests used in
this study, to elicit a difference between the autism control group and the LDC group,
especially considering the strong evidence towards the superior performance of
individuals with autism on such tasks. One explanation for this finding is the large IQ
range of participants in this study, which, combined with the small number of
participants in each group, could have hidden any significant group differences. It is
interesting to note, however, that whereas on both the EFT and the block design there
was a strong correlation between performance and IQ in the LDC group, this was not
the case in the autism control group. Indeed, although PIQ was found to correlate
with block design, on the EFT the only correlation within this group was the positive
relationship with VIQ. As was noted earlier, this indicates that those with higher
verbal IQ produced slower scores on the EFT. Although the N was very small,
meaning any conclusions are tentative, it appears that those individuals in the autism
control group, with less verbal ability have weaker central coherence and more detail
focussed processing strategies in the visual domain.
differences, particularly any interactions which may have arisen, rather than to directly compare within
group performance on the two measures.
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Finally, it is important to add that attributing superior performance on these two tasks
to a perceptual ability related to segmentation rather than a semantic independence,
does not immediately dismiss the notion of central coherence as proposed by Frith
and Happe (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe; 1994; Happe, 1999). Rather, as several other
researchers have suggested (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Mottron & Belleville,
1993), it is argued that on low level, visual tasks such as the EFT and the block
design, the performance can be attributed to perceptual factors, in this case the
recognition of a hidden shape and the segmentation of a visual array. Indeed this
suggestion is in keeping with several studies which indicate that the processing of
visual information in individuals with autism does not differ from that of non-autistic
control participants (Ameli et al., 1988; Brian & Bryson, 1996; Pring et al., 1994).
However, while the results of this study provide no evidence that individuals with
autism experience less capture by meaning on a visual perceptual task, they may still
exhibit less 'drive for meaning' on more active tasks (see Pring et al., 1995).
To conclude, the aim of this study was to investigate the nature of visual processing in
savant artists. It had previously been shown that good performance on tasks such as
the block design and the EFT was not only associated with autism, but also artistic
ability. Although it has consistently been found that savants gifted at art are better at
a variety of both abstract and meaningful picture puzzle tasks, no attempt had
previously been made to measure ability at identification of a hidden figure. On this
task there was no effect of either autism or artistic ability at facilitating performance.
The savant artists were significantly faster than the LDC group overall, indicating that
a combination of the two factors may have arisen. The main aim of the EFT
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experiment was, however, to investigate the nature of this perceptual ability, namely
was it related to semantic independence or perceptual segmentation? The failure to
find a significant interaction effect illustrates that none of the groups experienced less
capture by meaning and that any superior performance is likely to result from
perceptual factors. This suggestion is supported by the finding that the savant group
produced superior responses to the LDC group on the abstract block design. What is
more the savant artists were also found to be significantly better than the autism
control group on this task. The interesting contrast between the failure to find a
difference between the two groups with autism on the EFT and the clear superiority of
the savants on the block design is attributed to the different abilities tapped by each
tasks. Although both tests measure segmentation ability, the block design can be
considered an active task with a motor element and it is this which allows the savant
artists to produce responses out of line with their autism and their general level of
cognitive functioning.
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Chapter 7:
Executive Function; a question of monitoring?
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The term executive function was initially coined to describe the impairments found in
frontal lobe patients (Duncan, 1986). It can be defined as the set of abilities necessary
for the maintenance of appropriate problem solving set (Welsh & Pennington, 1988).
Such abilities include; being able to disengage from external context, inhibit incorrect
but prepotent responses, plan and generate sequences of actions, monitor performance
using feedback and flexibly shift attentional set (Russell, 1997).
Executive impairments have been found to be evident in autism, with deficits reported
on tasks measuring planning ability (Ozonoff et al, 1991), set shifting and flexibility
(Ozonoff, et al., 1991, Hughes, Russell & Robbins, 1994), inhibition (Hughes &
Russell, 1993) and monitoring behaviour (Russell & Jarrold, 1998). As discussed in
detail in chapter 2, some authors have suggested that the difficulties individuals with
autism display on tasks of generativity or creativity are executive in nature (Leevers
& Harris. 1998; Turner, 1997, 1999). Jarrold (1997) argues that the generative and
creative deficits exhibited by individuals with autism are a result of poorly specified
or represented goals. As discussed in detail in chapter 2, he argues that problems with
selection of appropriate goals or adequate representation, would result in individuals
with autism producing less responses overall. as well as more perseverative or
incorrect responses. This pattern of behaviour is especially evident on tasks requiring
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novel behaviour and with few environmental guides. Such a pattern of results was
indeed reported in Turner's (1999) investigation, again detailed in chapter 2.
So far the executive abilities of the savant artist have yet to be investigated, making
this investigation particularly important. However, despite the lack of direct
empirical evidence available, it is possible to glean some indication of the executive
skills of this group. These savant artists all produce their artistic outputs
spontaneously, indicating initially that they do not appear to suffer from an activation
impairment, More interestingly the actual process of drawing can itself be
considered an executive function, in that it involves the conscious control of
behaviour (Lezack, 1995; Mottron, Belleville & Menard 1999). What is more the
activity of generating a piece of artwork involves planning, goal setting and
monitoring (Thomas & Silk. 1990). As Van Sommers (1989) argues, the construction
sequence itself depends on depiction decisions that involve a variety of planning
operations. Several authors (Mottron & Belleville, 1993, 1995; Sacks, 1995; Selfe,
1977, 1983) have pointed out that savant artists rarely, if ever, make any mistakes in
their artwork, which require altering or erasing. From this observation one could
conclude that the planning skills possessed by savant artists in the domain of their
ability, are intact and that they are very good at monitoring their behaviour as they
draw. Moreover, there is experimental evidence that this group of savant artists are
better than controls at constantly monitoring their motor behaviour on a mirror
drawing task (Hermelin et al., 1994).
Taken together, the above points indicate that savant artists may show spared
executive abilities comparative to their non-talented autistic controls, at least
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regarding visual-motor control or in the domain of their ability. But, there is some
evidence that casts doubt onto this hypothesis. Firstly, the observation that savant
artists rarely amend their artistic outputs, does not mean that they do not make errors
and this lack of correction could actually be seen as evidence of a lack of monitoring.
What is more, in relation to the planning accuracy outlined above, both Sacks (1995)
and Selfe (1977, 1983) pointed out that Stephen and Nadia respectively, paid no
attention to drawing their outputs in the centre of the page. Rather they began
drawing anywhere on the page and frequently drew off the edges, not behaviour one
would associate with a well-planned approach. Itmay be then, that the accuracy and
ability evident in their artistic outputs results from factors such as semantic
independence (drawing what is seen rather than known, with no interest in the
viewer's perspective) or accurate visio-kinaesthetic programming, rather than
executive abilities in areas such as planning or monitoring. Finally, similarly to
Lewis and Boucher's (1991) observation that the children with autism showed less
thematic variation in their artwork, possibly due to a lack of flexibility, it has been
noted (Hennelin et al., 1999; Pring et al., 1997; Sacks, 1995) that savant artists do
tend to stick to a restricted range of topics in their art work, although this limitation in
topic is associated with many artists.
As the above discussion illustrates, a full investigation of the executive abilities of this
group of savant artists is necessary. In particular it is important to identify if savant
artists suffer from the same impairments as their non-talented controls or whether
their artistic ability results in a sparing of these processes. There are many different
measures of executive function, each with a focus on a different area, although the
measured abilities do overlap considerably, for instance the Tower of Hanoi (Anzai &
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Simon, 1979), and later Tower of London (Shallice, 1982), are primarily tests of
planning ability, though, they also assess monitoring and working memory (Ozonoff
& Jensen, 1999). It appears to be processes such as monitoring, inhibition and
fluency that are particularly relevant to creative performance (see chapter 2). It is
thus important that a test of executive function which measures these areas is utilised.
Moreover, as the question of executive performance is a hitherto neglected topic in
savant investigations, it is important that performance is measured, in the first
instance, in the domain of the ability. One measure which appears to be of particular
use in this instance is the design fluency task.
The design fluency lask
The design fluency task was formulated by Jones-Gotman and Milner (1977) as a
non-verbal analogue to the commonly used word fluency tasks. As such it was a very
good test to use in order to measure fluency performance in a group of individuals
with language difficulties. In this task participants are required to draw as many
abstract or meaningless designs or patterns as they can in a given time period.
Performance on the design fluency task is measured on a number of factors over and
above that of a simple fluency score. Like the word fluency tasks, outlined in chapter
2. it is possible to look at monitoring ability and perseveration by looking at the
participant's ability to produce a variety of different responses.
The design fluency task has previously been used with a group of individuals with
autism (Turner, 1997, 1999). Turner's findings are discussed in more detail in chapter
2, however, it is necessary at this point to briefly recap the main conclusions of her
study. Turner used the design fluency task with four groups of participants; two
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groups of autistic participants, a low and high-functioning group, and their non-
autistic IQ matched controls. She found, contrary to the findings on verbal measures,
that there was no overall autism deficit with regard to the overall number of responses
produced. However, despite generating a comparable amount of responses overall,
the two groups with autism were found to produce significantly more inappropriate
responses and more repeats or redundant responses. This, Turner (1999) argued, was
because participants did not have to prefonnulate their drawings, due to the lack of a
semantic or verbal element in the task. She argued this finding was consistent with a
primary impairment in the appropriate regulation of response behaviour in these two
groups; that is they were unable to effectively monitor their responses.
The design fluency task has several advantages in the current context, beyond simply
testing executive ability in the domain of drawing. Firstly, it is an open ended task, in
that participants are required to draw as many responses as they can in a given time
limit, thus fluency performance can be measured and it is possible to fully assess the
generative ability of the participants. Moreover, as the designs must be entirely
abstract the task can be seen to tap true generative ability, in that participants are not
able to rely on stored knowledge and the task itself is free from semantic influence.
In the design fluency task, participants must generate their responses from scratch,
there being no starting prompt, as discussed previously initial stimuli figures may in
some cases aid performance, especially in groups of participants with detail focussed
processing styles. Finally, this task allowed perseveration to be investigated by
looking at redundant or repeat responses and monitoring ability to be measured by
looking at the number of acceptable responses produced in a task with several
complex rules.
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The use o(control participants on measures o(execulive function
Throughout this thesis a variety of control groups have been used in order to test the
various hypotheses. In this instance the two mixed intelligence control groups will be
included (the autism control group and the LDC groups). Still, as mentioned
previously executive function deficits have been found in a variety of different
disorders (Lezack, 1995; Ozonoff, 1997; Temple, 1997), as such it may be that
several of the participants in the LDC group have executive deficits as a result of
their individual disorders. For this reason, the LDC group are included in analysis for
comparative purposes, but it is the performance of the savant group relative to the
autism control group which is of particular importance in this instance. As such, the
focus of interest in this study is on whether the savants possess the same impairments
as the non-talented, autism control group, rather than on the executive performance of
individuals with autism in general.
Aims
The purpose of this study was thus to investigate the executive performance of a
group of savant artists, with particular focus on fluency, inhibition and monitoring
behaviour, in a visual-motor based task.
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Experiment 5: The Design Fluency
7.2 METHOD
7.2.1 Participants
Three groups of participants took part in this experiment; the savant artists, the autism
control group and the LDC group. A full description of these participants is presented
in chapter 3.
7.2.2 Procedure
The procedure for this experiment followed that outlined by Jones-Gotman and
Milner (1977). The task consisted of two conditions, a free and a fixed condition.
The free condition was always administered first in line with Jones-Gotman and
Milner. This was followed by a short break of several minutes after which the fixed
or four line condition was presented. A time limit of four minutes was imposed on
both conditions.'
Participants were informed that they were to take part in a pattern drawing task and
that they were to draw as many simple patterns as they could in four minutes. They
were instructed not to draw real shapes or real objects but to make up the patterns or
designs themselves and not to scribble. The experimenter depicted the instructions by
drawing two allowable designs and two unacceptable designs, while explaining why
these designs were not allowed. Participants were then told to draw as many patterns
7 In the Jones-Gorman and Milner study a time limit of five minutes was imposed on the free condition
but this was reduced to four minutes on the fixed condition. The reasoning behind this variation was
that the responses drawn in the free condition were more complex. Pilot testing this study indicated
that the responses produced in both conditions were very simple. In an effort to make performance on
both tasks comparable a time limit of four minutes was set for both conditions.
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or designs as possible, with emphasis on making each drawing different to the last.
As the aim of this task was in part, to look at monitoring performance and
perseveration in the light of negative feedback, participants were given three warnings
for each type of mistake8 as suggested by Turner (1999), rather than the single
warning method adopted by Jones-Gotman and Milner (1977). An example of the
verbal warning given to participants following the production of a recognisable
response would be "that looks like a __ , remember, each drawing must not
resemble a real object". Participants were praised for all acceptable responses.
For the fixed condition, participants were informed that they were to do the same
again. but this time each response must only have four lines. A line was described as
single line that did not involve a sharp comer. The experimenter explained the task
demands further by illustrating what was accepted as a line (for instance a circle,
curve or spiral could also be counted as aline) and drawing several acceptable and
unacceptable responses. Further comprehension of what designs were acceptable in
the fixed, four-line condition was tested by asking participants to name which of
several examples were acceptable in terms of consisting of the correct number of
lines. Again participants were given three warnings of each type and praised for all
correct responses.
• The types of mistake issued with a warning were: the production of a recognisable shape or object;
scribbling; drawing identical or very similar designs; drawing very elaborate designs. In the later fixed
condition warnings were also issued for using the wrong number of lines.
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7.3 SCORING AND RESULTS
7.3.1 Fluency: The Total Number of Responses
Fluency: Scorjng
According to the procedure outlined by Jones-Gotman and Milner (1977) and used by
Turner (1999), all produced responses were included in this measure. Thus the
fluency score consisted of the total number of responses generated, irrespective of any
repeats, scribbles or inappropriate responses.
Fluency: Results
The mean scores and standard deviations (SO) for the two conditions of free and
fixed, and the overall fluency measures are shown in table 7.1.
Table 7.1: The mean scores (SD) for the measure of overall fluency in the design
fluency test
Free Fluency Fixed FlueDq' Total tluenq'
Savants
Autism
LDC
14.22 (8.20)
7.44 (4.69)
15.67 (8.23)
15.11 (8.20)
4.56 (2.51)
11.11 (7.82)
29.44 (14.54)
12.33 (6.40)
27.56 (15.59)
The mean scores indicate that the performance of the autism control group is
particularly poor, with participants in this group producing less than half of the
number of responses produced by the savant group and the LDC group. The
performance across the two tasks differs quite noticeably between the three groups as
illustrated in figure 7.1. Here the performance of the two non-talented groups
decreased in the fixed condition, but improved slightly in the savant group.
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Figure 7.1: The mean scores (or the three mixed intelligence groups on the two
conditions in the design fluency test.
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In order to investigate any interaction effect, the results of the three groups were
entered into a mixed 2 x 3 ANOVA, with condition (free, fixed) the within group
variable and group (savant, autism, LDC) as the between-participants factor. A main
effect of condition was found (F (1,24) :: 4.35, p < 0.05, l')2== 0.15), indicating that
overall, participants produced less responses on the fixed condition, however this
effect was only small. Despite figure 7.1 indicating a possible interaction effect, with
the savants producing more responses in the fixed condition, this interaction did not
reach significance (F (2,24) == 2.36,p = 0.16, ,,2= 0.16). Finally, a small significant
effect of group was found (F (1,24) == 4.78, P < 0.05, l')2= 0.15). As discussed in the
introduction it is the contrast between the savant group and the autism controls that is
of particular interest in this instance, thus an independent t-test was conducted on the
scores produced by these two groups. The savant artists were found to produce
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significantly more responses than the autism control group (t = 3.23, p < 0.01, d =
1.56).
7.3.2 Perseverative Responses: The Number of Repeats of Visually Similar
RespoDses Produced
Perseverative responses: Scoring
In line with the guidelines presented by Jones-Gotman and Milner (1977), a
perseverative response consists of the following; a response that was simply a rotation
of one that preceded it, variations on a theme, designs that only varied from a former
response by a single detail, scribbling and exact repetitions. Both Jones-Getman and
Milner (1977) and Turner (1999) suggest using only the percentage scores for
discussion in order to reduce the confounding effect of a low fluency score.
Perseverative responses: Results
In order to maintain the suitable power in the analysis of the error scores, only the
combined scores for the two conditions will be discussed, this is in keeping with the
methodology previously employed in such this task (See Turner 1999). The
percentage of responses classed as perseverative on the two conditions combined, are
illustrated in table 7.2.
Table 7.2: The total percentage (SD) of perseverative responses produced by the
three groups on the design fluency task
Perseverative 0/0
Savant
Autism
LDC
27.26 (21.32)
29.27 (22.12)
26.53 (16.55)
229
As table 7.2 illustrates there was very little between groups variance with regard to
the percentage of perseverative responses produced. nevertheless. as the high standard
deviations indicate, there was a great deal of individual difference within groups.
Kruskal-Wallis analysis indicated that there were no significant group differences on
this measure (X2 = 0.05. p = 0.97).
7.3.3 Novel responses: The Amount of Acceptable Responses
Novel responses: Scoring
The perseverative error score only incorporated errors that were markedly similar to
previous responses. yet, as outlined in the procedure section. there were several other
types of error that were possible on this task. Firstly, any responses which resembled
real shapes or objects were disallowed and in the fixed condition, any responses
comprising of the wrong number of lines were counted as errors. Such errors were
relatively rare and hence did not warrant individual discussion but, when combined
with the perseverative error score, give an indication of how capable participants were
at adhering to the rules given to them at the start of the task and their overall
monitoring ability. In order to investigate this monitoring behaviour a novel response
score was calculated. This score consists of the total number of responses produced.
minus any perseverative errors, any recognisable responses or any designs with the
incorrect amount of lines.
Novel responses: Results
Again, in order to investigate monitoring performance independent of the total
number of responses produced, the percentage scores were calculated for each
230
individual. The percentage of novel, or acceptable, responses produced by each group
and the standard deviations (SD) are presented in table 7.3.
Table 7.3: The percentage of novel responses (SD) produced by each grOUP on the
design fluency task
Free Novel % Fixed novel % Total novel %
Savant
Autism
LDC
72.37 (28.76)
46.57 (25.20)
64.68 (26.12)
42.10 (28.46)
26.79 (25.35)
47.09 (28.89)
57.06 (23.70)
37.92 (14.38)
57.20 (21.62)
Here again the performance of the savant group is almost equal to the LDC group and
noticeably above that of the autism control group. The percentage scores for the two
conditions are illustrated in figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: The percentage of novel responses produced on the free and fixed
conditions ofthe design fluency test
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As figure 7.2 illustrates, the performance of all groups decreases in the fixed
conditions, revealing that participants in all groups made more errors in total in the
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fixed, four line condition. A mixed 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on these
percentage scores with condition (free, fixed) as the between groups factor and group
(savant, autism, LOe) as the within group factor. As indicated in figure 7.3, a
significant main effect of condition was found (F (1,24) = 11.40, p < 0.01,112 = 0.32).
There was no significant interaction between group and condition (F (1,24) = 0.34,p =
0.72,112 = 0.03). Tests of between participants effects narrowly missed significance
however a small effect size was indicated (F (2,24) = 2.66, P = 0.09, 112= 0.20). As
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, it is the performance of the savant
group, comparative to the autism controls, that was of particular interest in this
investigation, and the small effect size indicated on the group measure highlights the
need for further investigation. As such, an independent t-test was conducted on the
combined percentage scores for the two conditions of the two groups with autism.
The results of the t-test for percentage of responses indicated that the savant artists
produced significantly more responses that were recognised as acceptable, and
therefore less errors, than the autism control group (t = 2.07,p < 0.05, d = 0.98).
The combined scores over the two conditions for the measures of fluency,
perseverative error and novel response were entered into a correlation matrix along
with the IQ scores. There were no significant correlations within the two groups with
autism (r below 0.43, p = 0.27). The performance of the LDC group, by contrast,
appeared to be largely associated with both VIQ and PIQ on total fluency (VIQ: r
=0.70, p < 0.05; PIQ: r = 0.69, p < 0.05) and total novel response (VIQ: r = 0.84, p <
0.01; PIQ: r = 0.75,p < 0.05).
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7.4 DISCUSSION
The aim of this present experiment was to investigate the executive performance of
savant artists in the domain of their ability, with particular emphasis on the areas of
fluency, perseveration and error monitoring. Although both non-talented control
groups were included in this study, due to the mixed aetiology of the LDC group and
the prevalence of executive function deficits in a variety of disorders, it was the
performance of the savant group compared to the autism control that was of interest in
this instance. Specifically this test was incorporated to conclude whether the savant
group showed the deficits associated with autism on executive measures (Jarrold
1997; OzonotT et al., 1991; Turner, 1999) or whether their artistic ability resulted in a
sparing of these processes.
Dealing firstly with the fluency dimension, the two most comprehensive
investigations of fluency performance in autism (Jarrold, 1997; Turner, 1999) both
found evidence of a pervasive generativity deficit associated with autism. The results
of this investigation not only support their conclusions, but also indicate that, at least
in the domain of their ability, savant artists do not display a deficit in this area. What
is more, as the abstract nature of this task called for participants to generate responses
completely from scratch and without the use of stored memory associations, it can be
seen to measure true generative ability. From these results one can conclude that the
savant artists show no fluency deficit with regard to the total number of responses
produced, in the domain of their ability.
The fluency result outlined above does, nevertheless, need to be looked at in the
context of the other measures gained on this task, as Turner (1999) found when she
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presented participants with the same task. In Turner's task, although the overall
fluency was comparable between the autistic and non-autistic controls, the
participants with autism were found to produce significantly more perseverative errors
and inappropriate responses. The results of this study are at odds with Turner's
results, here there were no group differences with regard to the number of
perseverative errors reported. The lack of an autism-specific deficit in the non-
talented controls, is also inconsistent with previous studies that maintain that
problems with set shifting and perseveration are consistent amongst individuals with
autism (see Liss, Fein, Allen, Dunn, Feinstein, Morris, Waterhouse, Rapin, 1999;
Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999). One possible explanation is that the design fluency task is
not a good measure of perseveration, for instance it does not require an individual to
overcome a previously reinforced or prepotent response. However, as noted by both
Turner (1997, 1999) and Jarrold (1997), perseverative errors are more apparent in
tasks which provide few environmental cues, regardless of previous feedback.
Furthermore, when one compares the mean scores produced by the savant and autism
control groups in this study, to those obtained by Turner (1999), they are very similar
If one combines the performance of the HFA's and the LFA's in Turner's study, and
obtains an overall score for perseveration, rather than looking at repeats separately, a
perseveration score of approximately 25% can be estimated. This compares to the
scores produced by the participants in this study, with the IQ range within this study
and between all the participants used in Turner's study being very similar. In this
instance then, using the scores produced by participants in Turner's study as a
comparison, it appears to be the performance of the Loe group which is particularly
poor, rather than good performance by the two groups with autism. As such it is
difficult to draw any conclusions from this result. Nevertheless, it is important to
234
recognise that the savant group showed no sparing of ability comparative to the
autism controls.
Whereas the two groups with autism were found to produce an equal number of
perseverative errors, this was not the case when the total number of errors was looked
at by analysing the novel response scores. Here the savant group were found to
produce significantly more acceptable responses than the autism control group. The
novel response score has often been used as an overall measure of monitoring ability
(Jones-Gotman & Milner, 1977; Turner, 1999) and in this case it appears that the
savant artists have a spared ability in this area, at least when the output is drawn. This
sparing of ability may arise from the fact that the design fluency task had no semantic
element, particularly as individuals with autism have been shown to exhibit less
benefit from semantic processing (Pring, et al., 1995; Shah & Frith, 1993). However,
this explanation cannot account for why performance was so good amongst the savant
group, but not amongst the autism controls. It may thus be that the savant artists
showed superior monitoring ability on this task as the response output was drawn,
indeed this is in keeping with the results of Hermelin and colleagues in which the
savants were found to have spared ability in tasks which took place in the drawn
domain (O'Connor & Hermelin, 1987b, 1990) or which require them to monitor
motor performance (Hermelin et al., 1994).
If the savant artists do indeed show a spared ability when it comes to effectively
monitoring their motor behaviour, the question arises as to whether this is found only
when the tasks have a drawn, or motor element, or do they show better monitoring
performance in general compared to the autism control group? One useful measure
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which not only looks at monitoring ability but also perseveration and flexibility is the
Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WeST, Grant & Berg, 1948; Heaton, 1981).
The WSeT requires participant to sort a pack of cards according to a set of rules
which are not disclosed by the examiner. Indeed, participants are not informed of the
purpose of the task, only that they are to sort the cards and after each card has been
placed the examiner will tell them whether they were correct or incorrect. The rules
(colour, shape and number) are alternated after the participants have correctly sorted
six or ten cards correctly, but they are not informed that the rule has changed and
must utilise the examiner's feedback to guide them to the correct response. The
weST can be scored on a number of measures; the amount of correct categories,
which gives a measure of cognitive flexibility and general task understanding, the
amount of perseverative errors, showing cognitive inflexibility and inhibition, non-
perseverative errors, which can be taken as evidence of monitoring and the use of
feedback.
Although studies including participants with autism have consistently reported
deficits, such studies have, on the whole, used high-functioning individuals (Griffith,
Pennington, Wehner & Rogers, 1999). This is no doubt due to the abstract nature
and overall complexity of the task, making it very difficult to comprehend in
individuals of lower overall IQ. Indeed pilot testing indicated that both individuals
with general learning difficulties and those with autism, with a VIQ of around 70,
found the task very stressful and frustrating and failed to understand what was
required of them. The outcome was that the results provided little information with
regard to the types of errors made. The aim of using the WeST in this instance was
236
to investigate the types of errors made by the savant group in comparison to their
controls. As has been illustrated throughout, the IQ range of the groups involved in
this series of experiments was very wide. For this reason, the task demands as they
originally stood were too high for those at the lower end of the IQ range and, for this
study to be meaningful, it was of paramount importance that the task demands were
understood initially. This point has been raised by several researchers investigating
executive function in areas other than autism (Goldman, Axlerod & Tomkins, 1992;
Nelson, 1976; Rossell & David, 1997) and several modifications have been suggested.
These modifications, although resulting in more clarity at the outset still, nevertheless,
show sensitivity between groups with executive difficulties and those without.
Test modifications
One of the most common modifications was suggested by Nelson (1976). Firstly, each
card sharing more than one attribute with a stimuli card was removed from the pack,
meaning that there was no ambiguity regarding sorting principle employed by the
participant. The removal of such cards left a pack of 24 cards, with a total of 48 if
two packs of stimuli cards were used as suggested. Nelson (1976) asked participants
to sort the cards and after six cards had been sorted to a single rule participants were
clearly informed that the rule had changed and they were now to work out a new rule.
A further variation found useful with some patient groups is to inform them of the
sorting principles at the start of the test and to explain that the sorting principle could
change at any time, yet not explicitly stating when (Goldman et al., 1992). This later
modification is advantageous in that participants still have to use feedback effectively
in order to sort correctly, rather than the explicit instruction employed by Nelson
(1976). Indeed several researchers have criticised Nelson's modification, stating that
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it is too simple and does not distinguish between levels of mild cognitive deterioration
(Hart, Kwentus, Harkins & Taylor, 1988).
Aim
This next experiment sought to measure executive ability on the WeST, a
standardised test, specifically looking at inhibition and monitoring. To reduce the
overall task complexity any cards sharing more than one attribute with a stimulus card
were removed. Further to this participants were informed of the sorting principles at
the start of the test.
Experiment 2: The Card Sort
7.5 METHOD
7.5.1 Participants
The same participants who took part in the design fluency task, took part in the card
sort.
7.5.2 Materials
The stimuli was taken from the WeST (Grant & Berg, 1948; Heaton, 1981). The
WeST consists of two packs of 64 cards, and 4 stimuli cards, differing in colour, form
and number. Following Nelson (1976) all cards sharing more than one attribute with
a stimulus cards were removed. This led to 24 cards from the original set being
suitable. In order to make the test of adequate length two packs were combined
resulting in 48 test cards.
238
7.5.3 Preeedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room at their day centres. The task
was introduced as a puzzle task. The experimenter began by laying down the four
stimulus cards, participants were instructed that that they needed to sort the cards
using three rules; colour, shape or number. The experimenter then illustrated the
three rules by sorting two cards according to each rule and explaining why the cards
were sorted that way. Next, to illustrate that participants fully comprehended these
results, the experimenter gave the three cards to each participant and instructed them
to match one card to the stimulus cards according to each of the three rules. All
participants were able to complete this initial task and the removal of any cards
sharing more than one attribute with a stimulus card ensured that participants were
sorting to the correct principle.
Following this training task all practice cards were added back into the original pack
and participants were given the following instructions: "I want you to try to work out
which rule / am thinking of, / will tell you whether you are wrong or right when you
have placed each card. Sometimes the rule / am thinking of will change, then you
need to work out which rule / am thinking of again. / will tell you after you have laid
each card if that is the rule / am thinking of."
Participants were then given the pack of cards and the experimental session began.
After each card the participant was given the following feedback; for correctly placed
cards they were informed "that is very good, that is the rule / was thinking of'. For
incorrectly placed cards participants were informed "that is not the rule / am thinking
239
of, try again" and given a new card. After each card had been laid it was left in place
and incorrect cards were not returned to the pack.
The sorting principle changed after six cards were consecutively placed correctly,
following the colour, number, shape order, however, in line with Goldman et al.
(1992) participants were not explicitly instructed when to change principle.
Following Nelson (1976) the test was discontinued after six categories had been
successfully sorted, or the pack of 48 cards was exhausted.
7.6 SCORING
Firstly the total number of correct categories was calculated. As stated above, a
category consisted of six correctly sorted cards in order. The maximum number of
categories was six. Next the total number of incorrectly sorted cards was counted,
giving the total error score. The categorisation of errors followed that outlined by
Heaton (1981). Firstly the number of perseverative errors was calculated. A
perseverative error was defined as a response that would have been correct at the
previous stage. There were two exceptions to this rule, the first related to
perseverative errors that occurred before a category had been completed. In this case
participants could perseverate on the basis of the first incorrect card placed. The
second type of perseverative error related to which arose within a single stage of the
test. This occurs when the participant begins to sort incorrectly and then perseverates
on this incorrect response, even though the incorrect response was not the preceding
correct response. For example, the previous sorting principle was colour, the current
sorting principle is shape, yet participants continue to sort to number even though they
are given negative feedback. In these instances, the 'perseverated to' principle
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changes after three cards have been incorrectly placed in the way outlined above. The
number of perseverative errors is then subtracted from the total number of errors, to
give the number of non-perseverative errors.
As all participants sorted the same amount of cards, the total error scores are
illustrated rather than using percentage scores.
7.7 RESULTS
The mean scores and standard deviations (SO) for each of the measures obtained on
the WeST are illustrated in table 7.4 .
Table 7.4: The mean scores (SD) for the three mixed intelligence grOUPS on the
Categories Total Error Perseverative Other Error
Error
Savant 3.41 (2.79) 18.22 (12.66) 10.22 (8.18) 7.00 (5.74)
Autism 2.79 (2.81) 20.21 (10.49) 14.11 (7.11) 7.78 (3.56)
LDC 2.89 ~2.20} 17.44 ~13.08} 11.56 ~10.25} 5.89 !6.51}
A one-way ANOVA conducted on the category, total error and other error scores
indicated no significant group differences (categories: F (2,24) = 0.55, p = 0.55, T)2 =
0.04; total error: F (2,24) = 0.50, p = 0.50, T)2 = 0.04; other error: F (2,24) = 0.28, p =
0.28, T)2 = 0.03). Due to the high standard deviations with regard to perseverative
errors a Kruskal- Wallis was used to analyse these scores. Despite the scores of the
autism control group appearing noticeably lower than the scores of the savant and
LDC group, this difference failed to reach significance (X2 = 0.89, P = 0.64).
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As mentioned at several points throughout this chapter, due to the poor discriminative
validity of tests of executive function, it is the performance of the savant group
comparative to the autism control group which is of particular importance in this
investigation. Despite this, independent t-tests conducted on categories, total error
and other error and a Mann Whitney test on perseverative errors, failed to highlight a
difference (categories: t = 1.10, P = 0.29, d = 0.22; total errors: t = -.98, P = 0.34, d =
-0.17; other error: t = -.35, P = 0.73, d = -0.16; perseverative errors: U = 31.00, P =
0.41).
The results of these measures were entered into a correlation matrix. In all groups
there was a strong correlation between the various measures, indicating that those
good at the task overall produced less errors overall and less perseverative errors. In
the LDC group performance was determined mainly by VIQ, with highly significant
correlations on all measures other than the perseverative errors (categories: r = 0.75, P
0.05; total error: r = -0.76, p < 0.05; other error: -0.65, p <0.05; perseverative errors:
r = -0.55, p = 0.34). There were no significant IQ relationships in the two groups with
autism (r below 0.34, p = 0.32).
7.8 DISCUSSION
The main finding from the weST was the failure to find any significant group
differences on any of the measures. Initially this result might appear somewhat
surprising, especially considering that the weST has proved in the past to be one of
the more consistent measures in identifying executive deficits in autism (Liss et al.,
1999). There are a number of reasons for this result. Firstly, as has already been
mentioned, poor performance on executive tasks has been associated with a variety of
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disorders. The LDe group in this series of studies were drawn from a day centre
catering for individuals with a variety of needs including patients with disorders such
as schizophrenia, a disorder found to result in particularly poor performance on the
WeST (Rossell & David, 1997). It may then be that the mixed aetiology of this
control group masked any significant findings.
An even more important point relates to the effect that overall IQ has on these sorts of
tasks. A number of researchers have pointed out the relationship between VIQ and
performance of executive tasks. As Griffith et al. (1999) point out, tests of executive
function often fail to discriminate between groups with lower IQ's, with consistent
results only obtained using individuals with normal range intelligence. In this study
the mean VIQ for the three clinical groups was around 80. A score of 80 is often the
mean used for lower functioning control groups (see Turner, 1999) as such it is not
surprising that the executive tasks used in this study failed to find a difference
between those with autism and those without.
The main reason for the inclusion of the WeST in this series of experiments was then
to identify whether savant artists show any spared performance on a classic test of
executive function, compared to a non-talented, autism control group, as a result of
their artistic ability. This was not the case, despite producing slightly less
perseverative and overall errors than the autism controls, this difference did not reach
significance. The failure of the WeST to differentiate between groups in this context
and the differences that arise between the groups in the design fluency task warrant
some further discussion, provided below.
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7.9 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this set of experiments was to investigate the executive performance of the
savant artists, firstly on a task in which the output was in the domain of their ability
and secondly on a classic task of executive function. Firstly, the performance of the
savant artists was found to be significantly above that of the autism controls on the
measure of fluency in the design fluency task. Indeed, the performance of the non-
talented autistic group was also lower than that found in the LDe group. This
supports previous findings pertaining to pervasive fluency deficit in autism (Jarrold,
1997; Tumer, 1999). However, the savant group did not show such a deficit,
indicating that, in the domain of their talent, they are more generative than their non-
talented controls.
The second topic for discussion, that of perseveration, was measured on both the
design fluency test and the WeST. In Turner's (1999) study of fluency performance,
she made the distinction between low (repeats) and high (redundant) level
perseveration. In this investigation the rate of repeats was very low". As such the
errors made on this task can be seen as evidence of stuck in set perseveration, or a
lack of flexibility, and are comparable to the type of error measured in the WeST, a
specific test of cognitive flexibility. Here the savant artists were found to produce the
same proportion of perseverative errors as the autism controls on both the design
fluency task and the WeST. Hence, not only did they fail to show any sparing of
ability overall, but also there was no domain-specificity found on this measure of the
design fluency task. The finding that the savant artists showed similar performance to
the autistic controls on this measure is not entirely surprising. Flexibility deficits are
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a robust finding in autism, not only on tasks such as the weST and the IDlED
(Hughes et al, 1994; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Rumsey &
Hamburger, 1990), but also on their generative output (Lewis & Boucher, 1991).
Indeed the same could be said about savant artists who, as mentioned in the
introduction of this chapter, often stick to one topic in their art work.
The third area investigated on this task was monitoring performance. In the design
fluency task, monitoring performance was measured by looking at the total number of
novel, or acceptable, responses. In the WeST monitoring performance was measured
by looking at the total number of non-perseverative errors, although total error can
also be seen as evidence of a monitoring impairment, as participants still fail to use
the feedback provided by the experimenter to modulate performance. It is here that
the most interesting contrast between the two tasks arises. Whereas on the weST the
savant artists produced the same number of errors as the autism control group, on the
design fluency task they produced significantly less. As Jones-Gotrnan and Milner
(1977) mention, the more responses produced. the more likely errors will occur, as the
more likely it will be that responses either resemble real things or previous patterns.
Yet, despite producing more responses overall, as indicated on the fluency score, the
savant artists did not produce a higher proportion of errors.
This result may occur as a result of the savant group possessing superior monitoring
behaviour, in that they were better able to relay the visual information of what they
were drawing back to motor control, in order to produce acceptable responses. This
suggestion is consistent with the points raised by Turner (1999). She maintained that
9 A total of four repeats were recorded, between two participants, one from the autism control group
and one from the savant group.
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due to the abstract nature of the task, participants were not required to preformulate a
response, hence are more reliant on visual feedback to monitor their responses. In her
study the individuals with autism were particularly poor at this, indicating an autism-
specific monitoring deficit. This appears not be the case in the savant group. What is
more, the view that the savant artists are more able at monitoring their responses and
feeding back visual information to motor control fits in with previous results obtained
with a savant group, on tasks such as mirror drawing (Hermelin et al., 1994).
The finding that individuals with autism have difficulty in action monitoring and error
correction was also raised by Russell and Jarrold (1998). They suggested that the
problems encountered by this group arose from difficulties in generating visual
schemas and utilising visual feedback effectively. They cite two studies in support of
this view. Firstly they refer to a finding by O'Connor and Hermelin (1975) in which
children with autism were found to be as poor as those with a serious visual
impairment at reproducing a distance movement. They argue that the poor
performance of the children with autism results from their inability to construct a
visual schema to accompany their motor movement, as a result they have to rely on
visual input only. They then cite a study by Frith and Hermelin (1969) in which
children with autism were found to rely on motor feedback rather than visual
feedback, on a tracking task. While initially these two results do not gel together,
Russell and Jarrold maintain that the children with autism are unable to utilise both
the visual and motor feedback, which would result in optimum performance on this
task. This, they maintain, is because children with autism have, as a result of their
impaired ability to generate visual schemas, learned to rely on motor feedback in
order to avoid confusion from the two input sources.
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In testing this hypothesis Russell and Jarrold (1998) found that children with autism
were less able than controls at correcting visible errors (external) and those which had
yet to become an apparent error (internal errors) on a computerised missile shooting
task. They concluded that the failure to correct internal errors resulted from their
failure to generate an adequate visual schema for the action taken, whereas they failed
to correct external errors as they were more efficient at using motor feedback rather
than visual input. The results of Russell and Jarrold's study, fit well with the results
obtained on the design fluency task and with the style of drawing favoured by savant
artists, in which they rarely amend outputs by rubbing out. The superior performance
of the savants on this task then, and the incredible accuracy associated with their
artwork, may then result from their ability to construct visual schemas. This
explanation is certainly consistent with previous findings in which savant artists have
superior motor programming capacity (O'Connor & Hermelin, 1987b) and are better
at reca1ibrating novel visual feedback with motor ability as evident in Hermelin et
al.'s (1994) study. The ability of savant artists at generating visual schemas from
motor input is especially evident in O'Connor and Hermelin's (1990) finding that
savant artists were better than controls on a visual-kinaesthetic matching task and also
at reproducing tactically presented figures. It may thus be that as a result of the
savant artists being able to generate better visual schemas, based on motor or visual
input. they are superior at internally monitoring their motor outputs. Whether their
failure to correct external errors arises from their visual schemas being so accurate
that they do not need to make any corrections, or a failure in external error monitoring
remains to be seen.
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The main aim of this investigation was to gain a measure of the executive abilities of
the savant artists with specific reference to inhibition and monitoring. Following the
paradigm used throughout. performance was measured firstly in the domain of ability,
this study this was then followed by a more general task. On the WeST, a task taking
place outside of the visual-motor domain, the performance of the savant artists was
comparable to the non-talented control groups. This is in contrast to the results that
were gained on the design fluency task. Here both overall fluency and the amount of
acceptable responses were talent dependent, as evident in the superior performance of
the savant artists compared to the autism control group. This indicates that in the
domain of their ability the savant artists are both more generative and more able to
correctly monitor their responses. This superior monitoring behaviour is only evident
where the task is drawn and appears to result from the savant group being more able
to generate visual schemas based on motor movements, which may result in increased
accuracy in their art work.
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Chapter 8:
General discussion
8.1 THE AIMS OF THIS THESIS
The aim of this thesis was two fold; firstly to attempt to measure the creative and
generative capacity of a group of savant artists both in and outside of the domain of
their ability and secondly, to uncover the processes that underlie their creative
performance. This was investigated with specific regard to their diagnosis of autism,
their artistic ability or their overall level of cognitive functioning. On the whole, until
recently, studies that have looked at creative ability have been taken less than
seriously by the scientific community. Some have argued that creativity is not a valid
psychological area and others have criticised the subjective nature of research
endeavouring to measure this concept (see Finke et al., 1992). However, despite these
criticisms, investigations into the processes considered to underlie original or novel
thought in everyday thinking have been steadily increasing over the past decade and
the study of creative ability is finally becoming recognised as a viable area for
objective, scientifically based research.
The change in viewpoint regarding research into creativity is mirrored in autism
research. Until the mid 1990's, there had been only a handful of investigations into
this area (Frith, 1970; Jarrold et al., 1994a,b,c; Lewis & Boucher, 1988, 1991), despite
a lack of imagination making up one third of the triad of impairments, along with
communication and socialisation, which characterise autism. Nevertheless, despite
this increase in interest, creative performance in autism is still a comparatively
neglected topic, making the investigations outlined in this thesis very important in
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furthering our understanding. The creative and generative capacity of savant artists is
an area that has, until this point, been almost entirely overlooked. Several single case
study papers (Hennelin et al., 1999; Pring et al., 1997) have attempted to investigate
creative transformations in spontaneous artistic output produced by several, individual
savant artists, although thus far not one attempt has been made to actually measure
such abilities and processes comparative to non-talented control participants. This is
an interesting paradox as most savant artists have received a diagnosis of autism.
The relative lack of previous investigations into this intriguing topic naturally resulted
in a number of challenges early on in this thesis, first and foremost was to define the
terminology that would be used throughout. Unlike other processes that have been
the subject of investigations with similar groups (for instance memory or manual
dexterity) creativity is a term with many, often sceptical, connotations. As the aim of
this series of experiments was to objectively measure creativity and generativity and
the processes underlying these, rather than make judgements regarding the creative
nature of the savant artists' output, no assumptions have been made regarding the
historical or aesthetic importance of their spontaneous productions. Chapter 2
provided a number of definitions that have been proposed throughout the years. As
mentioned, there appeared to be a division between those accounts which place
emphasis on the end product and those placing importance on the process. This
thesis takes both factors into account, the first two experimental chapters (the TTCT
and the figural synthesis task) look at the product, with the focus on objective
measurement, whereas the fmal two experimental chapters provide further insight
into the processes that may underlie such performance. A further distinction was also
made, for the purpose of this study, between creativity and generativity. Creativity
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was defined as the capacity to produce new or original ideas. Generativity on the
other hand. is seen as the production of a number of ideas, with little regard as to the
value of these products. In view of this, an emphasis on both quality and quantity of
output is critical. These two aspects of production are independent and although they
may, they do not necessarily co-exist. For instance, an individual may produce a
number of mundane, everyday responses or ideas, thus illustrating high generativity
but low creativity, whereas a highly creative individual may only produce a small
number of highly original responses.
8.2 THE CREATIVE PRODUCT
As mentioned above a distinction was made throughout this thesis, between the
product and the cognitive processes that might influence this. The initial aim of
experiments 1 and 2 was to identify the creative and generative capacity of the group
of savant artists who participated. In order to assess their ability, performance was
compared to three control groups; two IQ matched groups, a group with autism and a
group with general learning difficulties, and a group of talented A-level art students.
The inclusion of these three groups allowed comparisons to be made between
performance and conclusions to be drawn as to whether this was a result of an autism-
specific impairment, general cognitive functioning or artistic ability.
8.2.1 The Terrance Test of Creative ThiDkiDg
The next step was to find a measure suitable for administration to participants with a
range of IQ scores, from borderline up to high-functioning. Furthermore, as this was
the first attempt to measure savant creative ability, it was important to assess this
initially in the domain of their ability. As such, the Torrance Test of Creative
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Thinking (Torrance, 1974) was chosen. At the outset this appeared to be a very useful
test; not only did it require only minimal verbal instructions but it also provided a set
of standardised norms, a detailed scoring guide and importantly for a study of this
sort, it broke down separate areas of creativity into four dimensions. It was the use of
the different dimensions that made this test particularly appealing, as not only did the
dimensions measured correspond with areas previously found be deficient in autism
(such as flexibility), but it clearly differentiated between generativity as measured by
the fluency dimension. and creativity as measured by originality.
Despite early indicators as to the suitability of the ITCT for this study, the results
were disappointing. The over-riding result was the far superior performance of the
group of art students whom, despite having comparable levels of artistic ability to the
savants, far out performed the three clinical groups on every measure. This result
highlights the importance of overall intelligence on this test and as a result, brings into
question the ITCT's usefulness as a valid measure of creative performance.
Generativity: The amount oOdeas produced
Although the TTCT made use of four dimensions, it was fluency and originality that
were of specific interest here. Throughout, fluency performance has been equated
with generarivity, yet here the results were inconclusive despite the generative
problems associated with autism. This is partly due to a decision that was made to
reduce the number of stimulus figures in the repeated figures task to the same amount
as was presented in the incomplete figures task, thus allowing performance on the two
tasks to be compared. This decision was taken in order to reduce the overall task
demands and to allow the investigation of each of the dimensions without the added
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demands of producing many different responses. This meant, however, that the task
was a closed test and as many participants performed at ceiling, there was little
differentiation between groups. Notwithstanding, the performance of the autism
control group was somewhat lower than in the other three groups but this difference
did not meet significance.
Creativity: How original were the responses
Aside from the problems concerning the measurement of generativity by the TICT, it
was initially thought to be very useful for measuring originality, in that it tapped how
statistically rare a response was. Again no group differences arose on this task
between savant artists and the two IQ matched control groups. One important
criticism that can be aimed at this measure, however, is that a visual response is
scored on semantic title, thus any unusual visual representations will go unrecognised
as scoring is on the basis of response title only. This criticism is especially valid
considering the unusual visual, perceptual characteristics associated with autism
(Turner, 1995).
Elaboration: A critical (actor
Regardless of the criticism levelled at the TICT it is still possible to glean some
interesting findings from this study, especially with respect to the performance of the
savant group on elaboration. Here the savant artists were found to produce
significantly more elaborate responses than both the autism control group and the
LDC group. Although it has been stated above that it was performance on the
measures of fluency and originality that were crucial in this task, the dimension of
elaboration can be seen to pick up on each of these. Elaboration measures the amount
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of new details added to a response, and to gain a high score individuals need to be
both generative (to generate a number of details) and creative (to make each detail
different). Therefore simply drawing a tree with lots of leaves would not have gained
a high elaboration score unless each of the leaves was clearly drawn in a different,
meaningful style. On this measure then. the savant artists do show a greater creative
and generative capacity than other individuals of equal cognitive ability.
8.2.2 The Figural Synthesis, Construction Task
The next step was then to look at performance outside of the domain of drawing. As
discussed in chapter 5, although the question of domain-specificity is an important
one, savant artists do show superior scores to controls in related areas, usually in the
visual-motor domain. This study thus attempted to investigate if creative and
generative ability also extended beyond responses that were drawn. Further to this it
was also important to pick up on the shortcomings of the TTCT as an adequate
measure of creative and generative ability. One of the most critical problems with the
TTCT was the failure of this test to pick up on unusual representations of common
objects, hence the next task used needed to recognise this type of visual creativity.
Moreover, it needed also to gauge generative ability by gaining a true measure of
fluency. For this purpose a paradigm used by Finke and Slayton (1988) was modified
in order for it to be applicable for use with a mixed intelligence group. Participants
were presented with a variety of simple shapes with which they were required to
generate recognisable representations, these responses were named by the participant
and then drawn by the experimenter. Responses were scored on three factors;jluency,
the number of recognisable responses and originality. Importantly, this figural
synthesis, or construction task, was also very useful as it required participants to
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generate their responses without the use of a given starting figure or prompt.
Although there was very little difference between groups on the two and three-figure
conditions, it was on the four-figure condition that the patterns were found to emerge.
It was suggested in chapter 5, that the reason that the four-figure condition was crucial
was because participants were not able to draw on stored memory representations
(such as a square with an inverted triangle for a house) to aid their responses. The
four-figure condition, therefore, required participants to be both more generative and
more creative.
The quality vs. quantity distinction.
In contrast to the inconclusive results gained on the ITeT, a clear autism-specific
deficit was found on fluency in the figural synthesis task. Here the performance of
the savant group did not differ from that of the autism control group and was below
that of the LDC group, although this difference narrowly missed significance. This
result thus provides further support for a general generativity impairment pervasive in
autism, which affects savant artists similarly when responses are outside of their
domain of expertise. While performance on the measure of fluency seemed to be
determined by diagnosis. in contrast the result of the originality measure was talent
related and the performance of the savant group mirrored that of the art student group.
A point does need to be raised at this time regarding the measurement of originality in
the two tasks used to investigate the creative product. Namely that in both cases
originality has been measured by comparing the number of original responses
produced, thus confounding the measures of creativity and generativity. Although
throughout, a fluency independent score has been calculated, is may still be argued
that it is inappropriate to measure a qualitative product using quantitative means.
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However, for the results to be subject to statistical analysis it was important to look at
creativity in a quantifiable way. It is perhaps important to point out though, that on
the crucial four figure condition of the construction task, six of the nine savant artists
produced at least one response seen as original, compared to only four and two
participants in the LDC and autism control groups respectively.
8.2.3 The Creative Preduen SomeCcuelaslons
What conclusions can be drawn then from this first set of studies as to the generative
and creative product? Although a variety of measures were taken on these first two
investigative tasks, it is the contrasting findings on the measures of fluency and
originality which are of most interest regarding the generative and creative capacities
of this intriguing group of artists. These two areas will now be discussed individually.
The decision to reduce the number of stimulus figures in the TTCT, repeated figures
task, meant that it was difficult to draw any suggestions regarding generative ability
on the TTCT and this has meant that any conclusions on this measure are still
tentative. Nevertheless, the savant group seemed to be subject to the same deficit as
the autism control group on the fluency measure of the construction task. This
indicates that the savant artists do share the generative impairment that characterises
autism performance on this task. However, a further measure of generativity was
obtained by looking at the results of the design fluency task reported in chapter 7.
Here the performance of the savant group was equal to that of the LOC group and
clearly above that produced by the autism control group. This supports the suggestion
that in the area of their special ability, autistic savants do not show the general autism
fluency impairment, This inconsistency between performance on the two tasks can
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then be seen as evidence of the domain-specific nature of savant talent. It appears that
the generative capacity of the savant artists is unhindered on tasks in which the
response is drawn. Conversely, on tasks where the response takes place outside of
this modality, the artistic ability of the savant group, and the generative nature
associated with this, do not spare such individuals from the deficit resulting from their
diagnosis.
In contrast to the above discussion, the pattern of results is reversed regarding
creativity. Here there is no difference between the savants and their IQ matched
controls on the Tf'C'I' and performance is far below that of the art students, even when
the fluency independent scores are analysed. Yet, on the figural synthesis task, a task
that takes place outside of the drawn domain, the creative performance of the savant
group is more similar to that of the art students than the two non-talented groups.
Initially this result is somewhat unexpected, why does the creativity difference only
arise on the non-drawing task? The reasoning for this may be in the superior
sensitivity of the construction task at picking up visual originality or creativity.
Further to this, the presence of a stimulus figure in the TICr may actually have
reduced creativity, in that individuals found it difficult to over come the initial
representation prompted by this stimulus figure. It was noticed by many of the
participants that some figures in the TICr were easier to incorporate than others,
indeed it may have been that those 'easy' figures that prompted immediate and
common responses were the reason behind the large within-participant variation
found on this task. In the construction task, conversely, there was no initial starting
point and participants needed to generate the response totally from scratch.
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With regard to the original responses produced in the construction task. although the
difference between the savant group and the LDC group only approached significance
on the crucial four-figure condition, this is likely to be more a result of the low power
of the analysis due to the small number of participants in each group. Thus it is the
pattern of data which is most important here, with the savant group producing exactly
the same pattern of results as the art students. This is a stark contrast to the difference
between these two talented groups on the TICT. Creativity as measured by the
figural synthesis is thus seen to be facilitated by artistic ability even though the mode
of output does not involve drawing. This result is important as it illustrates that
artistic ability goes beyond this simple act of putting pencil (or paint brush) to paper
and is also evident in other domains.
Conclusion on the creative product
The poor discriminatory power of the TICT was disappointing and this test on the
whole can be criticised for being little more than a measure of general cognitive
ability, as evidenced by the very strong correlation between performance on the
various measures and IQ in the LDC group. This aside, conclusions can be drawn on
the basis of the far superior tests of generativity used thereafter, namely the figural
synthesis task and the design fluency. Here we can conclude that the savant artists
show a fluency deficit on tasks where the modality of response is not drawing that is
characteristic of their diagnosis of autism. However, on tasks where the response is
drawn, the performance of the savant group is equal to, or in some cases above. that
of the IQ-matched non-autistic control group. It can be argued that this is only
evident on a non-meaningful task such as the design fluency task, however, this is
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unlikely to be the case as evidenced by the superior elaboration scores reported in the
ITCr; dependent on the addition of meaningful new details.
In terms of creative ability, when this is measured by looking at the originality of a
visual response rather than a semantic title, the performance of the savant group is
equal to that of talented art students with no cognitive impairment. It is interesting
that this result is apparent on a task which takes place outside of the direct domain of
their ability. One can conclude from this that in terms of creativity, the savant artists'
ability extends beyond simply representing images by drawing or painting and
extends to those which are constructed. The next question to address is thus, what
processes can be seen to underlie these results?
8.3 THE CREATIVE PROCESS: ASSETS AND DEFICITS
There are, as described briefly in chapter 2, many processes seen to underlie creative
performance, As such, the aim of this thesis was not to attempt to uncover all of these
processes, but to attempt to identify those underlying the performance of the savant
artist. A good place to start therefore, was by looking at the unusual processing style
evident not only in autism, but also associated with talent and in some cases
creativity.
8.3.1 Segmentation: Perceptual, Visual Style or Semantic Independence?
Chapter 6 set out to investigate if the segmented processing style, often referred to as
weak central coherence (Frith, 1989) or segmentation (Pring et al. 1995), was stronger
in savant artists. A second aim was to examine the nature of this processing style,
specifically if it was related to a semantic or contextual independence or whether it
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was related to a visual processing style. One particularly appealing quality of this
approach from a theoretical point of view, is that this theory is able to account for
both the deficits and the assets associated with autism (Happe,1999) At several points
throughout the discussion of the TTCT and the figural synthesis task, it was suggested
that a segmented processing style might result in both the superior performance of the
two autism groups as well as the autism-specific deficits they exhibit.
On the TTCT it was suggested that the performance of the two groups with autism
may benefit from the initial presentation of a stimulus figure. This prediction was not
supported, although this was possibly due to the limitations of the test. However, the
proposal that this processing style may account for both the deficits and assets
associated with the performance of the participants with autism on this measure, was
more relevant under the discussion of the originality scores produced in the figural
synthesis task. Here it was proposed that the particularly strong segmentation skills of
the savant group allowed them to produce results in keeping with the talented art
student group. Further to this it was also suggested that this processing style may
account for the poor performance found in both the savant group and the autism
control group, with regard to representational fluency. This was seen to be due to
either problems in generating meaning, associated with the difficulties individuals
with autism have displayed extracting meaning, or alternatively the result of a
heightened segmentation leading to responses that were so unusual they were
unrecognisable.
It was therefore necessary to investigate if the savant artists in this group did indeed
show a stronger bias toward this detail focused processing, and if so, did this style
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result in a lack of contextual awareness? In order to do this two versions of the
embedded figures test were generated, based on the original stimuli. The results
indicated that, although the savant group did differ from the LDC group overall, their
performance was not above that of the autism controls, despite a trend towards the
savant group producing faster responses. What is more, none of the groups appeared
to show any sort of semantic independence, as indicated by the lack of any interaction
between the meaningfulness of the condition and nature of the group. The lack of any
semantic independence in the groups with autism, as evidenced by the lack of any
relative superiority on the meaningful condition, indicates that it is unlikely that the
lack of representational fluency is due a semantic impairment.
That the performance of the savant group did not differ significantly to that of the
autism control group appears to indicate that it is unlikely that superior segmentation
abilities in the savant artists can account for the positive results gained on the
originality measure in the figural synthesis task. However, the finding that
individuals with autism perform above controls on the EFT is not a consistent one
(Brian & Bryson, 1996; Ozonoff et al., 1991). Hence if the discriminatory value of
this task is questionable between groups of individuals with and without autism, it
may not be the most appropriate test to use to investigate differences within different
groups of autistic individuals. Therefore, before any conclusions could be drawn it
was necessary to look at performance on another task associated with this processing
style, but which has consistently been found to differentiate between talented and
non-talented groups of autistic individuals such as the block design.
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The results of the block design task presented here, supported previous findings
(Hermelin et al., 1994; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1987a; Pring at al., 1995) by indicating
that the savant artists were indeed superior to both IQ matched control groups at this
task. This is interesting as many studies have reported strong correlations between the
two tests (Jarrold et al., 2000; Ropar & Mitchell, 2001). It brings us to question what
it is about the savant artists' ability that results in superior performance on the block
design, but not the EFT? The reasoning behind this relates to the differential task
demands. In the EFT participants are required to draw around the hidden figure only
after it has been identified, on the block design, however, the test itself has an inherent
motor element in that participants are required to continually manipulate the blocks
until the correct design is achieved. As such the EFT can be considered a passive
recognition task, whereas the block design appears to be an active construction task.
It is also interesting that the two tasks appear to be mirror versions of each other, in
that in the EFT, the aim is to fmd a part within a whole, whereas the block design
requires the generation of a whole from parts. Although both measures are facilitated
by a cognitive style favouring attention to parts or details, only the test involving a
generative aspect, with a motor element, distinguished between the performance of
the two groups with autism.
The results of EFT and the block design, as discussed above do support the view that
a segmented, although not semantically independent, processing style may facilitate
performance in the savant artists, especially on tasks with an active, constructive
element. As illustrated here in the EFT, there was no evidence of an autism-specific,
semantic independence. Hence the hypothesis that the poor representational ability of
children with autism was a result of a deficit in the generation of meaningful
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responses, was not supported. A second explanation was that the poor performance
of the savant group on the representational fluency measure of the figural synthesis
task might also be due to this unusual processing style, in that their visual processing
is so detailed that the responses were unrecognisable to anyone else. While appealing
in the first instance, this explanation can be brought into doubt when one considers
that neither the block design nor the EFT differentiated between the LDC group and
the autism control groups. As the autism controls did not display this segmented
processing style it is unlikely then that it could account for the number of non-
recognisable responses produced on the construction task. Thus, in looking for an
acceptable account for the autism-specific deficits found on measures such as fluency
and representational fluency, attention must focus on a different area, one which
seems to affect both savant artists and non-talented individuals with autism equally.
8.3.2 Monitoring: An Explanation for a Deficit?
The finding that neither a semantic deficit nor heightened segmentation is likely to
account for the autism-specific deficits reported on the figural synthesis task,
indicated that there were other factors at play leading to the poor performance of these
participants. One area proposed to account for the difficulties shown by individuals
with autism on tasks of generativity relates to their executive abilities. A
comprehensive account of these deficits, which places the pattern of performance
associated with individuals with autism into a theoretical background, was suggested
by Jarrold (1997). He argued that the poor generative and creative performance
shown by individuals with autism was a result of their poor goal representation or
specification, within the Supervisory Attentional System. The suggestion was that
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poorly represented goal states would result in reduced generativity, increased
inhibition and perseveration and a lack of behavioural monitoring.
With regard to the generativity displayed by the savant group here. the results were
mixed and explanation of this pattern of results is proposed later in this chapter.
However. it can be concluded that where the response is not drawn. the savant artists
suffer from the same generative impairments as individuals with autism. This
supports previous findings discussed throughout and it is likely that the root of this
deficit is executive in nature and related to the Supervisory Attentional System. as
suggested by Jarrold (1997). A similar response pattern was indeed reported by
Turner (1997. 1999) in her thorough investigation into the generativity performance
of individuals with autism.
An autism-specific deficit was also indicated on the representational fluency measure
of the figural synthesis task. In some ways this poor performance can be considered
a monitoring deficit. in that the participants in the two groups with autism seemed
unable to produce a variety of acceptable results. It is interesting that on this task the
scores produced by the LDC group were consistently poor across all four conditions.
This contrasts with the performance of the two groups with autism, who only
displayed a clear drop in performance as the number of figures increased. In the case
of the LDC group it is likely that their consistently poor performance was due to the
effect of IQ distribution on performance, with the participants at the lower end of the
IQ rarely producing any recognisable responses. This suggestion is supported by the
strong correlation between IQ and representational fluency in this group. It was
proposed then, that a deficit in monitoring performance may account for the poor
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performance of the two groups with autism on this task, in that they were less able to
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable responses. Again this supports the
results of Jarrold (1997) and Turner (1999). It would appear that individuals with
autism are unable to amend a response when it is incorrect, as a result of external or
internal feedback. Thus, even when reminded that their answer must resemble a real
object, they continued to produce unrecognisable responses. To investigate the
suggestion that a monitoring impairment might result in poor performance on tasks of
generative and creative ability, it was necessary to test this process directly.
In order to investigate the executive abilities, with particular reference to monitoring
behaviour, two tests were presented to the three mixed intelligence groups. Initially
the design fluency task was used. This was a very useful task not only because it had
previously been found to discriminate between individuals with autism of both high
and low-functioning, but also as it took place in the domain of the savant's ability. It
was found that the savants made significantly less errors than the autism control group
on this measure. Indeed, the poor performance of the autism control group on this
task is consistent with previous reports of a monitoring impairment associated with
the disorder. What was interesting was that the artistic ability of the savant group
seemed to spare them from this. The next step was then to look at monitoring on a
task where the response was not related to the savant artists domain of ability. Here
the WeST was used and the performance of the savant group found to be equal to that
of the autism control group. It appears that when the output is drawn the savant artists
are able to monitor their outputs effectively, however, on tasks with no drawn element
they exhibit the same impairments as those with autism but without any special
artistic ability. This explanation neatly accounts for the autism-specific deficits found
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in this group on the figural synthesis construction task whereby participants did not
appear to be able to monitor their responses effectively.
8.4 THE WIDER PICTURE
The contribution of this thesis goes some way in extending our understanding of
artistic savants and their creative and generative capacities, however, there is the need
for some further explanation. The distinction made throughout this thesis between
creativity and generativity is an important one, as it appears that there is a playoff in
savant artists between creating novel, original outputs and generating a number of
acceptable responses. These two results will now be discussed in more detail as
related to the savant artists' spontaneous artistic productions. Firstly, this group of
artists do appear to produce more creative responses than their IQ matched control
groups, a conclusion based mainly on the results of the figural synthesis task. While a
critique of the methodology behind the TTCT has already been proposed there is one
more important criticism concerning the use of this test and this relates to the
specialist nature of savant artists' talent, specifically that the TTCT was designed as a
general test of creativity and thus may not pick up the specialist, visually based, skills
found in savant artists.
It is then interesting that their creative ability was picked up in the figural synthesis
task. The figural synthesis task has many similarities to the block design, a test where
savant artists have been consistently found to produce higher scores than non-talented,
autism control participants. As mentioned, both tasks require the individual to create
a whole out of parts and it is thus likely that the heightened segmentation, the capacity
to use this skill creatively and their superior manual dexterity, in part result in the
266
savant artists' ability. Indeed several case studies (Hermelin et al. 1999; Pring et al.,
1997; Sacks, 1995; Selfe, 1983) have reported the superior transformational abilities
apparent in several of these artists' productions. The heightened segmentation ability
possessed by these individuals may allow them to highlight different elements in their
outputs, resulting in more aesthetically appealing end products. Although many of
these artists need a constant visual aid to help them with their outputs, their artwork is
rarely a exact replica of what they see (Sacks, 1995). What is more, the production of
a piece of art work is dependent on the artist combining several elements in order to
produce a meaningful whole. As Hermelin et al. (1999) discuss in their case study of
artist Richard Wavro, he built up each element of a painting piece by piece, often
painting over images in the background.
Clearly, the creative aspects of these savants' spontaneous artistic productions are
quantifiable using scientific tests, as long as these tests are designed to pick up
creativity in the visual domain and not reliant on strong verbal responses.
Furthermore, this creativity is also apparent on tasks which do not involve an output
which is drawn. This final point is an important one; the creativity the savant artist
possesses is a perceptual one, it has a limited conceptual component and it is for this
reason that while these artists may be able to produce exceptionally accomplished
drawings and paintings, it is unlikely that they will ever produce a meaningful piece
of art. As Hermelin (2001) points out, despite an outstanding artistic ability the
savant artist will never produce a great masterpiece, in the same way that a savant
musician will never become a great composer. While their diagnosis of autism might
in many ways add to their ability, ultimately it is also the factor restricting them from
achieving true greatness.
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As discussed in detail, domain-specificity is an area very important to this
investigation. Several researchers have suggested that creative discovery or
production can only occur within the narrow field of an individual's expertise (see
Finke et al., 1992). However, certain cognitive strategies may promote creativity in
related areas. This certainly seems to be the case initially in the series of experiments
outlined here. Savant artists are often found to produce superior results to their non-
talented controls on tasks that involve a drawn response, as well as those with a strong
visual-motor component (see Hermelin, 2001 for a review). The explanation of
creativity above is in line with this view, however, while initially the results regarding
generative ability also support this notion, the explanation is not as simple as first
appears. The next discussion focuses on the autism-specific deficits found
throughout.
It was suggested that the superior creativity scores produced by the savant artists on
the figural synthesis task were related to their segmentation ability, and parallels were
drawn between this task and the block design. In line with the above points
concerning domain-specificity in creative performance, it can be argued that very
similar cognitive processes are at play in the two tests and that the processes are also
integral to artistic ability in general. However, while performance on the originality
measures relate to talent, performance on representational fluency and generativity
was determined by the savant artists' diagnosis of autism. The question then arises, if
this group of savant artists do posses superior segmentation skills on constructional
tasks and are better than non-talented controls at generating a whole out of parts as
measured on the block design, why is their performance on the other two measures of
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the figural synthesis task so poor? Surely if an overall monitoring deficit could
account for the poor performance on the figural synthesis task, as a result of
participants being unable to utilise visual feedback on a task that was not drawn, this
would also affect performance on the block design, regardless of the positive
facilitation that may arise as a result of their heightened segmentation?
The answer to the above question can be found in the emphasis of the two tasks
discussed above, in particular whether they are convergent or divergent. Support for
this view can also be found in the reported literature. Specifically it is suggested that
the tasks on which the savant group have produced superior results to the controls
(such as in the mirror drawing, the movement in 3-D space and the block design) all
have clearly outlined end goals. In the case of the mirror drawing task the goal was to
draw around a simple figure using the reflection in a mirror. For the movement in 3-
D space, participants were required to move a ring around a metal frame and on the
block design, they were required to create a 3-D construction of a visible 2-D image
(Hennelin et al., 1994; Pring at al., 1995). The key factor in each of these tasks,
above that of motor control, was that in each the goal of the task was clearly stated,
responses were either correct or incorrect and as such the tasks are considered
convergent. This was not the case in the figural synthesis task, here there were no
clearly defined right or wrong answers, it was the responsibility of each participant to
make a choice as to whether each response was a clear representation. As such the
performance of the savant group dropped in line with the autism control group. A
similar result was also gained on the WeST, a test of monitoring ability but with no
continuous motor component.
269
The suggestion that the savant artists display autism-related deficits with monitoring
behaviour in accordance with a goal state, is consistent with Jarrold's (1997)
explanation of the generativity deficit found in autism and also with the finding of a
generativity deficit in the savant artists. Nevertheless, while this explanation is
compatible with the results reported on measures of fluency and representational
fluency on the figural synthesis task, it cannot account for the fact that savant group
did not show any generative deficits on drawn responses. The finding that savant
artists produce superior results on tasks that include an element of drawing is
consistent with previous research (see chapter 5 for a full discussion of these tasks),
although there has yet to be a fully conceptualised account of this finding. The results
of this investigation indicate this ability is also generative in nature. So again, the
question arises, what is it that allows the savants to produce more generative
responses with less errors when the response is drawn?
Perhaps it is easier for this group of talented artists to set themselves goals in the
drawn domain. Certainly, as Thomas and Silk (1990) suggest, the act of producing a
piece of art work requires a goal to be set, even if that goal is as simple as to represent
an image on paper. Art is by definition a generative activity, therefore perhaps it is
not surprising that the savant artists are able to generate more in this domain, even if
they are generating images with no semantic associations, such as in the design
fluency. This may be in part due to them having a larger pictorial lexicon, or visual
dictionary (Hennelin, 2001), which certainly one would expect given their artistic
ability. They may also have better hand-eye co-ordination and as such are more able
to amend what they are drawing as they are drawing it.
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This last point brings us to the finding that the savant artists also produced fewer
mistakes in the design fluency task. This is interesting considering the points raised
above with regard to clearly specified goals, since as Turner (1999) states, the design
fluency task requires a considerable amount of monitoring. As the savants appeared to
have a problem with this on the figural synthesis task, it seems strange that their
performance should be so much better than the autism controls on the design fluency.
It is possible that the savant artists' familiarity with monitoring their drawn outputs
and their superior manual dexterity, may impact in a positive manner on their
performance. What is more, there is a qualitative difference, observable in the
performance of the figural synthesis and the design fluency tasks. In the design
fluency participants were required to draw consecutive responses until the time limit
had expired. Consequently it could be seen that the savant artists set themselves
short, individual goals, compared to the constantly changing role of the figures used
in the figural synthesis task. Perhaps the impairment arises because the participants
with autism were unable to update rules effectively in their minds, a necessary process
as they were required to use the same figures throughout.
Interestingly, a further difference between the two tasks relates to the points made at
the end of chapter 7 in which a study by Russell and Jarrold (1998) was discussed.
Here it was suggested that individuals with autism may show deficits at amending
internal and external errors. Although this hypothesis was not directly tested, it is
possible to extrapolate on the basis of the results gained in this series of studies that
the savant artists are able to internally monitor their drawn outputs. This may occur
as a result of the savant artists' superior visual schemas, but possibly being less able
to amend responses after they had been completed. What is fascinating in line with
271
this suggestion is the observation made in chapter 5, where it was recognised that both
groups with autism made less use of the 'trial and error' method when producing their
responses. That is they did not appear to internally monitor and simply named most
of the responses produced on the figural synthesis task, a result that could be seen as
evidence of an external monitoring deficit.
In relating the above discussion back to the spontaneous artistic outputs produced by
the savant artists, this account can go part of the way toward explaining why many of
the savant artists need a constant visual aid in order to help them paint and rarely draw
from imagination. As discussed in chapter 3, of the nine artists involved in this
research, only two regularly drew from their imagination or even from memory. The
remaining seven all require constant visual aids such as an image which they could
refer back to. It may be that only when the goal of their art work is immediately
apparent are they able to draw to the best of their ability, without this visual aid many
of the savant artists seem unable to set themselves goals regarding what to portray in
their output. A perfect illustration of this can be seen in the two examples of artwork
shown below produced by savant ML. The first, shown in figure 8.1, was produced
by ML following instruction from his art teacher to draw something that reminded
him of a recent holiday he had just returned from. Clearly the quality of this output is
nowhere near that of his usual standard, when he draws from photographs he has
taken.
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Figure 8.1: 'A holiday memory' produced by ML trom memory
Unusually for ML, the image in figure 8.2 was also drawn from his imagination,
however, this was drawn after being told a very detailed story about a broken
escalator. Following this story he was talked through what this scene might look like
by his art teacher and ways in which he could draw it. The fmal outcome still retains
ML's unique artistic style and can thus be seen as evidence of the creative nature of
his artistic ability. It also shows that with clear goal-setting he is able to draw
effectively from his imagination. It is unfortunate that this goal setting needs to be
governed by another person, rather than ML being able to do this by himself.
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Figure 8.2: 'Fallingdown' an original drawing produced byML !tom imagination
8.5 LIMITATIONS OF TIDS STUDY
One criticism that could be aimed at the studies reported in this thesis is that only
visual or drawing tasks were used to assess creative and generative capacity. Indeed,
there were several verbal tests that could have been used in this instance to gain a
wider picture. However, the measurement of generative ability on a verbal task, when
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these savants have visual skills, would have been inappropriate and the equivalent of
judging the creativity of a musician by asking him to paint a mural. As such the focus
of this thesis was on the area thought to be associated with the talent expressed.
The most significant limitation of this investigation was the large within-group IQ
range. Usually when research into the processes related to developmental disorders
such as autism is undertaken, individuals with similar levels of cognitive ability are
included. Such groups may include individuals with IQ scores of well below the
average or, more often, due to the ease of testing, individuals with normal IQ scores
are used. Some studies have utilised both groups at the same time in order to asses
the overall influence of intelligence on performance (see Turner, 1999). Never, or at
the very least rarely, are papers published reporting studies of non-talented individuals
with wide ranging scores in intelligence tests. The reason for this is clear; in order to
be sure that the results are due to autism related processes, all other variables must be
reduced. Unfortunately this study, like similar investigations into savant ability
before, could not follow that protocol. Savant syndrome is a rare occurrence, and as
such all individuals who fit the profile need to be included in research. In actual fact
this investigation of nine participants is one of the largest samples ever undertaken.
As autism is a severe developmental disorder affecting individuals of all levels of
cognitive functioning it is only natural to expect a wide range of IQ scores. To have
excluded any participants because of their intelligence in order to make the group
more homogeneous would have resulted in distorted results, which were
unrepresentative of the savant population, however small.
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The effect of overall cognitive functioning on performance is clear when the
performance of the LDC group across the tests is studied. Here, on almost every test
there was a very strong correlation between performance and IQ. Interestingly, such
correlations were never apparent in the savant group and very rare in the autism
control group. The range of IQ and it's effect on performance within the LDC group
is clearly visible when one looks at the large standard deviations that characterised the
results of this group, more so than the savant artists and the autism control group. Of
course, this wide IQ range had implications for the tasks used in this set of
experiments and in some cases it was felt that reducing the complexity of the task, in
order for it to be presentable to individuals at the lower end of the IQ range, actually
prevented group differences from occurring, such as on the EFT. However, it was felt
that in this instance the end justified the means, and as was discussed throughout, the
group differences on many of the tasks indicate that performance is not wholly a
result of intelligence. Indeed the lack of a general IQ to performance correlation in
the two groups with autism illustrates that deficits are found at all levels of cognitive
functioning, indicating deep-rooted impairments within these groups.
A further, associated limitation relates to the small number of participants in each
group and again there was little that could be done to rectify this. Some attempt was
made at the beginning of this study to include a larger group of savants by contacting
schools affiliated to the National Autistic Society, asking if they had any children at
the school who displayed a precocious artistic ability. While several positive replies
were received it was decided that it would be methodologically more sound to use a
group of adults for this study, rather than confusing matters more by using a mixed
range of ages and IQ's. It is nevertheless accepted that the small group numbers did
276
have serious implications on the statistical analysis presented throughout and, coupled
with the large standard deviations, often meant that full statistical investigations could
not be undertaken. One possibility for future research with less time constraints
would be to include control groups twice the size of the savant artist group to reduce
any variance and increase power. As it was, however, the participants were closely
matched on both verbal and performance intelligence in the two IQ matched control
groups. This was no mean feat in itself, and very time consuming to achieve.
With regard to the tests used in this investigation, a full critique has been presented
throughout in particular regarding the ITCT, which despite statements to the contrary
by Torrance (1974) appears be greatly influenced by general cognitive ability. Also
recognised were problems with the LOC group in the investigations into executive
function, particularly as several of the participants in this group were diagnosed with
mental health disorders associated with poor executive performance. While it would
have been possible to get results from different participants it was felt that it was
better in this instance to maintain consistency in the groups. Moreover, on tasks such
as the WCST, it was the performance of the savant group comparative to the autism
controls that was important. Finally, with hindsight it is accepted that there were
some tasks that might have been preferable to the WCST to measure monitoring
ability. However, in this instance it was necessary to use a task with no motor
element and as such the WCST seemed most appropriate. Also the WeST did look at
other areas of executive ability that were of interest and conclusions could still be
gleaned from the results gained on this task despite the limitations associated with it.
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8.6 FUTURE DIRECTION
So what can finally be concluded with regard to the creative and generative capacity
of these artists? How does this relate to their spontaneous artistic output? And where
does one go from here? From the experiments outlined in this thesis the following
conclusions were drawn with regard to the creative and generative capacity of this
group of savant artists. Firstly they only appear more generative than their non-
talented controls when the task is in the domain of drawing. They are also more
creative than those with similar intelligence but no artistic ability, possibly as a result
of their unusual processing style; a style favouring segmentation. However, their
performance on non-drawing tasks seems subject to the same deficits as found in non-
talented individuals, possibly as a result of their failure to monitor their performance
correctly when a clear goal is not set.
In chapter 2 several accounts of the creative process were outlined. Two which seem
particularly apt in this instance were presented by Perkins (1981) and Lehmann
(1991). Firstly Perkins argues that creativity involves four factors; planning,
abstracting, undoing and making means into ends. Lehmann proposed a three-factor
model of high ability; goal setting, evaluation and feedback. As such planning and
goal setting appear to be analogous and, as Trehub and Schellenberg (1998) argue.
savant artists do not seem to plan, evaluate or use feedback in their outputs. The
findings presented here indicate that savant performance was poor when the goals
were unspecified, indicating they have difficulty in selecting appropriate goals.
However, in their drawn outputs they did not show the same impairments as the
autism control group. It would appear then. that in their drawn output there is some
evidence of goal setting, if only as simple as to represent an image on paper.
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The other evaluative processes referred to by both Lehmann and Perkins do still seem
missing in this group, as evidenced by their lack of evaluation, and anecdotal accounts
that they do not amend their art work or actively seek to make it better (Hermelin,
2001). Finally, several descriptive case studies have referred to the creative
transformations which occur in their art work and this could be due to the unusually
segmented perceptual style that they exhibit, a style also associated with artistic
ability in general. It appears, from the results presented here, that this perceptual style
actually enables them to produce more creative responses, even outside of the domain
of their ability. Returning to the earlier point regarding goal-setting in autism, it is
interesting to note that of this group of savant artists, only one individual consistently
drew using pure imagination. The lack of purely imaginative outputs without direct
stimuli, may be the result of this poor goal specification. It may be that the savants
are unable to set themselves achievable goals to follow unless they know what they
are to draw, based on a visual input. Further research is warranted to look at the
actual artistic productions of the savants in this group and to identify how their
creativity may be manifest in their actual output. It is interesting in this respect, and
in line with the points made regarding the influence of IQ on creative ability, that the
savant artist who regularly draws only from imagination and often produces abstract
pieces, PM, has the highest IQ of the group.
One further area of experimental interest would be to look at the monitoring
performance of this group of savant artists on tasks which involve drawing following
specific feedback, or to assess their ability to use evaluation and monitoring in this
domain. Related to this and also of interest would be to investigate the points raised
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by Russell and Jarrold (1998); specifically to examine how this fits in with Jarrold's
suggestions that the impairments shown by individuals with autism relate to goal
representation or selection, and to attempt to assess if they do indeed show superior
visual schema's as a result of motor movement. Finally, further investigations are
warranted regarding the co-existence of a segmented visual processing style and
planning ability. Indeed planning was one area which was not covered in this set of
studies, mainly as it was not thought to be an underlying process associated with the
production of creative thought; nevertheless if planning affects the production and
output of creative thought then is it an important area for study.
These investigations will give us more insight into the processes underlying the
performance of these fascinating individuals.
280
References
Ameli, R., Courchesne, E., Lincolm, A., Kaufman, AS., & Grillon, C. (1988).
Visual memory processes in high-functioning individuals with autism. Child
Developmeni. Is, 1127-1137.
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
Anastasti, A, & Leeve, R. (1960). Intellectual deficit and musical talent: A case
report. American Journal of mental deficiency, 64,695-703.
Anderson, M. (1992). Intelligence and development: A cognitive theory. Oxford:
Blackwell Scientific Publications.
Anderson, M. (1998). Mental retardation general intelligence and modularity.
Learning and Individual Differences, J 0, 159-178.
Anderson, R. E., & Helstrup, T. (1993). Visual discovery in mind and on paper.
Memory & Cognition, 21, 283-293.
Anzai, Y., & Simon, H. A (1979). The theory of learning by doing. Psychological
Reivew,86, 124-140.
281
Atlas, J. A. (1990). Play in assessment and intervention in the childhood psychoses.
Child Psychiatry and Human Development, 21, 119-33.
Baer, J. (1998). The case for domain specificity of creativity. Creativity Research
Journal, 11, 173-177
Bailey, A., Le Couteur, A., Gottesman, I.,Bolton, P., Simonoff, E., Yuzda, E., &
Rutter, M. (1995). Autism as a strongly genetic disorder: Evidence from a British
twin study. Psychological Medicine, 25, 63-78.
Bailey, A., Phillips, W., & Rutter, M. (1996). Autism: Towards an integration of
clinical, genetic, neuropsychological, and neurobiological perspectives. Journal of
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 37, 89-126.
Baron R. A. (1989). Psychology: The essential science. London: Allyn Bacon.
Barron, F. (1963). Creativity and Psychological Health. New York: Von Nostrand.
Barron, F., & Harrington, D. M. (1981). Creativity, intelligence and personality.
Annual Review of Psychology, 32,439-476.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1987). Autism and symbolic play. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 5, 139-148.
282
Baron-Cohen. S. (1995). Mindblindness: an essay on autism and theory of mind
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Baron-Cohen. S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have
theory of mind? Cognition, 21, 37-46.
Bartak, L. Rutter, M., & Cox, A. (1975). A comparative study of infantile autism and
specific developmental receptive language disorder: I.The children. British Journal
of Psychiatry, 126, 127-145.
Bell, E. T. (1965). Men of mathematics. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Bennetto, L., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. 1. (1996). Intact and impaired memory
functions in autism. Child Development, 67, 1816-1835.
Berger, R. M. & Guildford, J. P. (1960). Plot lilies. California: Sheridon
Psychological Services.
Boden. M. A. (1994) What is creativity? InM.A. Boden, (Ed.). Dimensions of
creativity (pp. 75-117). Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press ..
Boucher, J. (1988). Word fluency in high-functioning autistic children. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 18,637-645.
283
Brace, N., Kemp, R., & Snelgar, R. (2000). SPSSfor psychologists. A guide to data
analysis using SPSSfor windows. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
Brian, J. A. & Bryson, S. E. (1996). Dissembedding performance and recognition
memory in autism /PDD. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 37, 865-87.
Bryson, J. A. (1983). Interference effects in autistic children: Evidence for the
comprehension of single stimuli. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 92, 250-254.
Cattell, R. B. (1956). Objective Test Battery. Champaign, Ill.: Institute for
Personality and Ability Testing.
Charla, N. K. (1985). Creativity and cognitive style. Psycho-lingua, 15,81-88.
Charman, T., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1993). Drawing development in autism: The
intellectual to realism shift, British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 11, 171-
185.
Chase, C.1. (1985). Review of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. In J. V.
Mitchell Jr. (Ed.), The ninth mental measurements yearbook (pp. 1631-1632).
Lincoln: Buros Institute of Mental Measurement.
Chamess, N., Clifton, J., & Mcdonald, L. (1989). Case study of a musical mono-
savant: A cognitive-psychological focus. In L. Obler & D. Fein (Eds.), The
exceptional brain. (pp.277-293). New York: Guildford
284
Christensen, P. R., Merrifield, P. R., & Guildford, J. P. (1958). Consequences.
California: Sheridon Psychological Services.
Christensen, P. R., Guildford, J. P., Merrifield, P. R., & Wilson, R. C. (1960).
Alternate Uses. California: Sheridon Psychological Services.
Clapham, M. M. (1998). Structure of figural forms a and b of the Torrance tests of
creative thinking, Educational and Psychological Measurement, 58, 275-283.
Costall, A. (1997). Innocence and corruption: conflicting images of child art.
Human Development, 40, 133-144.
Craig, J., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). Creativity and imagination in autism and
Asperger syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29, 319-326.
Craig, J., Baron-Cohen, S., & Scott, F. (2001). Drawing ability in autism: A window
into the imagination. Israeli journal of Psychiatry, 38, 242-253.
Detterman, D.K. (1993). Discussion. In G. R. Bock & K. Ackrille (Eds.), Ciba
Foundation Symposium J 78: The origins and development of high ability. New York:
Whiley.
Down, J. L. (1987). On some mental afflictions of childhood and youth. London:
Churchill.
285
Duckett. J. (1976). Idiot-savants: super-specialisation in mentally retarded persons.
Doctoral dissertation. Austin, University of Texas.
Duncan, J. (1986). Disorganisation of behaviour after frontallohe damage.
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 3, 271-290.
Dunn, L. M., & Dunn, L. M. (1997). Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. MN, USA:
American Guidance Service.
Dworker, A., Hennelin, B., & O'Connor, N. (1996). A savant poet, Psychological
Medicine, 26, 913-934.
Erricsson, K. A. & Faivre, I.A. (1988). What's exceptional about exceptional
abilities? In L. K. Obler & D. Fien (Eds.), The exceptional brain. UK: Guildford
Press.
Eysenck, H. J. (1995). Genius: The natural history of creativity. Cambridge, UK.:
Cambridge University Press.
Farber, J. & Rosinski, R. R. (1978). Geometric transformations of pictured space.
Perception, 7, 269-282.
Feldman, D. H., & Katzir, T. (1998). Natural Talents: An argument for extremes.
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 21, 414-415.
286
Finke, R. A (1986). Mental Imagery and the visual system. Scientific American,
254,88-95
Finke, R. A. (1989). Principles a/mental imagery. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
Finke, R. A. (1990). Creative Imagery: Discoveries and inventions in visualisations.
Hillsdale, NJ.:Erlbaum.
Finke, R. A. & Shepard, R.N. (1986). Visual functions of mental imagery. In K. R.
Boff, L. Kaufman, & J. Thomas (Eds.), Handbook of perception and human
performance (Vol. 2). New York: Wiley-Interscience.
Finke, R. A., Ward, T. B., & Smith, S. M. (1992). Creative Cognition. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
Finke, R. A. & Slayton, K. (1988). Explorations of creative visual synthesis in
mental imagery. Memory and Cognition, 16, 252-257.
Fodor, J. A. (1983). Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Frith, U. (1970). Studies in pattern detection in normal and autistic children: II.
Reproduction of colour sequences. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 10,
120-135
Frith, U. (1989). Autism: explaining the enigma. Oxford: Basil Blackwood
287
Frith, U., & Happe, F. G. E. (1994). Autism: Beyond "theory of mind". Cognition,
50, 115-132.
Frith, U., & Hennelin, B. (1969). The role of visual and motor cues for nonnaI,
subnonnaI and autistic children. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 10,
153-163.
Frith, U. & Snowling, M. (1983). Reading for meaning and reading for sound in
autistic and dyslexic children. Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1, 329-342.
Gardener, H. (1982). Art, Mind, and brain: A cognitive approach to creativity. New
York: Basic Books.
Gardener, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New
York: Basoc Books.
Getzels, 1. W., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1976). The creative vision: A longditudinal
study of problem finding in art. New York: Wiley.
Getzels, J. W. & Jackson, P. W. (1962). Creativity and Intelligence. New York:
Wiley
Gombrich, E. H. (1988). Western art and the perception of space: Estratto da 'storia
dell arte ', London, UK: Phaidon.
288
Goldman, R. S., Axlerod, B. N. & Tomkins, L.M. (1992). Effect of instrumental
cues on schizophrenic patients performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 1718-1722.
Grant, D. A., & Berg, E. A. (1948). A behavioural analysis of the degree of
reinforcement and ease of shifting to new responses in a Weigle-type card sorting
problem. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 404-411.
Griffith, E. M., Pennington, B. F., Wehner, E. A., & Rogers, S. J. (1999). Executive
functions in young children with autism. Child Development, 70,817-832., 70, 817-
832.
Guildford, 1. P. (1950). Creativity. American Psychologist, 5, 444-454.
Guildford, J. P. (1956). The structure of intellect. Psychological Bulletin, 53, 267-
293.
Happe, F. G. E. (1994a). Wechsler IQ profuile and theory of mind in autism - a
research note. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 35, 1461-1471.
Happe, F. G. E. (1994b). Autism: An introduction to psychological theory.
Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
289
Happe, F. G. E. (1996). Studying weak central coherence at low levels: Children
with autism do not succumb to visual illusions. A research note. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 37,873-877.
Happe, F. G. E. (1997). Central coherence and theory of mind in autism: reading
homographs in context, British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 14, 1-12.
Happe, F. G. E. (1999). Autism: Cognitive deficit or cognitive style? Trends in
Cognitive Science, 3, 216-222.
Hart, R. P., Kwentus, J. A, Harkins, S. W., & Taylor, J. R. (1988). Rate of forgetting
inmild alzheimers-type dementia. Brain and Cognition, 7, 31-38.
Hartley, J. & Greggs, M. A. (1997). Divergent thinking in arts and science students:
Conrary Imaginations at Keele revisited. Studies in Higher Education, 22,93-97.
Heaton, R. K. (1981). Wisconsin Card Sort Test Manual. Colorado: Psychological
Assessment Resources.
Heaton, P., Hermelin, B., & Pring, L. (1998). Autism and pitch processing: A
precursor for savant ability? Music perception, 15, 291-305
Heaton, P., Hermelin, B., & Pring, L. (1999). A pseudo-savant: a case of exceptional
musical splinter skills. Neurocase, 5, 503-509.
290
Heausler, N. L. & Thompson, B. {I988). Structure of the Torrance Tests of Creative
Thinking. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 48, 463-469.
Heavey, L. (1997). Memory in the calendar calculating savant. Unpublished
doctoral thesis, University of London, London, UK
Heavey, L., Hennelin, B., & Pring, L. (1999). A date to remember: The nature of
memory in savant calendrical calculators. Psychological Medicine, 29, 145-160.
Helstrup, R. H., & Logie, T. (1999). Introduction. European Journal of Cognitive
Psychology, 11, 289-293.
Hermelin, B. (2001). Bright splinters of the mind. London: Jessica Kinsgley
Hermelin, B.& O'Connor, N. (1967). Remembering of words by psychotic and
subnormal children. British Journal of Psychology, 58, 213-218.
Hermelin, B. & O'Connor, N. (1970). Psychological experiments with autistic
children. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Hermelin, B. & O'Connor, N. (1986a). Idiot savant calendrical calculators: rules and
regularities. Psychological Medicine, 16, 885-893.
291
Hermelin, B. & O'Connor, N. (1986b). Spatial representation in mathematically and
artistically gifted children. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 56, 150-157.
Hermelin, B. & O'Connor, N. (199Oa). Art and accuracy: The drawing ability of
idiots savants. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 31,217-228.
Hermelin, B., O'Connor, N., & Lee, S. (1987). Musical inventiveness of five
musical idiots-savants. Psychological Medicine, 17, 658-694.
Hermelin, B., O'Connor, N., Lee, S., & Treffert, D. A. (1989). Intelligence and
musical improvisation. Psychological Medicine, 19,447-457.
Hermelin, B., & Pring, L. (1998). The pictorial context dependency of savant artists:
A research note. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 87, 995-1001.
Hermelin, B., & Pring, L., Buhler, M., Wolff, S., & Heaton, P. (1999). A visually
impaired savant artist: Interacting perceptual and memory representations. Journal of
Child Psychiatry and Psychology, 7, 1129-1139.
Hermelin, B., Pring, L., & Heavey, L. (1994). Visual and motor functions in
graphically gifted savants, Psychological Medicine, 24, 673-680.
Hill, A. L. (1977). Idiots-savants: Rate of incidence. Perceptual and Motor Skills,
44, 161-162.
292
Hill, A. L. (1978). Savants, mentally retarded individuals with special skills. In N.
Ellis (Ed.), International review of research in mental retardation. New York:
Academic Press. 277-298.
Hocevar, D. (1979a). Ideational fluency as a confounding factor in the measurement
of originality. Journal of Educational Psychology. 71, 191-196.
Hocevar, D. (1980). Intelligence, divergent thinking and creativity. Intelligence.
1980, 4, 25-40.
Hocevar, D. (1981). Measurement of creativity: Review and critique. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 45, 450-464.
Hocevar, D., & Michael, W. B. (1979). The effects of scoring formulas on the
discriminant validity of tests of divergent thinking. Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 39, 917-921.
Hoffman. E. (1971). The idiot savant: A case report and review of explanations.
Mental retardation, 9, 18-21.
Howe, M. A. J. (1989a). Fragments of Genius: The strange feats of idiots savants.
London: Routledge.
Howe. M. A. J. (1989b). The strange achievements of idiots savants. In A. M.
Colman & J. G. Beaumont. Psychological Survey 7. London: Routledge.
293
Howe, M. A. J. (1990). The origins of exceptional ability. London: Blackwell
Howe, M. J. A., Davidson, J. W., & Sloboda, J.A. (1998). Innate talents: Reality or
myth? Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 21, 399-342.
Hughes, C. & Russell, 1. (1993). Autistic children's difficulty with mental
disengagement from an object: Its implications for theories of autism.
Developmental Psychology, 29, 498-510.
Hughes, C. Russell, J. & Robbins, T. R. (1994). Evidence for executive dysfunction
in autism. Neuropsychologica, 32, 477-92.
Jarrold, C., (1997). Pretend play in autism: executive explanations. In J. Russell
(Ed.), Autism as an executive disorder (pp. 101-140). Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Jarrold, C., Boucher, 1.,& Smith, P (1996). Generativity deficits in pretend play in
autism. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 14, 275-300.
Jarrold, C., Boucher, J., & Smith, P. K. (1994a). Executive function deficits and the
pretend play of children with autism: A research note. Journal of Child Psychology
and Psychiatry, 35, 1473-1482
Jarrold, C., Boucher, J., & Smith, P. K. (1994b). Pretend play: Is it representational?
Mind and Language, 9, 445-68.
294
Jarrold, C., Boucher, J., & Smith, P. K. (1994c). Comprehension of pretense in
children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24, 433-55.
Jarrold, C., Butler, D. W., Cottington, E. M., & Jimenez, F. (2000). Linking theory
of mind and central coherence in the general population. Developmental Psychology,
36, 126-138.
Jarrold, C., & Russell, J. (1997). Counting abilities in autism: Possible implications
for central coherence theory. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 27,
25-37.
Jones-Gotman, M., & Milner, B. (1977). Design fluency: The invention of nonsense
drawings after focal cortical lesions. Neuropsychologia, 15, 635-674.
Jolliffe, T., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1997). Are people with autism and Asperger
Syndrome faster than normal on the embedded figures test? Journal Of Child
Psychology And Psychiatry, 37, 873-877.
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1990). Constraints of representational change- Evidence from
children's drawings. Cognition,34. 57-83.
Kinget, O. (1953). Personality assessment. International House Quarterly, 17, 69-
76.
Koestler, A. (1964). The Act a/Creation. London: Hutchinson.
295
La Fontaine, L. (1974). Divergent abilities in the idiot-savant. Unpublished Ed.D
dissertation, Boston University School of Education.
Leevers, H. J., & Harris, P. L. (1998). Drawing impossible entities: A measure of
imagination in children with autism, children with learning disabilities, and normal 4-
year-olds. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 39, 399-410.
Leslie, A. M. (1987). Pretence and representation: The origins of 'theory of mind' .
Psychological Review, 94, 412-426.
Lewis, V., & Boucher, J. (1988). Spontaneous, instructed and elicited play in
relatively able autistic children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 6,
325-339.
Lewis, V., & Boucher, J. (1991). Skill, content and generative strategies in autistic
children's drawings. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 393-416.
Lezack, M. D. (1995). Neuropsychological assessment (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Lehmann, A. C. (1997). Acquisition of expertise inmusic: Efficiency of deliberate
practise as a moderating variable in accounting for sub-expert performance. In J. A.
Sloboda & I Deliege Perception and cognition a/music. NJ.: Erlbaum
296
Lindsley, O. R. (1965). Can deficiency produce specific superiority? The challenge
of the idiot savant. Exceptional Child, 31, 225-232
Liss, M., Fein, D., Allen, D., Dunn, M., Feinstein, C., Morris, R., Waterhouse, L.,
Rapin, I. (1999). Executive functioing in high functioing children with autism.
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42, 261-270.
Lloyd-Bostock, S. M. A. (1979). Convergent thinking and arts-science orientation.
British Journal of Psychology, 70, 155- 163.
Lockyear. L., & Rutter, M. (1970). A five- to fifteen-year follow-up study of
infantile psychosis: IV. Patterns of cognitive ability. British Journal of Social &
Clinical Psychology, 9, 152-163.
Lord, C. & Bailey, A. (2002). Autism spectrum disorders. In M. Rutter & E. Taylor
(Eds.) Child and adolescent psychiatry (pp. 636-664). Oxford: Blackwell Science.
Lord, C., Rutter, M., & DiLavore, M. (1998). Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule, Los Angeles, CA.: Western Psychological Services.
Martindale, C. (1994). How can we measure a society's creativity? In M. Boden,
(Ed.). Dimensions of creativity. (pp. 159-197). Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press.
Maestrini, E., Paul, A., Monaco, A. P. & Bailey, A. (2000) Identifying autism
susceptibility genes. Neuron, 28, 19-24.
297
Mednick, S. A. (1962). The associative basis of creativity. Psychological Review,
69, 220-232.
Miller, L. (1987). Sensitivity to tonal structure in a developmentally disabled
musical savant. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 91, 467-471.
Miller, L. (1989). Musical savants: Exceptional skills in the mentally retarded.
Hillsdale, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Miller, L. (1999). The savant syndrome: Intellectual impairment and exceptional
skill. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 31-46.
Minshew, N. J., Goldstien, G., Muenz, L. R., & Payton, J. B. (1992).
Neuropsychological functioning in nonmentally retarded autistic individuals. Journal
of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 14,749-761.
Minshew, N. J., Goldstien, G., & Seigal, D. J. (1995). Speech and language in high
functioning autistic individuals. Neuropsychology, 9, 255-261.
Mottron, L. & Belleville, S. (1993). A study of perceptual analysis in a high-level
autistic subject with exceptional graphic abilities. Brain and Cognition, 23, 279-309.
Mottron, L., & Belleville, S. (1995). Perspective production in a savant autistic
draughtsman, Psychological Medicine, 25,639-648.
298
Mottron, L.. Belleville, S., & Menard, E. (1999). Local bias in autistic subjects as
evidenced by graphic tasks: perceptual hierarchization or working memory deficit?
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 40, 743-755.
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees: the precedence of global features in visual
perception. Cognitive Psychology, 9,353-383.
Neblett, D. R., Finke. R. A. & Ginsburg, H. (1989). Creative visual discoveries in
physical and mental synthesis. Unpublished manuscript
Nelson, H. E. (1976). A modified card sort test sensitive to frontal lobe deficits.
Cortex, 12, 313-324.
Nettlebeck, T., & Young, R. (1996). Intelligence and the savant syndrome: Is the
whole greater than the sum of the fragments. Intelligence, 22, 49-68.
Newell. A, Shaw, J. C., & Simon, H. (1962). The process of creative thinking. In H.
E. Gruber, G. Terrell & M. Wertheimer (Eds.), Contemporary approaches to creative
thinking. New York: Atherton Press.
Noppe-Lloyd, D. & Gallagher, J. M., (1977). A cognitive style approach to creative
thought. Journal of Personality Assessment, 14, 85-90.
299
Norman. D. A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic
control of behaviour. InR. J. Davidson, G. E. Shwartz, & D. Shapiro (Eds.),
Consciousness and se/fregulation, Vol.4. NewYork: Plenum Press.
Nurcombe, B., & Parker, N. (1964). The idiot savant. American Academy of Child
Psychiarty, 3, 277-291.
O'Connor, N., & Hermelin, B. (1975). Modality-specific spatial co-ordinates.
Perceptual Psychology, 17,213-216.
O'Connor, N., & Hermelin, B. (1983). The role of general ability and specific talents
in information processing. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1, 389-403.
O'Connor, N., & Hermelin, B. (1987a). Visual and graphic abilities of the idiot-
savant artist, Psychological Medicine, 17, 79-90.
O'Connor, N., & Hermelin, B. (l987b). Visual memory and motor programmes:
Their use by idiot-savant artists and controls. British Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 78, 307-323.
O'Connor, N., & Hermelin, B. (1989). The memory structure of autistic idiot savant
mnemonists. British Journal of Psychology, 80, 97-111.
O'Connor, N., & Hermelin, B. (1990). The recognition failure and graphic success
of idiot-savant artists, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 31, 203-215.
300
O'Connor, N., & Hennelin, B. (1991). Talents and preoccupations in idiots savants.
Psychological Medicine, 21,959-964.
Ozonoff, S. (1997). Components of executive function in autism and other disorders.
In J. Russell (Ed.), Autism as an executive disorder (pp.57-1OO). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ozonoff, S., & Jensen, J. (1999). Brief report: Specific executive profiles in three
developmental disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29, 171-
177.
Ozonoff, S., & McEvoy, R. E. (1994). A longditudinal study of executive function
and theory of mind development in autism. Development and Psychopathology, 6,
415-431.
Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. 1. (1991). Executive function deficits in
high-functioning autistic individuals: Relationship to theory of mind. Journal of
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 1081-1105.
Paine, S. (1981). Six children draw. London: Academic Press.
Perkins, D. N. (1981). The mind's best work. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University
Press.
30)
Plucker, 1. A. (1999). Is the proof in the pudding? Reanalysis of Torrance's (1958 to
present) longditudinal data. Creativity Research Journal, 12,103-114.
Pressing, O. (1989). Improvisation: Methods and models. In 1. Sloboda (Ed.)
Generative processes in music (pp. 129-178). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pring, L., & Hermelin, B. (1993). Bottle, tulip, wineglass: Semantic and structural
picture processing by savant artists. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry. 34,
1365-1385.
Pring, L., & Hermelin, B., Buhler, M., & Walker, I. (1997). Native savant talent and
acquired skill. Autism. 1. 199-214.
Pring, L., Hermelin, B., & Heavey, L. (1995). Savants, segments, art and autism.
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry. 36, 1065-1076.
Raven, 1. C. (1986). Raven's Coloured Matrices. London: H. K. Lewis & Co.
Raven, 1. C., Court, J., & Raven, J. (1988). Standard Progressive Matrices. London,
UK.: H. K. Lewis.
Riguet, C. B., Taylor, N. D., Benaroya, S., & Klien, L. S. (1981). Symbolic play in
autistic, Down's and normal children of equivalent mental age. Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 11, 439-448.
302
Rimland, B. (1964). Infantile autism. The syndrome and its implication for neural
theory of behaviour. New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts.
Rimland, B. (1978). Savant capabilities of autistic children and their cognitive
implications. In Cognitive defects in the development of mental illness, G. Serban
(Ed.). (pp43-65). New York: Bruner / Mazel.
Reber. A. S. (1985). The Penguin dictionary of psychology, (2Dd ed.). London:
Penguin
Ropar, D., & Mitchell, P. (1999). Are individuals with autism and Asperger's
Syndrome susceptible to visual illusions? Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 40, 1283-1293.
Ropar, D., & Mitchell, P. (2001). Susceptibility to illusions and performance on
visuospatial tasks in individuals with autism. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 42, 539-549.
Rossell, S. L., & David, A. S. (1997). Improving performance on the WeST:
variations on the original procedure, Schizophrenia Research, 28, 63-76.
Rumsey, J. M., & Hamburger, S. D. (1988). Neuropsychological findings in high-
functioning men with infantile autism residual state. Journal of Clinical and
Experimental Neuropsychology, 10, 201-221.
303
Rumsey, 1. M., & Hamburger, S. D. (1990). Neuropsychological divergence of high-
level autism and severe dyslexia. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders,
20, 155-168.
Russell, 1. (1997), Autism as an executive disorder. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Russell, J., & Jarrold, C. (1998). Error-correction in autism: Evidence for monitoring
impairment? Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 28, 177-188.
Russell, J., Jarrold, C., & Henry, L. (1996). Working memory in autism. Journal of
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 37, 673-686.
Rutter, M. (1998). What can we learn from highly developed skills? Brain and
behavioural sciences, 21,422-423.
Ryder, N., Pring, P., & Hermelin, B. (unpublished manuscript). segmentation and
divergent thinking: two sides of the same coin. Goldsmiths College.
Sacks, O. (1986). The man who mistook his wife for a hat. London: Duckworth.
Sacks, O. (1995). An anthropologist on mars. London: Picador.
Scott, F. J., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1996). Imagining real and unreal things: Evidence
of dissociation in autism. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 8, 371-382.
304
Selfe, L. (1977). Nadia: A case of extraordinary drawing ability in an autistic child.
London: Academic Press
Selfe, L. (1983). Normal and anomalous representational drawing ability in
children. London: Academic Press.
Shah, A. & Frith, U. (1983). An islet of ability in autistic children: a research note.
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 24,613-620.
Shah, A & Frith, U. (1993). Why do autistic children show superior performance on
the Block Design task? . Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 34, 1351-1364.
ShaJlice, T. (1982). Specific impairments in planing. In D. E. Broadbent & L.
Weiskrantz (Eds.). The neuropsychology of cognitive function (pp. 199-209).
London: The Royal Society.
Shallice, T. (1988). From Neuropschology to mental structure. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Shall ice, T. (1994). Multiple levels of control processes. Attention and
Performance, 15, 395-420.
Sballice, T., & Burgess, P. (1991). Higher-order cognitive impairments and frontal
lobe lesions in man. In H. S. Levin, H. M. Eisenberg, & A. L. Benton (Eds.), Fronal
lobe functioning and dysfunction (pp. 124-138). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
305
Shepard, R. N. (1978). Externalisation of mental images and the act of creation. In
B. S. Randhawa & W. E. Coffman (Eds.), Visual/earning, thinking and
communication. New York: Academic Press.
Shepard, R. N. (1988). The imagination of the scientist. In K. Egan & D. Nadaner
(Eds.), Imagination and education. New York: Teachers College Press.
Sloboda, J., Hennelin, B., & O'Connor, N. (1985). An exceptional musical memory.
Musical Perception, 3, 155-170.
Smith, S. M., & Vela, E. (1991). Incubated reminiscence effects. Bulletin of the
psychonomic society, 19, 168-172
Smith, S. M., Ward, T. B., & Schumacher, J. S. (1991). Contrasting effects 0/
examples in a creative generative task. Paper presented at the Texan Cognition
Conference, College Station, TIC
Spearman, C. (1904). General intelligence, objectively determined and measured.
American Journal of Psychology, 15,201-293.
Spearman, C. (1927). The abilities of man. New York: Macmillan.
Steffenburg, S. & Gillberg, C. (1986). Autism and autistic-like conditions in
Swedish rural and urban areas: a population study. British Journal of Psychiatry, 149,
81-87.
306
Taylor, C. W. (1964). Creativity: Progress and potential. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Temple, C. (1997). Developmental cognitive neuropsychology. Hove: Psychological
Press.
Thompson. A. L.. & Klatzky, R. L. (1978). Studies of visual synthesis: Integration of
fragments into forms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 4, 244-263.
Thomas, O. V., & Silk, A. M. J. (1990). An introduction to the psychology of
children's drawings. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Torrance, E. P. (1974). The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking: Norms-technical
manual. Bensenville, IL.: Scholastic Testing Service.
Tregold, A. F. (1947). A text book of mental deficiency. London: Balliere, Tindall and
Cox.
Trehub, S. E., & Schellenberg, E. 0., (1998). Cultural determinism is no better than
biological determinism. Brain and Behavioural Sciences, 21,427-428.
Treffinger, D. J. (1985). Review of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. In J. V.
Mitchell Jr. (Ed.), The ninth menial measurements yearbook (pp. 1631-1632).
Lincoln: Buros Institute of Mental Measurement.
307
Treffert, D. A. (1989). Extraordinary people. Understanding "idiot-savants". New
York: Bantam.
Turner, M.A. (1995). Stereotyped behaviour in autism. Unpublished doctoral
thesis, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK.
Turner, M.A. (1997). Towards an executive dysfunction account of repetitive
behaviour in autism. In J. Russell (Ed.), Autism as an executive disorder (pp.57-
100). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Turner, M. A. (1999). A. Generating novel ideas: Fluency performance in high-
functioning and learning disabled individuals with autism. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 40, 189-201.
Van Sommers. P. (1984). Drawing and cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Van Sommers, P. (1989). A System for drawing and drawing related
neuropsychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 6, 117-164.
Vernon, P. E. (1964). Creativity and intelligence. Educational Research, 6, 163-
196.
Vernon. P. E. (1970). Creativity. Baltimore, MD.: Penguin.
308
Vernon, P. E. (1989). The nature nurture problem in creativity. In J. A Glover & R.
R. Royce (Eds.) Handbook of creativity. Perspectives on individual differences
(pp.93-110). New York: Plenum Press.
Wallach, M. A (1976). Tests tell us little about talent. American Scientist, 13,57-63.
Wallach, M. A, & Kogan, N. (1965). Modes of thinking in young children. New
York:
Ward, T. B. (1991a). Structured imagination: The role of conceptual Structure in
exemplar generation. Paper presented at the meeting of the Psychonomic Society,
San Francisco. In R. A. Finke. T. B. Ward, S.M Smith. (1992). (Eds.) Creative
Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Ward, T. B. (1991b). Structured Imagination in film: The case of Star Wars.
Unpublished manuscript. In R. A. Finke, T. B. Ward, S.M Smith, (1992). (Eds.)
Creative Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Welsh, M., & Pennington, B. F. (1988). Assessing frontal lobe functioning in
children: Views from developmental psychology, Developmental Neuropsychology, 4,
199-230.
Wing, L. (1979). The current status of childhood autism. Psychological Medicine, 9,
9-12.
309
Wing, L., & Gould, J. (1979). Severe impairments of social interaction and
associated abnormalities in children: Epidemiology and classification. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders. 9. 11-29.
Winner, E. (1996). Gifted Children: Myths and realities. New York: Basic Books
Winner, E. (1998). Talent: Don't confuse necessity with sufficiency, or science with
policy. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 21, 430-431.
Witkin, H.A., Oltman. P. K.• Raskin. E., & Karp, S. (1971). A manual for the
Embedded Figures Test. California: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Yamanda, H., & Tam, A. Y. (1996). Prediction study of adult creative achievement:
Torrance's longditudinal study of creativity revisited. Journal of Creative Behaviour,
30, 144-149.
Young, R. L. (1995). Savant syndrome: Processes underlying extraordinary
abilities. Unpublished Doctoral thesis, University of Adelaide, South Australia.
Young, R. L., & Nettlebeck, T. (1995) The abilities ofa musical savant and his
family. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 25, 231-248.
3]0
Appendix J: Individual IQ scores and personal characteristics of the
autism control group
Match for Year of Birth Diagnosis PIQ VIQ
CH 1962 Autism 55 73
CM 1968 High functioning autism 98 78
DP 1955 Asperger's 72 63
MD 1978 Asperger's 94 92
ML 1965 Autism 90 84
PM 1965 Asperger's 105 110
SQ 1966 Autism 72 73
SW 1975 Autism 65 80
TM 1970 Asperger's 87 103
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Appendix 2: Individual IQ scores and personal characteristics of the
LDCgroup
Match for Year of Birth Diagnosis PIQ VIQ
CH 1969 Downs Syndrome 55 68
CM 1965 Epilepsy 106 104
DP 1965 Down's Syndrome 82 68
MD 1980 Mental Health 100 98
ML 1967 Mental Health 88 91
PM 1965 Dyslexia 118 120
SQ 1963 Global Learning Delay 76 83
SW 1973 Down's Syndrome 68 87
TM 1970 Mental Health 78 114
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